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Foreword
Foreword
It is an honour and pleasure that I have been invited to 
be the guest editor of the second issue of Studies in Agricul-
tural Economics in 2018. This is a thematic issue organised 
around the future of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
the debating of which is already well underway in many dif-
ferent forums around Europe. One of such forums was the 
162nd EAAE Seminar, titled ‘The evaluation of new CAP 
instruments: Lessons learned and the road ahead’, held in 
Budapest on 26-27 April, 2018, where I was the Head of the 
Local Organising Committee. 
This issue contains selected papers from the seminar 
together with regularly submitted papers on the topic. The 
first paper, written by Swinbank, sets the scene and shows 
how past CAP reforms have been incomplete with high tar-
iffs on selected products distorting resource use in the Euro-
pean agricultural sector, imposing extra costs on European 
consumers and frustrating overseas suppliers. Swinbank 
argues that now it is time to complete CAP reform and shows 
how tariffs, trade and CAP reforms have been interrelated.
The second paper, written by Czyzewski and Matuszczak, 
also provides a holistic view on the CAP and investigates 
what rent-seeking behaviour in agricultural policy looks like 
in Europe. By proposing an original methodology for valu-
ing political rents, their results suggest that traditional rent-
seeking behaviour is not valid in the CAP and that historical 
payments are neither a rational nor a just solution.
In the third paper, Szerletics investigates another impor-
tant point of the debate on the future of the CAP – the poten-
tial impacts of degressivity and capping on European farm 
structures -by bringing new evidence from Hungary. After 
reviewing the relevant literature of the topic, data and new 
evidence shows that placing a cap on direct payments may 
be causing more harm than good by encouraging farms to 
split their land in Europe where land use patterns are in any 
case fragmented (if not dual, in many places). 
The fourth paper, written by Wrzaszcz, analyses the 
effectiveness of greening in Poland by using FADN panel 
data of 7400 private farms in Poland. This approach is highly 
needed as evidence on the potential effects of greening is 
currently scarce in the literature. Results of this paper sug-
xvi
gest that Polish farms have adapted well to greening require-
ments and the new system has not caused production and 
profitability of Polish farms to decrease in 2015.
The remaining three papers suggest evidence for research-
ers and policy makers interested in the CAP from an ‘out-
sider’ point of view. Liu and Ge investigates the beneficiaries 
of the export tax rebate policy of China through providing 
evidence from the local fishery sector. By applying a partial 
equilibrium framework, the authors indicate that although 
producers’ welfare is increased by export tax rebates, foreign 
consumers capture most of its welfare benefits. This paper 
offers a nice potential of new ideas and thoughts interested 
in the welfare analysis of CAP measures. 
Meyer contributes to the analysis of agri-environmental 
impacts of agricultural policies by analysing the impact of 
agricultural land use change on lake water quality through 
evidence coming from Iowa, USA. This paper quantifies the 
environmental impact of the Farm Bill by using a unique 
dataset covering fifteen years and hundred lakes. Results 
suggest that renewable fuel standards decreased lake water 
quality in Iowa – the approach and methodology used here 
might also be useful in analysing the environmental impacts 
of the CAP.
In a short communication, Duchoslav and Asseldonk 
explores the potential impacts of credit-linked crop index 
insurance through the case of Mali. Their results suggest 
that linking crop insurance with credit should not only be 
beneficial for banks to limit their exposure (on a mandatory 
basis), but should become beneficial as well for smallholders 
(in terms of better access to credit, lower interest rates or less 
required collateral). Their approach, again, might be useful 
for those working with insurance models in Europe.
On the whole, this special issue well reflects the diver-
sity of the debate on the future of the CAP and it hopefully 
contributes to a better understanding of the past and future 
impacts of agricultural policies by bringing examples from 
inside and outside Europe.
Jámbor Attila
Budapest, July 2018 
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Introduction
When the common agricultural policy (CAP) was con-
structed in the 1960s and 70s one distinctive feature, much 
remarked upon by outside observers, was its high levels of 
protection against third country imports. For many products 
a variable import levy bridged the gap between a fluctuating 
world market price and the EEC’s minimum import price.2 
In the Uruguay Round, tariffication put a stop to this prac-
tice, and modest reductions to the EU’s tariff bindings were 
negotiated. 
Tariffication, however, resulted in a compartmentalization 
of CAP decision-making. No longer were the Directorate-
General for Agriculture and the Council of Agriculture Min-
isters responsible, in the main, for determining border protec-
tion as part of the CAP. Instead this role had been ceded to the 
Directorate-General for External Relations (subsequently DG 
Trade) and the foreign affairs ministers. Moreover, whilst tar-
iffication meant that subsequent increases in the CAP’s levels 
of domestic market price support would no longer be reflected 
in increased border protection, equally reductions would no 
longer automatically trigger lower tariffs. 
Successive reforms of the CAP have resulted in further 
cuts in domestic support, but there have been no offsetting 
reductions in the EU’s farm tariffs, despite concerted efforts 
in the Doha Round to secure multilateral agreement on tariff 
cuts. One of the aims of the Doha Round, launched in 2001, 
in the negotiations on agriculture was to secure: ‘substantial 
improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view 
to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substan-
tial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’ (WTO, 
2001: 3). Initial plans to complete the Round in 2003 were 
frustrated, but in 2008 an agreement did seem to be within 
reach that would have involved developed-economy mem-
bers of the WTO (such as the EU) reducing their highest tar-
iffs on agricultural goods by up to 70% (WTO, 2008). 
This paper discusses both the continuing failure of the 
Doha Round to deliver on those promised tariff reductions, 
through to, and including the 11th Ministerial Conference in 
Buenos Aires in December 2017 (MC11); and also the EU’s 
reluctance to do so unilaterally. The consequences of this 
failure to reduce the EU’s tariffs on these highly protected 
CAP products are profound, as: i) only preferential supplies 
satisfying specific criteria (e.g. rules of origin) can penetrate 
the EU’s protected market, thus reducing the potential gains 
from trade; ii) negotiation of Free Trade Area (FTA) agree-
ments is made more complicated than might otherwise be the 
case; and iii) extricating the United Kingdom from the EU 
(“Brexit”) is more problematic.
To explore these issues the article proceeds as follows. 
First it explains how the EU’s old variable import levy 
mechanism worked, and how tariffication put an end to this 
practice. Second it argues that tariffication resulted in a com-
partmentalization of EU decision-making, and shows how 
subsequent CAP reforms have resulted in significant reduc-
tions in domestic support, with no offsetting reductions in 
border protection, despite the aspirations expressed at the 
launch of the Doha Round in 2001. The third substantive 
section explores the political economy constraints that limit 
the actions of the EU’s trade negotiators and (seemingly) 
preclude unilateral tariff reductions. Finally the text explores 
the political economy consequences of the EU retaining 
these excessively high tariffs, before concluding.
Variable import levies, and then  
tariffication
The ‘old’ CAP of the 1960s and 1970s, certainly as epito-
mised by the support arrangements for cereals, was depend-
ent upon three key policy measures: high levels of border 
protection to stop cheap imports accessing the EU and 
undercutting EU market prices; sale of products into inter-
vention at guaranteed prices should domestic prices weaken; 
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and payment of export subsidies (called export refunds by 
the EU) to encourage traders to sell surplus products to third 
country markets. As a result EU market prices were often 
well in excess of world market prices (for examples see Rit-
son, 1997: 3). The basic, if flawed, rationale for this policy 
was that, by raising farm-gate prices, and hence farm rev-
enues, farm incomes would be boosted too. But small farm-
ers, with little to sell, would not have much gain, whereas 
larger farmers with more sales would do disproportionately 
well; farm costs would tend to rise and absorb much of the 
increase in farm revenues, in particular the resultant increase 
in land prices would benefit landowners rather than tenant 
farmers; and a larger population would be retained on the 
farm, thus depressing ‘the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture’.
The international community’s ire frequently focussed 
on the disruptive impact of the EU’s export subsidies: indeed 
by the mid-1980s the USA and the EU were engaged in an 
export subsidy war in which each used taxpayers’ money 
to try to expand their export markets. As a USDA report 
acknowledged, the purpose of the Export Enhancement Pro-
gram of 1985 was ‘to aggressively recapture lost markets’ 
(Porter & Bowers, 1989: 19). However, the system of mar-
ket price support would have been impossible to maintain 
had border protection not kept cheap imports out of the EU’s 
protected market. Moreover, the insulating effect of the EU’s 
variable import levy was insidious, not only blocking access 
to its protected market from more competitive overseas sup-
pliers, but also tending to create price instability on world 
markets (see Johnson (1975) for a discussion of the likely 
impact of national price stabilisation schemes).
Dam’s extensive review of the EEC’s emerging support 
arrangements for cereals clearly identified how the variable 
import levy would work: 
‘The essential idea is to set in advance the desired inter-
nal price ... . The import levy is then varied as often and as 
much as necessary to make up the difference between the 
lowest price on the world market and the target price. … The 
variable levy has some dramatic economic effects for a defi-
cit area. It places the entire burden of adjustment to varia-
tions in local supply and demand on third-country suppliers. 
No matter what quantity is produced (short of a surplus) or 
demanded locally, domestic suppliers receive the promised 
prices.’ (Dam, 1967: 217-8).
In the annual farm price review under the ‘old’ CAP the 
Council of Ministers set support prices for the following 
year (Harris & Swinbank, 1978). By way of example, the 
evolution of support prices for sugar for the period 1972/3-
1976/7 is shown in Table 1. Annually, on a proposal from the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers fixed both a common 
intervention, and a threshold (i.e. minimum import), price for 
white sugar, as reported in the Table, although with boom-
ing world commodity prices in 1974 a second round of price 
fixing took place. Over this period the threshold price for 
sugar was being set some 16/17 per cent above the common 
intervention price.
Tariffication, a central plank of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2009: 
55-6), changed all that. The old systems of border protection 
– not only the EU’s variable import levy, but other coun-
tries’ protective mechanisms as well – created uncertainty 
for traders, and they could not readily be subjected to bilat-
eral concessions on tariff reductions in trade negotiations. 
Consequently the Uruguay Round negotiators decided that 
all existing systems of border protection would be con-
verted into conventional tariffs (fixed in either specific or 
ad valorem terms) by computing the difference between a 
representative internal price with an appropriate external 
price over the ‘base period’ 1986–8. These tariffs would 
be bound: that is they became part of the country’s WTO 
Schedule of Commitments and could not be increased with-
out the consent of other WTO Members in accordance with 
GATT Article XXVIII procedures. Moreover, as part of the 
Uruguay Round agreements, developed countries agreed to 
reduce these bound tariffs by 36% on average, over a six-
year implementation period, and by no less than 15% for 
any particular tariff line. The EU also agreed additional 
constraints on the tariffs it would charge on cereals (and, at 
the time, husked rice) to ensure that the duty-paid import 
price for cereals would not exceed 155% of the effective 
domestic support price (Swinbank, 2017: 4). WTO Members 
can charge lower tariffs than these bound rates (i.e. applied 
tariffs), but whatever tariff is charged has to be applied on a 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis.3 
Countries undertook their own calculations, which were 
barely scrutinised by other WTO negotiators in the run-up 
to the meeting in Marrakesh in April 1994 that finalised the 
round. Thus, for white (refined) sugar, the EU declared a tar-
iff equivalent of 524 ecu per tonne, and committed to reduce 
this by 20 per cent to reach a new bound rate of 419 ecu 
per tonne in 2000 (Swinbank, 2004).4 The maths that under-
pinned this determination is interesting: the internal support 
price for white sugar over the base period (1986-8) was said 
to be 719 ecu per tonne, from which was subtracted an exter-
nal price of 195 ecu per tonne.
In closing this section it is important to make two points. 
First, that tariffication, and the limited tariff reductions 
agreed in the Uruguay Round, resulted in very high tariffs 
3 GATT Article I provides for most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment in that no 
WTO Member is to receive treatment less advantageous than that offered to the most 
favoured nation, except in three circumstances: i) in a Free Trade Area (FTA) or Cus-
toms Union sanctioned by GATT Article XXIV; ii) when preferential access is offered 
to developing countries, as in a General System of Preferences (GSP); or iii) when 
country-specific tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were grandfathered into Members’ Sched-
ules of Commitments at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
4 This ecu (European Currency Unit) translates directly into today’s euro (€).
Table 1: Intervention and Threshold Prices for Sugar, 1972/3 to 
1976/7 (Units of account per tonne*).
1973/4 1974/5 1974/5** 1975/6
Common 
Intervention 
Price
235.7 252.2 264.8 304.5
Threshold 
Price 276.0 294.7 308.0 355.2
Council 
Regulation 
No.:
1637/73 1600/74
2496/74 & 
2518/74***
660/74
* This unit of account is not directly comparable with later units. See Ritson & 
Swinbank (1997) 
** A second increase within the year, from 7 October 1974 
*** A Commission, rather than Council, Regulation 
Source: Regulations published in the Official Journal of the European Communities
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on a number of CAP products: €419 per tonne in the case 
of white sugar cited above. Second, the EU’s border protec-
tion on agricultural products was now fixed. The displaced 
variable import levy had automatically increased as support 
prices went up, and similarly might be expected to have 
decreased had support prices been cut. But that link was now 
broken. Indeed, as outlined below, despite significant reduc-
tions in the EU’s support price for white sugar, the MFN 
tariff remains at a prohibitively high €419 per tonne, rather 
like the stranded carcass of a beached whale.
In 2014 about 70% by value of the EU’s agri-food 
imports were traded under the WTO’s MFN regime, with the 
remainder under concessional schemes for developing coun-
tries and FTA agreements. Of that 70%, some 43 percentage 
points came in over a zero MFN tariff (European Commis-
sion, 2015). This is not particularly surprising: it included 
tropical beverages (such as tea, coffee and cocoa), soybeans, 
and some cereals subject to a tariff suspension. The ten-
sions discussed in this article focus on the 20% of agri-food 
imports in 2014 that paid the full MFN tariff, and those that 
failed to penetrate the EU’s market because MFN tariffs for 
beef, dairy products, sugar, etc., were prohibitively high.
CAP reform and the failure of Doha
The 1992 MacSharry Reform was in part prompted by 
impasse in the Uruguay Round, but it then gave the EU 
enough policy leeway to accept the constraints of the Agree-
ment on Agriculture in 1994: a document that had been 
crafted with the EU’s “reformed” CAP in mind (Daugbjerg 
& Swinbank, 2009). The 1992 deal reduced support prices 
for cereals and beef, and introduced partially decoupled 
– taxpayer-funded – payments to compensate farmers for 
their implied revenue loss, but it did not alter the basic mar-
ket-price support arrangements, and the variable import levy 
mechanism. Thus Regulation 1762/92, setting out the new 
support arrangements for cereals, progressively lowered the 
threshold price. In the currency unit of the time, it was set 
45 ecu per tonne higher than the target price for each of the 
1993/94, 1994/95, 1995/96, and subsequent marketing years 
(Council of the European Communities, 1992: Article 3).
Tariffication was implemented later, after the Marrakech 
Agreement was signed in April 1994. As the European Com-
mission explained in proposing the changes: 
‘The fundamental change introduced by the new import 
arrangements is the replacement of variable charges (levies, 
compensatory amounts, etc.) and other types of non-tariff 
import restrictions … by stable, degressive tariffs. The intro-
duction of such tariffs will be effected, in legal terms, by 
means of a suitable amendment to the Common Customs 
Tariff … . The replacement of variable charges by the CCT 
duties implies the repeal of all the rules which refer to their 
calculation, i.e. in particular all provisions on the fixing of 
threshold prices, reference prices, etc. and the rules laid 
down for the calculation of variable charges applying to 
derived products’ (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1994: 35). 
Accordingly, in December 1994, agriculture ministers 
repealed the core CAP provisions fixing threshold prices and 
determining variable import levies (Council of the European 
Union, 1994).5 Tariffication was adopted with far less media 
publicity, and farm lobby opposition, than had been evident in 
the long debate over the MacSharry package. 
Tariffication severed the formal link that had previously 
existed between the import tax charged and levels of domestic 
market price support. This became evident in the Agenda 2000 
CAP reform, when some domestic support prices were reduced, 
but without any offsetting reductions in tariffs. As Swinbank 
(1999: 398) observed: ‘It is conceivable that in the years to 
come, CAP reform will entirely remove domestic support and 
export subsidies, and yet high import tariffs could be retained.’ 
Indeed, successive “reforms” of the CAP have further reduced 
domestic support, but there has never been a compensating 
reduction in tariffs (or even a proposal to reduce MFN tariffs). 
The cumulative impact this has had can readily be illustrated for 
butter and sugar, as presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Butter and White Sugar: €/tonne.
Intervention 
Price for 
1992/3*
Support 
Price in 
2017
MFN Tariff 
from 2000
Within-
quota TRQ 
Tariff**
Butter 3,535.3 2,463.9 1,896 700
White Sugar 640.1 404.4 419.0 98.0
* As reported in (European Commission, 1994: T61 & T67), and then converted by the 
author into today’s euro (€) by applying the coefficient 1.207509 to the support prices 
reported at the time 
** For butter, the TRQ extended to New Zealand; for sugar, the so-called CXL TRQ
Source: Ritson & Swinbank, 1997; WTO (2016), Certification of Modifications and 
Rectifications to Schedule CLXXIII – European Union, WT/Let/1220 (Geneva: WTO); 
Regulation 1308/2013.
Thus after the farm price review determining support prices 
for the 1992/3 marketing year, intervention prices for these 
products were €3,535.3 per tonne for butter and €640.1 for 
sugar, as reported in Table 2. Tariffication, and the limited tariff 
reductions agreed in the Uruguay Round, resulted in the bound 
tariffs of €1,896 and €419 per tonne (for butter and white sugar 
respectively) that have applied from 2000 until the present. 
These were formidably – indeed prohibitively – high tariffs for 
MFN suppliers to pay. In the case of sugar, some developing 
countries had (and still have) access to the EU market with a 
zero duty, and other suppliers have since secured limited Tariff 
Rate Quota (TRQ) access paying a within-quota tariff of €98 
per tonne (so-called CXL sugar). New Zealand has access to 
a country-specific TRQ to access the EU’s butter market, at a 
within-quota tariff of €700 per tonne, but no longer fully avails 
itself of this opportunity.
The sugar regime was excluded from Ray MacSharry’s 
CAP reform, and only modest reductions in support prices for 
dairy products were achieved. A reform of the dairy regime was 
agreed in principle in 1999 (as part of Agenda 2000), but not 
implemented until the Fischler Reform of 2003. This reduced 
the 2003 support price of €3,282.0 per tonne by 25 per cent 
to €2,463.9 in 2007, where it has remained ever since. As 
there was no corresponding reduction in either the MFN tar-
iff, or New Zealand’s preferential rate, the net effect was to 
increase by €818 the element of redundant “protection” in 
the tariff, and eliminate New Zealand’s tariff advantage. As 
5 Some border measures do, however, remain part of the CAP. This Regulation also dealt 
with the need to constrain the deployment of export refunds to comply with WTO limits.
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the tide retreated the stranded whale carcass was left far from 
the sea!
For sugar, the reforms did not kick in until 2005/6, fol-
lowing a WTO Dispute Settlement case in which the EU 
had been found to be exceeding WTO limits on its exports 
of subsidised sugar (Ackrill & Kay, 2011). This “reform” 
brought the EU’s support price for white sugar down by 36 
per cent, from €631.9 to €404.4 per tonne. Consequently the 
MFN tariff on sugar is now greater than the official support 
price.
The EU has from time to time suspended its import 
duties on farm products: for example for cereals in 2007 as 
a ‘reaction to the exceptionally tight situation on the cereals 
markets and the record price levels’ (European Commission, 
2007), or the supply difficulties faced for industrial (non-
food) uses of sugar (Noble, 2012: 21). The EU’s Everything 
but Arms initiative, and a number of FTAs, have opened-
up the EU’s market to selected suppliers; and some limited 
adjustments have been made to tariffs and Tariff Rate Quo-
tas in its Schedule of Commitments lodged with the WTO 
as a result of EU enlargement and other renegotiations of 
particular tariff lines. But, in the main, its bound tariffs are 
unchanged from those determined in the Uruguay Round, 
and the applied tariffs it charges on a MFN basis remain 
aligned with its bound rates.
… and the failure of Doha
Meanwhile the Doha Round had trundled on. The first 
skirmishes had occurred as WTO Members prepared for 
their 3rd Ministerial meeting in Seattle in late 1999. That 
September the EU’s Council of farm ministers had discussed 
the forthcoming negotiations. Whilst affirming their commit-
ment to the European Model of Agriculture, they conceded 
that: ‘The European Union … is prepared to negotiate for 
lowering trade barriers in agriculture … . However, it must 
also obtain, as a counterpart, improvements in market oppor-
tunities for its exporters’ (Council of the European Union, 
1999).
The Seattle Ministerial, however, did not result in the 
expected launch of a Millennium Round; and it was not 
until 2001 that the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
– the Doha Round – got underway (WTO, 2001). The EU’s 
basic approach was still defensive. In January 2003 the EU 
rejected the more ambitious proposals for tariff reductions 
advocated by the USA and the Cairns Group,6 and proposed 
instead a repeat of the Uruguay Round formula: ‘an overall 
average tariff reduction of 36% and a minimum reduction 
per tariff line of 15%’ (European Commission, 2003). This 
was rather less generous than that negotiated in the previous 
round however, for a 36 per cent reduction of a lower base 
would have produced a smaller reduction in absolute terms.
In fairness to the EU it should be noted that the timing 
was not propitious. The Doha timetable had envisaged that 
the “modalities” for agriculture (i.e. a fairly detailed blue-
print for the final agreement) should be established by 31 
March 2003 (WTO, 2001: 3), and the chair of the agricultural 
negotiating committee was eager to receive input from WTO 
6 A group of like-minded states led by Australia that took its name from the coastal 
resort in Queensland, Australia (Kenyon & Lee, 2006).
Members so that the first draft modalities document could 
be written. Although the EU’s Commissioner for Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs, Franz Fischler, had launched an ambi-
tious Mid-term Review of the Agenda 2000 reform package 
– which in the summer of 2003 would be enacted as the first 
phase of the Fischler Reforms (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011) – 
this was not yet the EU’s confirmed, let alone official, policy. 
Consequently the EU was not yet in a position to make a 
more ambitious offer to its WTO partners.
The Fischler Reform, further decoupling support for 
key arable and livestock products, and the extension of 
this decoupling principle to most other products in 2004/5, 
including the sugar reform overseen by Marian Fischer-Boel, 
and her “Health Check” Reform concluded in November 
2008, fundamentally changed the EU’s circumstances and 
hence its freedom of manoeuvre in the Doha negotiations 
(Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2011). Brief mention should per-
haps be made of the most recent recalibration of the CAP, 
to configure the policy for the post-2013 period, but by then 
WTO pressures were no longer a force capable of driving 
CAP reform (Swinbank, 2015).7 
In none of these reforms had it ever been suggested that 
farm ministers should also enact reductions in border protec-
tion as part of the package. And that is true of the European 
Commission’s latest thoughts on a post-2020 CAP. In its 
discussion paper on The Future of Food and Farming the 
European Commission (2017: 25) makes only one (passing) 
reference to the WTO, followed by one mention of imports 
when commenting: ‘it cannot be ignored that specific agri-
cultural sectors cannot withstand full trade liberalisation 
and unfettered competition with imports. We therefore need 
to continue to duly recognise and reflect the sensitivity of 
the products in question in trade negotiations and explore 
ways how to address the geographical imbalances of advan-
tages and disadvantages that affect the farm sector within the 
Union as a result of EU trade agreements’ (emphasis in the 
original). 
By 2008, with soaring prices on world commodity mar-
kets (Piesse & Thirtle, 2009) the EU was able to complete its 
switch from a defensive to an offensive stance in the WTO. 
This new confidence could already be seen in 2003. Then 
the Council had declared: ‘This reform is … a message to 
our trading partners …. It signifies a major departure from 
trade-distorting agricultural support, a progressive further 
reduction of export subsidies, a reasonable balance between 
domestic production and preferential market access, and a 
new balance between internal production and market open-
ing.’ But it also stressed that the bargaining process was still 
in play: ‘the margin of manoeuvre provided by this reform in 
the DDA can only be used on condition of equivalent agri-
cultural concessions from our WTO partners. … Europe has 
done its part. It is now up to others to do theirs’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2003: 3-4).
Despite this optimism, and an ill-fated venture with 
the USA to influence the outcome of the negotiations, the 
Cancún Ministerial in September 2003 ended in failure; with 
the EU’s stance on agriculture probably a contributory factor 
7 Swinnen (2015: 4) writes: ‘The question with the 2013 CAP decisions is not so 
much whether they are radical reforms (the consensus on this is “no”), but whether 
they are captured appropriately by the term ‘reforms’ at all’.
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tinued disagreement over a Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(SSM) to benefit developing countries. Indeed, some months 
earlier the Special Agriculture Committee chair had reported 
‘that a substantial outcome on market access is not feasible 
for MC11’ (WTO, 2017a).
Institutional and political economy 
constraints
Two broad sets of questions emerge from the foregoing 
discussion. First if, as suggested above, WTO Members were 
close to an agreement on agriculture in 2008, why was it 
not possible to conclude the deal; and secondly why, with 
adherence to the Single Undertaking undermined by subse-
quent Ministerial decisions, is an agreement to reduce agri-
cultural tariffs still elusive? Had WTO Ministers agreed such 
a package, the EU – committed as it says it is to a rules-based 
system of international trade – would presumably have com-
plied.9
Second, if the Doha Round process has faltered, and the 
EU is in a position to unilaterally reduce its excessively high 
MFN tariffs on key CAP products (for example beef and 
sugar), why does it not do so? As discussed in the next sec-
tion, these high tariffs are now an impediment to the pursuit 
of its wider trade agenda, so why does the EU persist?
Quite why the Doha Round has (as yet) failed to deliver 
on its initial promise of major cuts in agricultural tariffs, 
and a significant tightening of the disciplines written into 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture apart from 
the 2015 decision to eliminate export subsidies, is a topic 
that will exercise scholars for years to come, and will not be 
discussed here. All that can be offered is two brief, tentative, 
observations. 
First that in an organisation (of 160+ members) built on 
consensus, whose modus operandi is based on a balanced 
exchange of “concessions” across a complex array of issues, 
agreement is intrinsically problematic, unless some outside 
pressure can force change. The USA and the EU, it might be 
argued, managed this in the Uruguay Round by terminating 
their membership of GATT 1947, together with all their obli-
gations to GATT’s other Contracting Parties. In its place they 
set up a new international trade agreement – the WTO – and 
invited the other members of the old GATT to join, provided 
they accepted the whole package of WTO agreements as a 
Single Undertaking, which they all did (Daugbjerg & Swin-
bank, 2009: 90-3; Steinberg, 2002). 
The USA and the EU no longer have hegemonic pow-
ers to coerce WTO members, and it is difficult to envisage 
a repeat of the American and European Uruguay Round 
ploy. The USA is still however a major force in the WTO, 
and as such does exercise veto powers. Thus a second fac-
tor explaining the current impasse is the stance of President 
Donald Trump’s administration. In a frank discussion at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017) in 
September 2017, prior to the WTO Ministerial, the United 
States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer made clear 
9 The EU has for example implemented the decision to eliminate export subsidies 
(WTO, 2017b).
(see for example Bhagwati, 2004). In debriefing the Euro-
pean Parliament, the EU’s Trade Commissioner concluded 
that the Round was: ‘if not dead then certainly in intensive 
care’ (Lamy, 2003). Bhagwati (2004: 55), however, consid-
ered the outcome ‘more of a hiccup than a permanent end to 
the Doha process.’
The subsequent trajectory of the negotiations was dra-
matic and convoluted, but by June 2008 a fairly detailed 
Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture was on the table 
(see WTO, 2008, ‘Rev.4’, for the final December 2008 draft 
of this text). In conceding that the negotiators had failed to 
achieve the hoped-for breakthrough, Pascal Lamy (2008) 
– by now the WTO’s Director-General – did claim that ‘from 
a technical point of view, the issues are not intractable. In 
fact [he continued] from a purely technical perspective, you 
are not that far from an agreement on those issues. The bad 
news is that individual positions – and the position overall – 
have not changed significantly.’
Successive CAP reforms had meant – according to the 
EU – that most of its domestic support payments were no 
longer trade distorting, and accordingly it believed it would 
face no further constraints if the tighter limits on trade dis-
torting support envisaged in Rev.4 were implemented.8 
A series of reductions in intervention and other domestic 
market price support mechanisms, combined with the effects 
of inflation and the buoyant world market prices being expe-
rienced in 2008, meant the EU could now envisage a ban on 
the use of export subsidies: indeed it had committed to that 
outcome in Hong Kong in 2005. 
With EU farmers no longer reliant on market price sup-
port, and the EU able to countenance the demise of the export 
subsidy regime, the final element of CAP reform – removal 
of its excessively high border protection inherited from the 
‘old’ CAP of the 1980s – was surely feasible. Rev.4 had pro-
posed a ‘tiered formula’ for tariff reductions, with developed 
countries’ highest tariffs being reduced by up to 70 per cent 
over a five-year period (WTO, 2008: 14).
After 2008 WTO negotiators switched their emphasis 
from the Single Undertaking – the understanding that noth-
ing could be agreed until everything was agreed – which 
had successfully underpinned the Uruguay Round, to a 
more piecemeal approach. In Hong Kong in 2005 ministers 
had already agreed – in the context of the Single Under- 
taking – to the ‘elimination of all forms of export subsidies’ 
(WTO, 2005: 2); but then in Nairobi in 2015, no longer bound 
by the Single Undertaking, it was decided that ‘Developed 
Members’ would ‘immediately eliminate their remaining 
scheduled export subsidy entitlements’ (WTO, 2015: 2) – 
although, on closer reading, ‘immediate’ meant by 2020 for 
some products.
Although some WTO Members had hoped that some 
progress could be made on the agriculture dossier at their 
11th Ministerial Conference (MC11) in December 2017, 
including a tightening of disciplines on domestic support, 
this proved impossible (Bridges, 2017). There was certainly 
no movement on agricultural tariffs, in part because of con-
8  In WTO jargon, support that had previously been classified as Amber or Blue Box 
support had now been switched into the Green Box. See Daugbjerg & Swinbank (2009: 
59-62) for an explanation of Amber, Blue and Green Boxes. Whether the revised pay-
ment systems could legitimately be defended as Green Box support is a moot point.
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the USA’s lack of enthusiasm for multilateral, as opposed to 
bilateral, trade agreements, its distrust of the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement procedures, and predicted that ‘it’s unlikely that 
the ministerial in Buenos Aires is going to lead to negoti-
ated outcomes’. Without American backing the ministerial 
was unlikely to make substantive process. Indeed, ‘Ministers 
were unable to reach consensus on a ministerial declaration, 
despite multiple drafts being circulated … . Instead, minis-
terial conference chair Susana Malcorra issued a summary 
of the week’s discussions under her own responsibility’ 
(Bridges, 2017).
The second question posed above was why, if the EU is 
in a position to unilaterally reduce its excessively high MFN 
tariffs on many CAP products, it does not do so? There are 
probably several parts to the answer: the compartmentaliza-
tion of decision-making coupled with the mercantilist tradi-
tions of trade negotiators; political economy constraints with 
weak consumer voices no match for a well-resourced farm 
lobby (dispersed costs versus concentrated benefits); and the 
belief that preference erosion would weaken the existing ben-
efits enjoyed by the EU’s preferential suppliers and reduce the 
EU’s bargaining position in future FTA negotiations.
The compartmentalization of decision-making following 
tariffication, shifting the forum from agriculture to trade, has 
been outlined above. The Directorate-General for Agricul-
ture and Rural Development no longer has the responsibility, 
or authority, to fix (most) import taxes, as it did prior to 1995. 
The common commercial policy is one of the EU’s exclusive 
competences, vested in the European Commission, with DG 
Trade ‘the EU’s prime negotiator and guardian of an effec-
tively implemented EU trade policy’ (DG Trade, 2017). (The 
Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development also 
plays an active role in trade negotiations.) Trade negotia-
tors are loath to unilaterally allow increased market access 
to domestic markets if that improved access is unlikely to 
be reciprocated in some form – “concessions” in the trad-
ing partner’s tariff schedule, for example. Moreover, even 
if negotiators in the stalled Doha Round negotiations saw 
little scope for a mutual exchange of “concessions”, those 
tariff barriers could still be useful bargaining chips in future 
multilateral and bilateral trade talks.
Consequences: preferences, free 
trade areas, and Bexit 
Standard economic trade theory predicts that high tar-
iffs restricting access to the EU’s market will impose costs 
(higher prices, and a reduced range of available products) 
on European consumers and the wider economy. Access, in 
the main, will be limited to suppliers that have preferential 
agreements, be they generic schemes available to develop-
ing countries, FTAs, or country-specific TRQs grandfathered 
into the EU’s Schedule of Commitments in the Uruguay 
Round. Even if, by chance, preferential access has been 
granted to the world’s lowest cost suppliers (and often not!), 
the gains from trade will be abated by the additional customs 
procedures needed to check rules of origin, and TRQs may 
limit the volume supplied.
The EU’s protective tariffs on agricultural products are 
not fully reflected in EU market prices, particularly for those 
products for which the EU has emerged as a net-exporter, 
but some protective effect (which the farm lobby welcomes) 
remains. Third countries that have preferential access to 
these protected markets (for beef, sugar, etc.) are likely to 
bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the EU if they suspect 
that new trade initiatives will lead to preference erosion, 
whereas trade partners that do not have comparable access 
will seek to achieve the same through multilateral (i.e. Doha, 
or its successor) or bilateral (i.e. FTA) negotiations, or even 
by challenging the EU’s regime in Dispute Settlement pro-
ceedings. 
When the EU concludes FTAs, particularly with coun-
tries that have competitive farm sectors, agricultural com-
modities and food and drink products are often not fully 
liberalised. Instead, particular products might be written out 
of the agreement, or quantities limited by TRQs. Thus the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) excludes trade in eggs and poultry products, and the 
duty free import of pork and beef into the EU is limited by 
TRQs.10 Access for beef is one of the major requests of Mer-
cosur, which is met by strong resistance by the EU’s beef 
producers (see for example White, 2018). Thus, as with mul-
tilateral negotiations, agricultural protectionism can block 
(or prolong) FTA negotiations.
One egregious example of the distortive effect of the 
CAP’s unreformed agricultural tariffs currently playing out 
relates to the United Kingdom’s attempts to leave the EU, 
and the issues this raises for trade across the Irish border 
(Swinbank, 2017 & 2018). In short, what the UK has been 
arguing for some time is that it is seeking to leave the EU’s 
customs union and single market (and the CAP), giving it 
the freedom to negotiate FTAs with other countries around 
the world, whilst maintaining an open – frictionless – border 
between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (which 
is part of the UK) and maintaining the integrity of the UK’s 
own internal market. How this particular conundrum will 
be solved is as yet unclear, but the challenge posed by the 
CAP’s high tariffs is a key concern with which policy makers 
must grapple.
Concluding comments
In 1992 the EU agreed a package of CAP reform that 
began a progressive dismantling and decoupling of farm sup-
port. In 1995, following a successful conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round of trade negotiations, agricultural tariffs were first 
bound, and then reduced. Those bound tariffs are the ones that 
are still applied on a MFN basis: since that initial bundle of 
tariff cuts there has been no systematic reduction in the EU’s 
agricultural tariffs despite a succession of CAP reforms. On 
some key products (beef, sugar, etc.) these MFN tariffs are 
prohibitively high, and exports to the EU are only commer-
cially feasible if preferential access arrangements are in place.
Past CAP reforms have been incomplete, and high tar-
iffs on selected products continue to protect some farming 
10 CETA explained: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-explained/ 
(last accessed 26 February 2018).
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activities distorting resource use in the agricultural sector. 
They impose costs on Europe’s consumers and frustrate 
potential overseas suppliers. Moreover, they complicate the 
EU’s wider trade diplomacy, including the ongoing Brexit 
negotiations. With the EU’s institutions deliberating on the 
form that the post-2020 CAP should take, perhaps now is the 
time to complete CAP reform.
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Introduction
Agricultural interventionism is often justified on ideo-
logical grounds, with reference to the objectives of food 
security, food production self-sufficiency, food safety and 
natural resource protection. There is a lack of quantitative 
criteria that might indicate what kind of support should be 
provided, and to whom, in order to produce benefits in terms 
of social well-being.
The concept of political rent is defined based on the 
theory of rent-seeking – but is it conceptually appropriate to 
contemporary agricultural policy in developed countries? By 
definition, political rent is inextricably linked to the wastage of 
resources and to exclusive benefits provided to selected social 
groups at the expense of others. No attempts have yet been 
made in the literature to quantify political rents, even though 
this might lead to an improvement in the effectiveness of pub-
lic expenditure. This, in our view, is a significant gap.
The present work aims, firstly, to review the concepts of 
rents and rent-seeking as used in the literature on political 
economy with regard to their appropriateness to the discus-
sion on European Union (EU) agricultural policy. Secondly, 
we attempt to develop a methodology for quantifying pure 
political rents in agricultural policy, and apply it to a compar-
ative analysis of rents from the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in the 27 EU Member States in the years 2004-2012. 
In this way they refute certain stereotypes concerning the 
CAP, while seeking an answer to the question of what part 
of the subsidies paid to agriculture in the EU-27 is justified 
by the concept of payment for public goods or compensation 
for imperfections in agricultural markets, and what part has 
no objective justification and represents a pure political rent 
according to the rent-seeking theory.
This reasoning contributes also to the discussion on the 
fair level of the CAP payments in different Member States. 
Per-hectare payments are substantially lower in the countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 and subsequently. This arrange-
ment is usually supported by the argument that those coun-
tries have lower labour costs. However, if policy makers 
care about equal conditions for competition they should also 
consider other market imperfections. Some of them mani-
fest in Cochrane’s treadmill effects (Cochrane, 1958; Levins 
and Cochrane, 1996), as well as in the occurrence of public 
goods. We aim to show how the CAP consensus might be 
changed by including these effects.
Political rents and rent-seeking: a 
literature review
Rent-seeking involves a striving by economic entities to 
obtain benefits (primarily financial or material) by exerting 
influence on relevant institutions, such as through lobbying4. 
More detailed definitions refer to active rent-seeking, which 
denotes the expenditure of resources by private firms and 
interest groups for the purpose of obtaining protective forms 
of regulation from those in authority (Sztaba, 2002). Two 
points may be emphasised: firstly, that active rent-seeking 
includes legal activities and, secondly, that these restrict the 
free management of resources and to some extent distort 
competition.
The political rent market is formed on the one hand by 
those demanding the desired regulations, namely the afore-
mentioned interest groups and manufacturers’ and consum-
ers’ associations, which expend funds for that purpose and to 
which particular regulations will bring measurable benefits 
(such as protection of an internal market, maintenance of 
prices, approval or non-approval of a particular type of con-
sumer good etc.). The response to that demand is a supply, 
4 The term was first defined by Krueger (1974), although the phenomenon had been 
considered previously by Tullock (1967).
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perform comparative analyses with the aim of calculating the ‘pure political rent’, based on the input-output approach for 
representative farms according to the EU FADN typology and on a decomposition of the Hicks–Moorsteen TFP index for the 
period 2004-2012 and 27 European Union Member States. The calculations of political rents show that historical payments are 
neither a rational nor a just solution. No attempts have yet been made in the literature to quantify political rents, even though 
this might lead to an improvement in the effectiveness of public expenditure. The original methodology is proposed for valuing 
these items.
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created by politicians and officials, who ‘sell’ the regulations 
over which they have authority, in exchange for political sup-
port. Research shows that, fearing loss of electoral support, 
such persons are willing to intensify their actions relating to 
rent-seeking (Persson et al., 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
What occurs, then, is a kind of political economic trans-
action (Zybertowicz, 2010). More concretely, it can be con-
cluded that political rent most often occurs in the form of a 
transfer of income from certain entities to others, through 
the use of mechanisms of political power, and not – as is nor-
mally the case – through market mechanisms. On a micro-
economic approach, the benefits obtained should be consid-
ered individual benefits, and the expenditure made should 
be treated as ‘investment’. Hence, if in a democratic society 
the interests of narrow social groups are carried over to the 
actions of public authorities, thus providing those groups 
with exclusive benefits (rents), then this constitutes a politi-
cal rent (Wilkin, 2012).
From a social standpoint, one may analyse the losses 
resulting from the unproductive use of resources, and this 
has been the subject of many theoretical works. From this 
perspective, the concept of political rent serves to explain 
why economically-ineffective measures are put into effect 
by politicians, and then maintained in force, even when they 
cause obvious harm to the well-being of society. Policy may 
thus be ineffective in terms of overall well-being (causing 
non-optimal allocation of resources and distortion of market 
stimuli) if it provides preferential treatment and potential 
benefits for specific interest groups that constitute a suffi-
ciently strong electorate (Buchanan et al., 1980; Tollison, 
1982; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Schneider and Wagner, 2001; 
Lee and Tollison, 2011; Aligica and Tarko, 2014).
In this light, it can be claimed that the EU’s intervention-
ist agricultural policy provides an example of the existence 
of political rent. Rent-seeking in EU agriculture, however, 
does not concern only political lobbying. The claim that 
subsidies and other instruments of the CAP produce exclu-
sive benefits for farmers at the cost of consumers is some-
what trivial and not entirely accurate. The question would 
appear to be more complex, as the benefits are not always 
exclusive, in view of the fact that farmers provide certain 
public goods, and moreover agricultural producers need 
to fulfil certain requirements, expending their resources, 
in order to receive those privileges. According to Tullock, 
rent-seeking is profitable only in conditions of perfect 
competition and absence of economies of scale (Tullock, 
1980a; Tullock, 1991). If economies of scale are present, 
the total value of investment required to obtain a political 
rent is greater than the rent itself (Tullock, 1980b; Tullock, 
1991). This would mean that small family farms, which are 
not able to generate economies of scale in production, are 
net beneficiaries of political rents, while large farms, for 
which meeting the CAP’s environmental requirements car-
ries a significant alternative cost, may not receive any net 
rent. In other words, the cost of producing the public goods 
required in exchange for political rent exceeds the value of 
the rent (Aligica and Tarko, 2014). The present study aims 
to establish whether this theory of Tullock is applicable to 
agriculture in the EU.
In the literature, particularly in the field of political econ-
omy, political rents are considered widely, in relation to both 
the mechanisms for seeking (competing for) them, and their 
consequences for market processes and well-being. Below we 
make a review of various theoretical and empirical approaches 
to the concept of political rent, particularly those which pre-
sent in a new light the problem of rent-seeking in relation to 
the EU’s CAP. To these approaches may be ascribed the fol-
lowing hypotheses, put forward by the authors cited below: 
(a) the greater the degree of political competition, the higher 
the political rents (in other words: small interest groups have 
greater political strength); (b) market imperfections determine 
the distribution of political rents; and (c) rent-seeking may 
be complementary to an increase in production (the theory of 
complementarity between rent-seeking and production).
The fourth thesis refers to the phenomenon of political 
competition, in the sense of the intensity of rivalry between 
political parties (Roemer, 2006). The results of a study by 
Fałkowski and Olper (2014) show clearly that when the level 
of political competition is higher, the rents paid to agriculture 
are greater. This positive correlation can be observed in both 
developing and developed countries. The interpretation of this 
phenomenon is based, firstly, on an analogy between economic 
and political competition. Political parties cannot act against 
the will of the majority, just as producers cannot act against 
trends in consumption (Becker, 1958; Stigler, 1972). On the 
other hand, Olson’s theory of interest groups states that it is 
small groups that have greater political power (Olson, 1965), 
because as interest groups expand, the readiness for collec-
tive action declines. This leads to a ‘development paradox’ 
(Swinnen et al., 2000; Olper, 2001; Grzelak, 2011): in highly 
developed countries agriculture makes a relatively small con-
tribution to GDP, but receives relatively large political rents 
– since the agricultural lobby is small, but well-organised and 
politically strong (Poczta-Wajda, 2013). Moreover, economic 
development alters the division of the costs and benefits of 
support for agriculture (Swinnen, 2009). Per capita costs 
are distributed between an increasing number of persons 
employed outside agriculture, entailing a weakening of stimuli 
to protest against protectionist agricultural policy. At the same 
time, processes of urbanisation increase demand for services 
based on the state of the natural environment, which is inevi-
tably connected with rural areas. There is therefore an increase 
in the utility of the public goods supplied by agriculture, and 
in readiness to pay for them. Hence retransfers of income to 
agriculture, even if ineffective from an economic standpoint, 
are rarely challenged by political groupings (Aidt, 2003). As a 
result, the observation that in developed countries agriculture 
is subsidised, while in developing countries it is taxed in net 
terms, comes to be valid globally.
The best-developed line of research is that concerned 
with the effect of imperfections of the market (imperfect 
competition) and of agricultural policy (imperfect imple-
mentation) on the distributional effects (‘incidence’) of 
agricultural policy (Alston and James, 2002; de Gorter and 
Swinnen, 2002). It is found that only 20 per cent of total 
market and price support in agriculture in the OECD coun-
tries creates a net surplus in agriculture, while the remainder 
flows out to related sectors (OECD, 2000), including to land-
owners (except where individual farms are concerned). This 
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phenomenon is referred to by the authors as a ‘surplus drain’ 
from agriculture, and is particularly marked in Central and 
Eastern European countries. Research conducted in Poland 
shows that it occurs regardless of the scale of agricultural 
interventionism, and for example in the period 1990-2003, 
prior to Poland’s accession to the EU, it was equally strong. 
It can be concluded from this that market imperfections in 
sectors related to agriculture affect not only the division 
of political rents to agriculture (if such exist), but also the 
division of the surplus resulting from increasing agricultural 
productivity in general.
In view of the importance of this problem and the lack of 
adequate research in this area, we will devote the remainder 
of this paper to it. In Western Europe and the USA, where 
agricultural interventionism has operated continually since 
the 1950s, studies have confirmed that imperfect competi-
tion in the areas of agricultural food processing and the 
manufacture of means of production and service provision 
to agriculture has a significant effect on the distribution of 
political rents (McCorriston and Sheldon, 1991; Salhofer 
and Schmid, 2004). In turn, it has been shown (Ciaian and 
Swinnen, 2009) that the net effect of area payments on the 
profits of single-product farms is negative. For example, in 
extensive grain production, while farms profit directly from 
subsidies and indirectly from the increased efficiency result-
ing from subsidised investments, they lose significantly due 
to the increase in prices of rent and purchase of land, whose 
marginal productivity increases, stimulating demand. These 
losses are dominant in the balance of costs and benefits of 
decoupled payments. Mixed farms, however, may gain over-
all, as CAP payments make it easier for them to obtain credit.
Diverging from the main line of thought concerning the 
decrease in overall well-being due to the payment of political 
rents is the ‘theory of complementarity of rent-seeking and 
production’ (Teng, 2013). Based on a model formalisation, 
that author challenges the universality of the thesis whereby 
rent-seeking is identified with a fall in productivity, and pro-
poses a theory in which increased production and rent-seek-
ing are not substitutes. These processes become complemen-
tary when the entities seeking rent are also producers, and 
their production output at the same time constitutes inputs to 
the rent-seeking effort. It is not easy to apply this generalisa-
tion to agriculture (it would be as if farmers paid lobbyists 
in agricultural products), but certain analogies may be noted. 
If it is accepted that the ‘products’ of agriculture include 
specific public goods, they may also represent a bargain-
ing counter for the agricultural lobby and politicians. In this 
sense the aforementioned complementarity of production 
and rent-seeking also arises in agriculture. This is an issue 
to which we shall return in a later part of our considerations.
The above review of the literature leads to the important 
conclusion that political rents in agriculture diverge from the 
essence of the concept of rent-seeking, which is inextricably 
linked, firstly, to wastage of resources and loss of overall 
well-being and, secondly, to exclusive benefits obtained by 
selected social groups at the expense of others.
• If the resources devoted to rent-seeking even partly 
serve to produce public goods, then that part cannot 
be regarded as wastage (according to the theory of 
complementarity of rents and production).
• If the payment of political rents to agriculture results 
in the delivery of any public goods, then these ben-
efits are not exclusive.
• If market imperfections in sectors related to agricul-
ture cause rents and economic surplus to be captured 
by other entities, then it is even more the case that 
these benefits are not exclusive.
The above considerations motivated us to attempt to 
give a new definition of political rent in agriculture, and to 
develop a methodology for measuring it. There are no reports 
in the literature concerning attempts to quantify political 
rents, even though this might lead to an improvement in the 
effectiveness of public expenditure. It is generally accepted 
that agricultural incomes are primarily a result of institu-
tional actions rather than the action of the market (subsidies 
account for approximately two-thirds of agricultural income 
in EU Member States on average). For many years, the costs 
of agricultural production have been estimated to exceed 
the revenue generated in more than one half of EU Member 
States, and if it were not for the subsidies paid to farms, agri-
cultural production would become entirely unprofitable (cf. 
relationship of decoupled subsidies to agricultural income: 
according to Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
data, in most Member States it is above 0.5 but there are also 
instances where it exceeds 1).
We must be aware, however, that the stream of subsi-
dies received by farmers does not in its entirety constitute a 
political rent as hitherto construed. In this study an attempt 
is made to evaluate a new category – the ‘pure political rent’ 
obtained by agriculture in the various countries of the EU-27. 
To enable this category to be considered, it is necessary to 
distinguish within the total pool of subsidies received by a 
farmer the payment made for public goods generated by the 
farm, and the part which serves to compensate for the drain-
age of economic surplus resulting from market imperfec-
tions, which causes the prolonged opening of ‘price scissors’ 
in agriculture. There are also discussions in the literature 
concerning the distribution of political rents in the context of 
market imperfections, for example in relation to land (Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2006), credit (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009), and 
fishing restrictions (Wilen, 1989, Holzer et al., 2012). The 
residual amount can then be regarded as a surplus benefit 
not having any economic justification, and representing the 
result of rent-seeking.
Methodology for measuring pure 
political rents
We stated above, based on a review of the literature, that 
the distribution of political rents is dependent on market 
imperfections in agriculture and related sectors. Moreover, 
market imperfections decide not only about the distribution 
of political rents, but also about the division of economic 
rents in general. The price flexibility5 is mainly responsible 
for draining economic rents from agriculture. It is particu-
5 Tomek and Robinson (1990) define the price flexibility coefficient as 
(∆P/P):(∆Q/Q), where P denotes prices and Q output.
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larly characteristic of the sector of agricultural raw materi-
als according to the concept of agribusiness of Davis and 
Goldberg (1957). Also, Cochrane (1958) introduced the 
notion that farmers are on a treadmill which, in spite of their 
constant efforts to improve factors productivity (TFP), wears 
away any profits that might result. The point of departure for 
Cochrane was the statement that it is a myth that agriculture 
returns to balance automatically. In the case of increasing 
supply, a disproportionately high decrease in prices can be 
observed and, ultimately, it turns out to be disadvantageous 
for revenue even in the long run.
The EU’s CAP sets itself the goal of ameliorating the 
effects of market imperfections in areas related to agricul-
ture. Reforms of the CAP in recent years have aimed to 
soften the effects of market inefficiencies in such areas as 
absence of remuneration to agriculture for the supply of pub-
lic goods, the lower level of income compared with other 
sectors of the economy, and limitations on access to external 
financial capital (EC, 2010).
In order to model the flow of rents of price flexibil-
ity in agribusiness, it is necessary to separate processes 
of changes in real productivity from changes in prices of 
products and inputs. The change in real productivity in the 
agricultural sector (excluding subsidies) is calculated using 
the I-O (Input-Output) approach. In general, the proposed 
method of computing TFP change is based on indicators 
of total factor productivity of the Hicks–Moorsteen (HM 
TFP index, cf. Coelli et al. 2005), which have been decom-
posed in the input-output matrices for agricultural sec-
tors of different countries. The method was developed by 
Lecomte and Louis (1974) and also adopted by Gburczyk 
(1990) as the global productivity surplus accounts. It is a 
different approach to changes in TFP than that generally 
found in the literature. Changes in TFP are calculated in 
real terms (after elimination of the effects of prices, sub-
sidies and other payments from the CAP), not on the basis 
of the Malmquist Productivity Index but using input-output 
matrices (60 input-output variables). The Malmquist index 
has become extensively used in international comparisons 
of agricultural productivity since it does not require prices 
for its estimation, which are normally not available. In this 
case we had available a complete matrix of price indices for 
60 input-output variables, prepared with the use of Euro-
stat data. The I-O approach to measure TFP changes has a 
substantial advantage: it allows to estimate monetary value 
of the productivity change. Then one can assess the tread-
mill effect and distinguish the part of the economic surplus 
flowing out of farms as the result of flexible prices. The 
change in real productivity on the farm level is expressed 
as follows:
 (1)
where Qi is the quantity of product i in successive years (t–1, 
t); Fj is the quantity of external input j in successive years 
(t–1, t); Pi is the price of product i in year t–1; Rj is the price 
of external input j in successive years (t–1, t); and ΔTFP 
is the change in the real productivity of factors (in money 
units), neglecting the CAP and prices fluctuations.
In equation (1) the variable Qi is determined by price 
expectations. Productivity is understood here as the output 
produced with given inputs. In turn, the flow of rents result-
ing exclusively from the change in prices of sold products 
and purchased means of production is given by the equation:
 
(2)
where HICP is the inflation rate; ΔASt is the change in the 
farm’s economic rents in period t relative to t–1 (the drain-
age or inflow of economic surplus through prices known as 
Cochrane’s treadmill effect); other symbols have the same 
meaning as in equation (1).
For example, a farm has additional surplus (rent) com-
paring to a previous period t–1 when the actual revenues in 
real prices ( ) exceed the revenues in constant prices 
(Qit · Pit–1) deflated with producer price indices for specific 
outputs. Similarly, it has also unexpected surplus if the actual 
outlays in real prices ( ) is lower than the outlays in con-
stant prices (Fjt · Rit–1) deflated with producer price indices for 
specific inputs.
There are some limitations of this approach. A behav-
iour of farmers in our model is quite naïve since they 
consider a change of prices for the same amount of prod-
uct (Qit ) in two consecutive periods. If the stationary 
equilibrium was reached, both the production amount 
and prices would change. However, in this case we 
assume that the equilibrium is not stationary but static. 
We argue that it is an effect of adaptive expectations in 
agriculture. The equations (1) and (2) stay in the relation: 
ΔTFP + ΔAS = actual change in income.
The value of pure political rents PR for a representative 
farm over a long period lasting for n years is computed using 
equation (2) in the following way:
 
(3)
 
(4)
where n is the number of periods; PRt1...tn is the political rent 
in period t
1...tn; Si is the subsidy paid to agriculture under the s 
CAP programmes; VPGi is the payment for the public goods 
supplied by a representative farm according to the g CAP 
programmes (the choice of programmes is discussed below); 
other symbols have the same meanings as in equation (2).
By the above methodology, PRt1...tn was computed for 
an average farm from the FADN representative sample of 
approximately 80,000 farms, according to classes based on 
standard output (SO) in the EU-27 Member States in the 
period 2004-2012. For estimating the value of rents for the 
whole population of representative farms using the FADN 
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sample in a given Member State, the aggregate values 
,  and ΔAStn  for an average farm were mul-
tiplied by the number of representative farms in the class in 
question6.
CAP dilemmas of payments for  
public goods
The dilemmas faced by contemporary European agri-
culture come down to resolving the conflict between the 
pro-environmental and pro-social elements of the CAP, and 
the need to keep EU agriculture as competitive as possible. 
Attempts to solve these problems can be illustrated by sev-
eral example areas involving instruments of the CAP. The 
first is the determination of the relationship between the 
support provided under Pillars 1 and 2. There is a conflict 
of interest here between farmers, who are decidedly more 
interested in the instruments of Pillar 1 (particularly direct, 
income-supporting subsidies), and consumers, who expect 
rural areas to function as a supplier of public goods (Cooper 
et al., 2009; Lyon, 2009), namely the preservation of land-
scape and natural features, biological diversity and high 
quality of food products. It seems that, considering the needs 
of a wide group of citizens, agriculture ought to fulfil the 
function of a quasi-public sector – that is, we can expect to 
observe an increase in the role played by Pillar 2. However, 
in order to receive specified services it is necessary to pay the 
farmers – otherwise they will cease such activity and engage 
in the production of the agricultural raw materials that 
become more profitable according to demand for food and 
prices on the world market (Czyżewski and Stępień, 2009). 
Observation of the evolution of rural areas in EU Member 
States indicates that the centre of gravity of the Polish rural 
economy may soon shift in the direction of increasing impor-
tance for extra-agricultural functions. This is also indicated 
by the CAP reforms since 2014. There is also an awareness 
that it is not possible for the development of rural areas to be 
regulated by a market mechanism. Account must be taken of 
preservation of the state of the natural environment and care 
for the rural landscape, so as to preserve the identity of the 
countryside in spite of the increasingly rapid changes taking 
place (Wilkin, 2011).
Let us return to the previously-discussed thesis that “if 
the resources devoted to rent-seeking even partly serve to 
produce public goods, then that part cannot be regarded as 
wastage (according to the theory of complementarity of rents 
and production)”. It is nonetheless debatable how that part is 
to be defined. According to the assumptions of the concept 
being considered, rent-seeking farmers are also producers, 
and the positive external effects of their actions, having the 
nature of public goods, are in some sense rent-seeking out-
lays, in the sense of a bargaining chip providing legitimacy 
for the seeking of subsidies. Nonetheless, not all types of 
6 The SO classes are defined based on the value of output corresponding to the 
average situation in a given region for various types of agricultural production. In 
the FADN methodology, farms are described according to their SO values as follows: 
EUR 2,000-8,000: ‘very small’; EUR 8,000-25,000: ‘small’; EUR 25,000-50,000: 
‘moderately small’; EUR 50,000-100,000: ‘moderately large’; EUR 100,000-500,000: 
‘large’; above EUR 500,000: ‘very large’.
CAP subsidies carry a tangible effect in the form of public 
goods. The concept of a public good here is something of a 
generalisation. It includes not just utilities with the attributes 
‘non-rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’ – namely pure public 
goods (Head, 1962; Buchanan, 1968) – but also common 
goods, in whose case rivalry occurs between consumers. It is 
debatable whether support from Pillar 1 of the CAP leads to 
the creation of public and common goods. A certain step in 
this direction is certainly provided by the cross-compliance 
principle, but this can be said to serve more the maintenance 
of the usefulness of the private resource of land and other 
assets for the production of high-quality food in the long 
term. The receipt of area payments is not subject to strong 
restrictions as regards the chemicalisation of agriculture or 
increased intensity of agricultural production, which can 
have a negative effect on the environment and thus on com-
mon goods. Nonetheless a number of programmes under Pil-
lar 2 of the CAP, directed towards the development of rural 
areas, undoubtedly lead to the direct creation of new com-
mon goods or care for existing ones. In our view, these attrib-
utes pertain in particular to agri-environmental payments, 
support for least favoured areas (LFAs), set-aside payments, 
and to the subsidies to rural area development (RDA).
We tried to find the selection which is the least disput-
able, however we are aware of its limitations. If we assumed 
that instruments used within the CAP are strongly comple-
mentary to each other, it would be impossible to increase 
the provision of public goods without a growth in Pillar 1 
payments. One may argue that delivering public goods is a 
direct by-product of agricultural activities (as in line with the 
multifunctionality of agriculture argument). In that sense, 
for having these public goods we need to have agricultural 
activities. The latter are supported by direct subsidies (Pillar 
1 of the CAP). As a corollary to that: direct subsidies also 
contribute to public good deliveries (in that case our defini-
tion would be too narrow). However, by this reasoning we 
conclude that many more activities produce public goods, 
and the notion of ‘public good’ is too wide to support it by 
public funds.
We should also remember that a large part of the subsidies 
in the EU Member States that joined the EU prior to 2004 is 
of a historical nature. Thus, one can argue that introducing 
so-called ‘payments for public goods’ was used just to pre-
serve the status quo (so that the share is held more or less 
constant). In other words, one may argue that changes are 
only the rhetoric and not the sustainable philosophy. Collat-
ing Sweden, Finland and Austria with other Member States 
should be treated with caution as these countries joined the 
EU (and the CAP) when the movement towards ‘greening’ 
was already in place. In fact, there are arguments that they 
used LFA or agri-environmental payments precisely to max-
imise their share in the budget, as with any other strategy 
they would be worse off. Finally, there are doubts about the 
efficiency of using funds for public goods. It is hard to say 
whether this is the optimal way to achieve the goal.
Seeking a compromise, we follow the rule that any 
attempt to ‘green’ agriculture is better than doing nothing 
and we assumed that the agri-environmental payments, 
LFAs, set-aside payments and RDA subsidies contribute to 
public goods provision. We analysed the contribution of the 
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aforementioned payments (called by way of simplification 
‘payments for public goods’) to the total subsidies paid to 
average farms in the EU-27 Member States in 2004-2012 
(Tables 1 and 2). It was expected that, in accordance with 
current discussions and progressive reforms of the CAP, 
this share of the total subsidy would be found to be increas-
ing. It turns out that this is one of the myths concerning 
the CAP. The reality is quite different, and the postulates 
concerning the pro-environmental and multifunctional 
direction of the CAP prove to a large extent to be mere 
declarations. In most EU Member States the level of these 
payments remains relatively stable, while in the others it 
is usually decreasing. The highest percentage of payments 
for public goods is recorded in Austria and Finland (ca. 
40 per cent of total subsidies), countries where, in view of 
the unfavourable geography and consequent lower profit-
ability of agricultural production, traditional agriculture is 
shrinking markedly in favour of organic production, supply 
of public goods and multifunctional development of rural 
areas. The proportion is also large, although decreasing, 
in Slovakia and Luxembourg (average 34 and 30 per cent 
respectively) and in Slovenia and Sweden (average 29 per 
cent). The lowest proportion accounted for by such pay-
ments is found in Denmark (4 per cent), Spain and Poland 
(6 per cent), and Belgium (7 per cent), where favourable 
conditions for production successfully compete with the 
realisation of extra-agricultural functions in rural areas. 
Also interesting are France and Germany, two of the largest 
agricultural producers in the EU, where in the period under 
analysis there was a marked fall in payments for public 
goods as a percentage of total subsidies – respectively from 
14 to 9 per cent and from 19 to 11 per cent.
It can be assumed that the stream of subsidies theoreti-
cally linked to the supply of public goods is insufficient for 
them to be substituted for other payments and related pro-
ductive activity. The data in Tables 1 and 2 show that pay-
ments for public goods are not more widely used in the ‘old’ 
EU-15 Member States than in the EU-12, although it appears 
that Romania, Bulgaria and Poland are not making full use 
of their possibilities in this area. In those countries the envi-
ronmental potential is large, but in our view the structure of 
Pillars 1 and 2 of the CAP is determined by political reasons, 
since easily-available area payments represent the most per-
suasive offer to rural electorates.
Table 1: Payments for public goods as a proportion of total subsidies to an average farm in the EU-15 Member States in the period 2004-
2012.
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 mean
Denmark 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04
Spain 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Belgium 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07
Italy 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09
France 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10
Germany 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
Netherlands 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13
Portugal 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.14
Greece 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.16
United Kingdom 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
Ireland 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22
Sweden 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.29
Luxembourg 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.30
Austria 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.40
Finland 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.40
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
Table 2: Payments for public goods as a proportion of total subsidies to an average farm in the EU-12 Member States in the period 2004-
2012*.
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 mean
Romania - - - 0.00 0.001 0.01 0.006 0.18 0.07 0.02
Bulgaria - - - 0.00  0.02 0.06  0.11 0.06 0.06 0.06
Poland 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.09  0.10 0.08  0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06
Lithuania 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.11  0.13 0.10  0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10
Cyprus 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.11  0.04 0.09  0.16 0.11 0.26 0.11
Hungary 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.14  0.17 0.14  0.20 0.24 0.22 0.11
Latvia 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.19  0.14 0.15  0.16 0.10 0.16 0.14
Malta 0.30 0.06 0.18 0.28  0.23 0.14  0.12 0.11 0.14 0.16
Czech Republic 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.21  0.25 0.22  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21
Estonia 0.27 0.34 0.29 0.29  0.22 0.24  0.30 0.25 0.25 0.27
Slovenia 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.32  0.26 0.33  0.27 0.25 0.32 0.29
Slovakia 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.40  0.38 0.36  0.31 0.25 0.27 0.34
* 2007-2012 for Romania and Bulgaria 
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
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Pure political rents in EU-15 and 
EU-12 Member States
In accordance with the methodology adopted, political 
rents were computed for farms belonging to various standard 
output classes over a period of eight years, in the ‘old’ (Table 
3) and ‘new’ EU Member States (Table 4). We recall that the 
values given represent that part of EU agricultural subsidies 
which has no objective justification either as payment for 
public goods or as compensation for market imperfections 
affecting agriculture (leading to high flexibility of agricul-
tural prices). They therefore have the features of political 
rents. Our analysis is a pioneering attempt to quantify the 
phenomenon of pure political rent.
There are usually two arguments raised in a discussion 
on the differences in the per-hectare CAP payments across 
Member States and the total amount of subsidies resulting 
from these differences: (a) they exist due to the differences in 
historical yields, production areas, production volumes and 
livestock numbers; and (b) the per-hectare direct payments 
of the individual Member States have been converging, 
and this process of external convergence is to be continued. 
Although both arguments are reasonable, does it change 
anything in the interpretation of ‘pure rents’ distribution? As 
aforementioned, the pure rents in our approach has no objec-
Table 3: Political rents realised by farms by standard output (SO) class in the EU-15 Member States in the period 2004-2012.
Country
Political rents from farms by SO class  
(% total political rents in the country) CAP  
subsidies  
(EUR bn)
Pure  
political rent 
(EUR bn)
Political rent 
(% agricul-
tural added 
value)
Political rent of 
country  
(% total rents 
in EU-27)
I II III IV V VI
France - - 10.3 24.6 61.2   4.0 74.72 67.26 30.6 19.3
Germany - -   6.4 12.4 49.5 31.7 55.95 49.29 41.6 14.1
Italy   8.7 18.9 13.2 15.6 31.5 12.1 42.18 38.39 18.2 11.0
Spain   7.0 26.1 18.2 21.0 26.2   1.5 41.99 36.12 20.1 10.3
United Kingdom -   1.7 11.1 24.8 55.4   7.0 34.08 25.77 38.8   7.4
Greece 23.4 45.5 21.2   8.2 1.7 - 20.05 16.75 35.5   4.8
Ireland   5.5 28.6 24.6 19.5 21.8 - 15.37 11.74 95.1   3.4
Austria - 25.3 24.7 25.9 24.0 - 15.65   9.45 45.1   2.7
Denmark -   4.6   8.9 10.6 39.9 36.0   8.39   7.80 39.0   2.2
Finland - 13.0 14.4 28.1 44.5 - 13.05   7.69 69.4   2.2
Netherlands - -   2.1   8.8 68.9 20.2   9.42   6.42   9.3   1.8
Sweden -   8.1 13.8 16.8 48.6 12.7   7.71   5.51 46.2   1.6
Portugal   5.1 36.6 16.5 15.1 26.7 -   4.94   3.55 17.3   1.0
Belgium - -   5.8 45.2 49.0   0.0 10.64   2.52 13.5   0.7
Luxembourg - -   6.1 14.1 79.7 -   0.76   0.54 63.9   0.2
EU-15 total   9.9 20.8 13.2 19.4 41.9 13.9 354.92 288.80 38.9 82.7
EU-27 total 13.4 20.7 12.1 17.3 33.2 22.4 425.95 349.42 41.4 100.0
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
Table 4: Political rents realised by farms by standard output (SO) class in the EU-12 Member States in the period 2004-2012*.
Country
Political rents from farms by SO class
(% total political rents in the country) CAP  
subsidies
(EUR bn)
Pure  
political rent 
(EUR bn)
Political rent
(% agricul-
tural added 
value)
Political rent of 
country  
(% total rents 
in EU-27)
I II III IV V VI
Poland 15.2 31.7 19.4 12.1 12.3   9.3 24.53 22.36 36.6   6.4
Hungary   5.4 15.7   7.4 14.0 19.0 38.4 11.69   9.62 52.0   2.7
Romania 34.5 12.1   2.8 14.2 20.2 16.2   9.05   8.85 16.1   2.5
Czech Republic -   5.5   4.1   7.7 20.7 62.0   7.85   5.79 64.8   1.7
Lithuania 24.0 29.1 14.6 11.3 13.8   7.2   3.94   3.51 58.7   1.0
Slovakia - -   2.4   6.4 24.4 66.8   4.59   3.05 78.3   0.9
Bulgaria   7.7   8.2   4.4 12.5 38.9 28.4   3.34   2.91 24.1   0.8
Latvia   5.4 28.8 12.0 11.6 25.8 16.4   2.19   1.80 79.1   0.5
Slovenia 13.8 31.0 17.7 25.0 12.5 -   1.99   1.38 40.1   0.4
Estonia - 13.7   9.6 16.3 27.4 33.0   1.29   0.91 44.2   0.3
Cyprus 18.1 24.9 18.6 29.2   9.1 -   0.48   0.34 13.6   0.1
Malta - 25.5 16.4 15.5 42.6 -   0.11   0.09 19.5   0.0
EU-12 total 15.5 20.6 10.8 14.7 22.2 30.9 71.03 60.61 43.9 17.40
EU-27 total 13.4 20.7 12.1 17.3 33.2 22.4 425.95 349.42 41.4 100.0
* 2008-2012 for Bulgaria and Romania 
Source: own calculations based on FADN data
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tive justification (neither as compensation for public goods, 
nor for the market imperfections), and thus they are simply 
‘a waste of resources’ and ‘a loss of overall well-being’, no 
matter how relatively big they are. So, do the arguments 
mentioned above legitimise ‘old’ Member States to acquire 
a bigger share of pure political rents? In this sense as we 
propose, the pure rent has nothing to do with the yields, pro-
duction, livestock number, labour efficiency etc. It has also 
nothing to do with the size of a country: why might larger 
countries have the right to waste more public funds and to 
reduce the social welfare of the European Community more? 
So, we argue that the pure rents should constitute compara-
ble shares of CAP subsidies in each Member State since the 
subsidy envelopes agreed for a given programming period 
are a kind of political consensus. The rent-seeking level in 
each Member State shall be proportional to this consensus, 
because it would be naïve to assume that rent-seeking may 
disappear at all.
The pure political rents accounted for 77 per cent of the 
CAP subsidies on average (Figure 1). Assuming that actual 
CAP subsidies are a ‘fair political consensus’ for each coun-
try, there are Member States which profit from bigger shares 
of pure rents than others. More rents go to the two groups of 
countries:
• the biggest agricultural producers (such as France, 
Germany, Italy and Denmark);
• ‘new’ Member States with relatively big shares of 
agriculture in their national economies (Poland, 
Romania, Lithuania and Bulgaria). Considering the 
environmental potential of these countries, is not this 
a kind of free-riding?
It occurs at the expense of the countries with intensive 
and productive farming such as Belgium and Netherlands, 
as well as those with substantial environmental resources 
(Austria, Finland, Belgium and Slovakia). Intensive farming 
is likely to be more affected with market treadmill. For this 
reason, should some countries receive more compensation 
from the agricultural policy for market imperfection? Can 
we also reconsider if the present rent distribution is fair 
with regard to the countries with valuable environmental 
resources?
The sum of political rents in the EU in the period under 
analysis was estimated at close to EUR 350 billion, which 
is a substantial share of the EU’s entire budget of EUR 860 
billion for the years 2004-2013. Analysis of the rent realised 
per country over the analysed period as a proportion of total 
political rent in the EU shows that the greatest beneficiaries 
of rent-seeking are the Member States where agriculture is 
the strongest, including France (which receives almost one-
fifth of the total rent), followed by Germany, Italy and Spain 
(with 14.1, 11.0 and 10.3 per cent respectively). Hence, 
farmers in just four countries capture more than one half of 
the political rents from the CAP. It may be thought that this is 
linked to the lobbying strength of agricultural organisations 
from those countries and their engagement in the creation of 
agricultural policy. Confirmation of this comes from the fact 
that the EU-15 Member States account for 83 per cent of the 
total political rents in the EU-27.
Analysis at individual Member State level indicates that 
it is possible to distinguish those where the value of total 
realised rent is:
• relatively equal among farms in different standard 
output classes (e.g. Austria);
• highest among large and very large farms (e.g. the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Germany, Den-
mark, Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg);
• highest among small and very small farms (e.g. 
Greece, Lithuania and Romania).
Such a distribution may be a result of the differentiated 
structures of farms in different Member States, and con-
sequent differences in the political importance of the rural 
electorate associated with particular SO classes. For exam-
ple, in Poland approximately one third of political rents are 
received by SO class II (small farms), and these together 
with class I (very small farms) account for almost one half 
of total rents. These classes represent more than 90 per cent 
of the rural electorate, and as can be seen, Olson’s theory 
of interest groups, according to which a stronger political 
influence is exerted by small but well-organised groups, 
does not apply here. Similar situations exist in Romania, 
Lithuania and Latvia, where the agrarian structure is again 
very fragmented, but also in Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and 
Slovenia. A cautious conclusion can therefore be drawn, that 
the distribution of political rents corresponds to the structure 
of farms in a given country, such that the most numerous 
groups receive the largest pool of political rents. Hence no 
confirmation is found for the popular opinion that the largest 
political rents are obtained by sector of the strongest farms. 
On the other hand, economic size categories based on SO 
should be used with caution in this type of analysis because 
the physical size of farms corresponding to a certain SO 
class varies widely between Member States due to the differ-
ences in market prices, yields and produce quality. Bearing 
in mind the heterogeneity of farms within each SO class, we 
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Figure 1: Pure political rents vs. consensus of the CAP EU-27 
in 2004-2012.
Source: own estimation using EU FADN and Eurostat data
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however believe that the comparison of the relatively small-
est farms (I SO in ‘new’ Member States or III SO in ‘old’ 
Member States) with the highest SO class in the respective 
country is quite reasonable and gives a general overview for 
the rent-seeking problem.
A category of note is that of very large farms (SO class 
VI) in Belgium, where there was no political rent at all in the 
analysed period, which means that the sum of the subsidies 
received by a farm, adjusted by payments for the supply of 
public goods, is not able to compensate for the surplus drain-
age caused by price flexibility.
Another issue is the contribution of political rents to the 
added value from agriculture in a given country, shown in 
the penultimate column of Tables 3 and 4. On average, in 
the EU-27 this contribution is 41.4 per cent, and although in 
the EU-12 it is slightly higher, and in the EU-15 somewhat 
lower than average, there are Member States in which that 
value is exceeded almost twofold. We analysed the reason 
why political rents account for more than 95 per cent of 
the added value of agriculture in Ireland, and 78 per cent 
in Slovakia. In all of the extreme cases the problem lies in 
the low real productivity of agriculture, and not in market 
imperfections, which affect agriculture in all Member States 
to a similar degree apart from those with the most intensive 
farming. Irish agriculture uses a very large quantity of mate-
rials – the ratio of indirect consumption to production aver-
ages approximately 1 over the year, compared with an EU 
average of 0.66. A similar conclusion applies to agriculture 
in Slovakia and Latvia. In the Czech Republic, the cause is 
rather the relatively high cost of labour.
It can be asked whether such extreme differences in the 
level of subsidisation of low productivity from the CAP budget 
is socially just, in terms of the balance of costs and benefits for 
the community as a whole. What benefits do the EU taxpayer 
obtain by subsidising highly inefficient agriculture in certain 
Member States? Naturally, indirect benefits can be found, such 
as the maintenance of agricultural incomes and thereby the 
livelihood of rural areas, prevention of depopulation of those 
areas, and assurance of internal demand for food. This may be 
an indication of how the CAP could be more effectively modi-
fied so as to achieve the desired effects, at least those relating 
to the supply of public goods. Perhaps countries with structur-
ally inefficient agriculture ought to supply more public goods 
than they do at present, or else subsidise their agriculture to a 
greater degree from national funds.
Conclusions
The analysis carried out here leads us to conclude that 
agricultural interventionism in the EU requires a special 
conceptual approach, since it is not sufficient simply to 
treat all subsidies as political rents. The new approach we 
propose provides an indication of how to improve the effec-
tiveness of allocation of support for agriculture in individual 
EU Member States. A principal finding of this study is that, 
when using the concept of pure political rent, the EU CAP 
consensus (Figure 1) seems to be much more debatable than 
is usually believed since some Member States gain unex-
pected and unjustified advantages. Moreover, we pointed 
out that it is confusing to call all CAP subsides ‘the politi-
cal rents’ in terms of the rent-seeking theory. Quantification 
of the political rent in agriculture enables a more rational 
and socially-appropriate distribution of support from the 
CAP in accordance with the agricultural policy goals in 
the financial framework after 2014. Measuring pure politi-
cal rents has revealed a new dimension of inequalities in 
the distribution of CAP subsidies which particularly badly 
affect the most productive and the most eco-efficient Mem-
ber States. Although the division of payment envelopes 
between Member States has been decided, since 2014 the 
CAP has gained flexibility in terms of the structure of both 
Pillars and transfers between them. These matters remain 
in the hands of the Member State governments. The prob-
lem may be that in many countries the breaking of the link 
between subsidies and output was reflected more in decla-
rations than in facts, and ways are constantly being sought 
to ‘get round’ that requirement. Such attempts exacerbate 
King’s effect, and mean that a large share of the subsidies is 
not capitalised within agriculture, but are captured by sur-
rounding sectors. Economic surplus flowed out of farms in 
the period 2004-2012 through the unfavourable changes of 
prices, particularly of fertilisers, energy and feedstuffs, but 
also milk and poultry livestock (Czyżewski and Matuszc-
zak, 2017; Czyżewski, 2017) We have in mind here the fact 
that, for example, investment support goes mainly to the 
largest farms, where it is subject to the strongest drainage 
through price flexibility.
Redefinition is also required about the issue of social 
fairness in the determination of the sizes of national CAP 
envelopes. The calculations of political rents show that his-
torical payments are neither a rational nor a just solution, 
because the structurally low profitability of agriculture in 
certain Member States ought to be compensated for by a 
higher supply of public goods, and this is not happening. On 
the other hand, the most productive food suppliers and pub-
lic goods providers are not proportionally ‘rewarded’ with 
political rents. Of course, we are being somewhat facetious 
and we do not claim that the pure political rent is a reward for 
a productivity or eco-efficiency. But in fact, the present CAP 
consensus seems to be the least favourable for the Member 
States that are leaders in productivity and eco-efficiency.
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Introduction
In 2013, a general agreement was made by the European 
Council and the European Parliament on the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the period 2014-2020. 
The agreement was the result of many years of negotiations on 
different issues and topics. One of the most heavily debated 
issues was degressivity and capping, aimed at providing a 
more equitable distribution of direct payments by farm. 
On the one hand, the possibility of reducing/limiting direct 
payments for large farms has always been a popular idea 
amongst liberal agricultural economists and decision makers 
throughout the history of the CAP. The need for ‘balancing’ 
direct payments was even expressed in the MacSharry reform 
proposals in 1992 when direct payments were introduced. On 
the other hand, degressivity/capping was heavily opposed by 
countries where large farms dominated the agricultural sector. 
It seems that the opponents have won as original ideas on 
degressivity/capping have largely been watered down after the 
2013 removal of modulation (Sahrbacher et al., 2015). The 
aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of degressivity and 
capping on European farm structures by reviewing the exist-
ing literature on the topic as well as by providing new evi-
dence from Hungary.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section pro-
vides a review of the existing literature on the impact of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on European farm struc-
tures, followed by a political economy analysis of degressivity 
and capping. The fourth section shows the uneven distribution 
of direct payments in Europe, followed by the presentation of 
the Hungarian evidence. The last section concludes.
The impact of CAP on European farm 
structures
A large amount of literature is dedicated to the investiga-
tion of the impact of CAP measures on structural changes of 
agricultural holdings. According to EC (2015), there were 
11 million farms cultivating 172 million hectares of agricul-
tural land with 22 million people in European agriculture in 
2015. EC (2013) suggests that the number of farms has been 
declining since 1975 and those remaining have become big-
ger both in terms of agricultural area and also in economic 
terms. On the whole, the majority of European farms are 
small, both physically and economically, but the average 
farm size is increasing. 
Generally studies conclude that the CAP has a high 
impact on farm structures in Europe (Table 1). Breustadt 
and Glauben (2007) investigated the driving forces behind 
exiting from farming in Western Europe based on 1993-1997 
data to 110 regions in EU-12 by simulating the simple theo-
retical model of structural change. Their results show that 
exit rates are lower in regions with more part-time farming, 
high subsidy payments and high relative price increases for 
agricultural outputs. The authors suggest that opportunities 
to combine farm and off-farm income as well as govern-
ment intervention slows down structural change in European 
agriculture. These results, however, should be handled with 
caution as CAP was significantly different in the 1990s to the 
way it is implemented today.
Bartolini and Viaggi (2013) analysed the determinants of 
changes in EU farm size based on data obtained from a 2009 
survey of over 2363 farm households in 11 Catudy Areas 
(CSAs) in 9 different European Countries. By also applying 
simulation modelling, the authors found that single payment 
scheme models affect the changes in demand for land and 
CAP abolition strongly reduces the intention to increase the 
amount of farmed area. Geographic variables, farm character-
istics and the number of on-farm employees are found to be 
factors relevant to explaining planned farmed area expansion. 
Happe et al., (2009) investigated the role of CAP in shap-
ing Slovakian farm structure by agent-based modelling as 
well for 2002 as a base year, based on data of 327 farms. 
Their results suggest that that direct payments had a strong 
impact on the structural development of Slovakian farms 
in the long run and have made farm structure increasingly 
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homogenous towards larger farm sizes. Moreover, the SPS 
system was found to persuade single farm holders, otherwise 
hesitating to exit from the sector, to stay in agriculture 
Some studies focus on the role of generation renewal 
in agriculture as a prerequisite for structural change in the 
sector. As fewer and bigger farms are offering fewer jobs in 
Europe, agricultural employment possibilities for young farm-
ers are also shrinking. Young farmers (classified as younger 
than 35 years) made up 6% of all farm holders in Europe, 
while elderly farmers (above 55 years) account for 55% of 
farms in 2007. Moreover, statistics suggest that elderly farm-
ers are generally not retiring and passing on their farms to the 
younger generation, thereby creating serious consequences on 
the overall growth potential of the sector. What is more, there 
are fewer young people in the agricultural sector than in any 
other sector of the economy (EC, 2011a). 
Davis et al., (2013) investigated the efficacy of incentives 
for new entrants to farming as an alternative to early retire-
ment schemes for farmers in Northern Ireland by employing a 
dynamic farm optimisation model for survey data with 2001 
as a basis year. The authors found new entrant schemes having 
a positive impact on entry of young farmers, especially in the 
case of interest rate subsidies on farm development loans.
A comprehensive review on the main challenges young 
farmers are facing with as well as the evaluation of the effi-
ciency of young farmer schemes can be found in Regidor 
(2012) as well as in Zagata and Sutherland (2015). Their 
results, based on simple descriptive statistics, suggest that 
young farmer schemes have very limited effects on encour-
aging new entrants to agriculture.
Other studies focus on the impact of CAP on farm exit in 
terms of structural change and studies generally argue that 
CAP plays a crucial role in retaining farmers in the sector. 
On the one hand, farm exit strategies under CAP elimination 
scenarios were analysed by Raggi et al., (2013), building on 
survey data carried out in 9 EU countries in 2009, ending up in 
a sample of 2300 farms-households. By using a probit Heck-
man model, results suggest that numbers of farm households 
opting to exit from agriculture increased sharply under the 
scenario characterised by the removal of the CAP. Their article 
holds the clear policy message that the current CAP payments 
are important for staying in/exiting farming activities, but the 
land reallocation process (as a consequence of land abandon-
ment) clearly requires more targeted instruments (towards 
young and active farmers, in order to avoid fragmentation, 
dispersion, or attraction only for speculation purposes).
Olper et al., (2014) examined the different instruments 
of the CAP on the out-farm migration in a sample of 150 
EU regions of the EU-15 over the period 1990-2009 by 
using fixed effects and GMM regressions. Results suggest 
that CAP payments generally contribute to keeping labour 
in agriculture and especially coupled subsidies seem to be 
the most effective in reducing out-farm migration through 
obligatory production (and hence labour input).
Peerlings et al, (2014) investigated the resilience of 
European farms with and without the CAP and applied bino-
mial and logit regression models on survey data on 11 case 
study regions in 9 EU countries conducted in 2009. Results 
show that farms choosing to exit are those most depend-
ent on CAP support, lease a relatively large share of their 
Table 1: Summary of studies on the impact of the CAP on the structure of agricultural holdings.
Study Method Unit of  analysis Time Type Result
Breustadt and  
Glauben (2007) Simulation model EU-12 1993-1997 Ex-post
Government intervention slows down structural change 
in European agriculture
Bartolini and Viaggi 
(2013) Simulation modelling EU-27 2009 Ex-ante
Single payment scheme models affect the changes in 
demand of land and CAP abolishment strongly reduces 
the intention to increase the amount
of farmed area
Happe et al. (2009) Agent-based simulation modelling Slovakia 2002 Ex-ante
Direct payments make farm structure increasingly 
homogenous towards larger farm sizes 
Davis et al. (2013) Dynamic farm  optimisation model
Northern  
Ireland 2001 Ex-ante
New entrant schemes having a positive impact on 
young farmers, especially regarding interest rate  
subsidies on farm development loans
Raggi et al. (2013) Heckman probit model EU-27 2009 Ex-ante
CAP payments are important for staying in/exiting 
farming activities, but the land reallocation to young 
farmers process clearly requires more targeted  
instruments
Olper et al. (2014) Fixed effects and GMM regression EU-15 1990-2009 Ex-post
CAP payments generally contribute to keeping labour 
in agriculture and especially coupled subsidies seem to 
be the most effective in reducing out-farm migration
Peerlings et al. 
(2014)
Binomial and logit  
regression models EU-27 2009 Ex-ante
Least resilient and most CAP-dependent farms are 
most likely choosing to exit agriculture
Petrick and Zier 
(2011)
Difference-in-differences 
panel data regression Germany 1999-2006 Ex-post
Pillar I and II payments generally ended up in exit of 
labour from agriculture via investment and capital/
labour substitution effects
Tocco et al. (2013) Bivariate probit models
France,  
Hungary, Italy, 
Poland
2005-2008 Ex-post Decoupled payments kept labour in agriculture in the NMS but not in the OMS
Source: own composition
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land, and are part-time and diversified farms. These farms 
were confronted with a relatively high drop in income in the 
event of CAP abolition and faced relatively high adaptation 
costs when adjusting their factor input use or simply did not 
have sufficient assets to be able to survive as farms in a no-
CAP world. The results also indicate that – besides being 
less likely to exit – more specialised farms with young farm 
heads are most resilient, and small, more diversified farms 
headed by old farmers are least resilient.
On the other hand, Petrick and Zier (2011) analysed 
regional employment impacts of the CAP measures in East-
ern Germany based on regional data of 1999-2006, resulting 
in 483 observations. By using a difference-in-differences 
regression model, the authors found that investment aids and 
transfers to less-favoured areas had a zero marginal employ-
ment effect. They also present evidence that full decoupling 
of direct payments led to labour shedding, as it made trans-
fer payments independent of factor allocation. Spending on 
modern technologies in processing and marketing and meas-
ures aimed at the development of rural areas led to job losses 
in agriculture. However, agri-environmental measures, kept 
labour-intensive technologies in production or induced them. 
Tocco et al., (2013) examined the determinants of exit 
from agriculture of CAP payments in France, Hungary, Italy 
and Poland in 2005-2008 by bivariate probit models and 
found that total subsidies were negatively associated with 
the out-farm migration of agricultural workers in Hungary 
and Poland, implying that the CAP hindered labour exit from 
agriculture. Conversely, results were exactly the opposite for 
France and Italy, representing ‘Old Member States’. When 
analysing impacts of policy changes, the authors conclude 
that the OMS reacted more to the decoupling in the period 
analysed while the NMS responded to the recent introduc-
tion of EU subsidies.
The political economy of  
degressivity and capping
The uneven distribution of direct payments has been on 
the Europe policy agenda for 25 years (direct payments were 
introduced by the MacSharry reform in 1992). Attempts 
to limit payments made to large farms have systematically 
been brought up in all CAP reforms so far (Sahrbacher et al., 
2015). As 80% of payments are received by 20% of farms 
in Europe, the idea seems reasonable and has gained wide 
public support.
However, it was only in 2005 when a 5% compulsory 
reduction of direct payments of farms receiving more than 
€5,000 (modulation) was first implemented, transferring 
funds from the first pillar of the CAP to the second. From 
2009 as a part of a political compromise, modulation rates 
were stepwise increased to 10% until 2012 and set 4% higher 
for large farms (progressive modulation) in the belief that the 
issue has completely been solved (Anania-D’Andrea, 2015).
In the Commission’s original proposal published in Octo-
ber 2011 (European Commission 2011a), direct payments 
were proposed to be reduced by 20% for the tranche of more 
than €150,000 and up to €200,000; by 40% for the tranche 
of more than €200,000 and up to €250,000; by 70% for the 
tranche of more than €250,000 and up to €300,000 and by 
100% for the tranche of more than €300,000. However, 
the Commission allowed these amounts to be ‘calculated 
by subtracting the salaries effectively paid and declared by 
the farmer in the previous year, including taxes and social 
contributions related to employment, from the total amount 
of direct payments initially due to the farmer without taking 
into account the payments to be granted pursuant to Chapter 
2 of Title III of this Regulation’ (EC, 2011a, p 28.). The text 
also added that ‘Member States shall ensure that no payment 
is made to farmers for whom it is established that, as from 
the date of publication of the Commission proposal for this 
Regulation, they artificially created the conditions to avoid 
the effects of this Article’ (EC, 2011a, p 29.). 
There has been a heavy debate on the original proposal 
above. Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Sweden and the Netherlands rejected any cap-
ping on direct payments by arguing that capping would dis-
criminate between farms according to their size, contradicting 
the original principles of the CAP Sahrbacher et al., (2015). 
These countries also argued that capping would result in artifi-
cial split of large farms (see next section for evidence). 
However, at the other end, Bulgaria, Austria and Poland 
were in favour of capping, mainly because of their extremely 
concentrated farm structures as well as their relatively dis-
advantaged positions in terms of direct payments per hec-
tare. Another argument against capping was that several 
New Member States inherited dual farm structures from the 
socialist era, dominated by large-scale units. However, as 
salaries and wage levels were relatively low in this part of 
Europe, these countries would have been the most affected in 
degressivity and capping (Sahrbacher et al., 2015).
All in all, the final decision introduced a mandatory 
reduction of 5% for the part of basic payments exceeding 
€150,000. Member states, however, are allowed to increase 
the degressivity rate up to 100%, making de facto the 
€150,000 threshold a ‘cap’ on basic payments. Member states 
were also allowed by the Ciolos-reform to apply the reduc-
tion after deducting labour costs of the previous year from 
the basic payment. Such ‘savings’ resulting from degressiv-
ity were then to be added to the EAFRD ‘envelope’, free 
of any co-financing by the member state. Note that member 
states were exempted from mandatory degressivity if vol-
untary redistributive payments were implemented, absorb-
ing more than 5% of its ceiling for direct payments (Anania-
D’Andrea, 2013). 
In practice, fifteen member states where degressivity was 
implemented decided to apply the minimum possible per-
centage cut (without imposing any cap), while nine member 
states decided to put a cap on direct payments (Table 2). The 
EC estimated that for the period 2015-19, degressivity and 
capping would result in a ‘saving’ of €112 million, which is 
less than 0.3% of the financial resources allocated to direct 
payments in the EU-28 (Anania and D’Andrea, 2015). Such 
a low rate of ‘savings’, however, was not a surprise after the 
Commission’s initial impact assessment (EC, 2011b), which 
talked about a 1.3% release of the total amount of direct pay-
ments at the EU level, equivalent to around €590 million. 
Sahrbacher et al., (2015) highlight that this was much less 
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than the amounts coming from modulation (around 3 billion 
in 2013), while Matthews (2016) shows that by introducing 
degressivity and capping, Member States reduced their EU 
direct payment envelopes, as laid down in Annex II of Regu-
lation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, by around €109 million, in 2015. Almost two-
thirds of this reduction was committed by Hungary.
As to the latest reform ideas, In its Communication “The 
Future of Food and Farming” of 29 November 2017 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2017), the European Commission pro-
claims capping as compulsory, and would allow for Member 
States to introduce or maintain the degressive reduction of 
direct payments. As for the capping of direct payments, costs 
of labour could be considered to avoid negative effects on 
jobs. Member States would be also encouraged to redistrib-
ute direct payments to better target small agricultural hold-
ings. These would be the tools of the post-2020 CAP which 
could influence the distribution of direct payments among 
the beneficiaries. 
The uneven distribution of direct 
payments in Europe
On average, 80% of the beneficiaries (88% for Bulgaria 
and Romania) received around 20% of direct payments in 
2015 with important differences among member states (EC, 
2015). A detailed analysis of the respective dataset provides 
further information on the payments related to degressivity/
capping (Table 3). 
German farms received above €150 thousand, the high-
est amount in the EU-28 in 2015, while the highest share of 
direct payments under degressivity was found in Slovakia 
(71% of payments were made above this threshold). The 
highest number of beneficiaries receiving direct payments 
above €150 thousand could also be found in Germany (Table 
3). The highest share in this regard is observable for Czech 
Republic (5.17%). Moreover, the average payment above 
€150 thousand to recipients was the highest in Croatia 
(almost €500,000 per beneficiary).
The idea of degressivity/capping described above, how-
ever, is not theoretically perfect. Bureau and Mahé (2015), 
for instance, found capping of payments almost completely 
ineffective at the European level. By allowing member 
states to choose different degressivity/capping options, the 
equal distribution of direct payments remains only rhetoric. 
The authors find a ‘general reluctance’ of member states to 
introduce effective capping. They also argued that deducing 
labour costs is a strange way of fostering rural employment 
as wage rates were mainly set by the national labour market, 
thereby resulting in a biased transfer of land and capital to 
labour. Moreover, heterogeneous proportions of large farms 
across Europe also make the capping idea hard to implement. 
Table 2: Degressivity and capping applied by the EU Member States.
Country Degressivity Capping
Austria YES Cap at 150,000€
Belgium (Flanders) YES Cap at 150,000€
Bulgaria YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ Cap at 300,000€
Cyprus YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Czech Republic YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Denmark YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Estonia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Finland YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Greece NO Cap at 150,000€
Hungary YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ Cap at 176,000€
Ireland NO Cap at 150,000€
Italy YES, cut of 50% above 150,000€ Cap at 500,000€
Latvia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Luxembourg YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Malta YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Netherlands YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Poland NO Cap at 150,000€
Portugal YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Slovakia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Slovenia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Spain YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Sweden YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
United Kingdom (England) YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) NO Cap at 150,000€
United Kingdom (Wales) YES, cut of 15% above 150,000€,  progressively increasing up to 300,000€, Cap at 300,000€
United Kingdom (Scotland) YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ Cap at 500,000€
Note: The table just contains countries applying degressivity/capping 
Source: own composition based on Anania and D’Andrea (2015)
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Table 3: Direct payments paid above €150,000 by member state, 2015.
Country Amount paid  (in 000 €) Out of total (%)
Number of  
beneficiaries
Out of total (%) Average payment to 
recipients (in €)
Austria 11,213 1.59 41 0.01 273,488
Belgium 11,440 2.08 58 0.17 197,241
Bulgaria 203,577 31.62 709 0.72 287,133
Croatia 25,747 16.16 52 0.01 495,134
Cyprus 695 1.35 4 0.01 173,750
Czech Republic 583,062 66.07 1,543 5.17 377,876
Denmark 164,160 17.42 747 2.53 219,759
Estonia 20,393 18.42 87 0.51 234,402
Finland 5,570 1.06 29 0.01 192,069
France 254,786 3.35 883 0.24 288,546
Germany 1,130,648 21.99 3,545 1.12 318,942
Greece 1,727 0.08 10 0.01 172,700
Hungary 432,039 33.63 1,090 0.01 396,366
Ireland 12,263 11.08 64 0.01 191,609
Italy 426,730 10.86 1,588 0.14 268,722
Latvia 13,153 8.40 59 0.01 222,932
Lithuania 38,116 9.67 144 0.10 264,694
Luxembourg 407 1.23 2 0.01 203,500
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 46,548 5.82 209 0.44 222,287
Poland 222,663 6.64 728 0.01 305,856
Portugal 76,957 11.93 335 0.21 229,722
Romania 233,581 16.46 785 0.01 297,555
Slovakia 305,630 70.87 816 4.62 374,547
Slovenia 7,554 5.56 16 0.01 472,125
Spain 417,361 0.08 1,569 0.01 266,004
Sweden 44,898 6.53 205 0.33 219,015
United Kingdom 431,485 13.87 1,714 1.03 251,742
EU-28 5,122,413 12.14 17,032 0.24 300,752
Source: own calculations based on DG AGRI (2015)
The average amount deduced was €144,531 in 2015 and 
€153,022 in 2016. The total amount ‘saved’ by degressivity 
was €46,371,476 in 2015 €39,331,252 in 2016 (compared to 
€69,746,000 in 2015 and €68,961,000 in 2016 moved from 
the first pillar to the second).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
BeneficiariesAmount paid
150,000 +100,000-149,9991,250-99,9990-1,249
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Figure 1: Distribution of direct payments and beneficiaries in 
Hungary, by amount received (thousand euro), 2015 financial year.
Source: own composition based on DG AGRI (2015) data
New evidence from Hungary1
According to the latest national statistics (HCSO, 
2017), there were 9 thousand agricultural enterprises and 
416 thousand agricultural holdings engaged in agriculture 
in 2016. However, many of the latter were subsistence or 
semi-subsistance farmers cultivating agricultural areas 
less than one hectare. According to the Hungarian Paying 
Agency, however, there were only 173,578 farms applying 
for direct payments in 2016, accounting for 41% of total 
farms. 
The distribution of direct payments in Hungary is well 
in line with European evidence (Figure 1). Almost 50% of 
beneficiaries received less than 5% of the total payments, 
while 34% of payments were received by 1% of the benefi-
ciaries. Most beneficiaries receive direct payments between 
€500 and €1250 (small farmers), while the highest amount of 
payments pertain to the €20-50 thousand size category.
In terms of degressivity/capping, Hungary chose to apply 
a 5% cut above €150,000 and a cap at €176,000, as evident 
from Table 1. Degressivity was applied to 568 farms in 
2015 (out of which capping was applied to 74) and to 534 
farms in 2016 (out of which capping was applied to 60).
1 All data in this section are from the Hungarian Paying Agency. 
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As a new result, the number of farms by physical size 
categories before and after degressivity/capping was imple-
mented is analysed here. Results echo the fear of Bureau and 
Mahé (2015), suggesting that degressivity/capping leads to 
the splitting up of farms. As it is observable from Table 4, the 
number of farms with over 1200 hectares UAA (affected by 
capping) decreased by 26% and by 41% from 2014 to 2015 
and 2016, respectively. In contrast to this decline, the num-
ber of farms with 600-1200 hectares UAA increased by 36% 
from 2014 to 2016, while the number of farms with 300-600 
hectares UAA also grew by 15%.
However, note that changes above are also due to the 
new Land Transaction Act in force since 2014. According to 
this, only active farmers (and their family members) living in 
Hungary and obtaining at least a secondary agricultural and/
or forestry qualification can buy land up to 300 hectares in 
total. National and foreign legal entities are excluded from 
the Hungarian land market. Moreover, the total area of land 
used by farmers cannot exceed 1,200 hectares (except for 
livestock farms and seed producers where the limit is 1,800 
hectares). Furthermore, in the new Land Transaction Act, 
pre-emption rights are provided for the Hungarian State, the 
farmer using the land, the neighbouring farmers, local farm-
ers and farmers living within a 20 km distance. 
All the above creates high administrative burdens and 
strong state control for local land markets. In terms of land 
use regulations, Hungarian land policy favours family farms 
instead of large farms, in line with its capping ceilings (note 
that €176,000 euro corresponds to 1200 ha in Hungary). On 
the whole, land regulations together with degressivity/cap-
ping are both responsible for the splitting up of large farms. 
Conclusions
The paper has analysed the impact of degressivity and cap-
ping on European farm structures by reviewing the literature 
and showing new evidence from Hungary. Results suggests 
that the CAP has had a high impact on farm structures. The 
vast majority of the studies conclude that government inter-
vention slows down structural change in European agricul-
ture, though the overall impact of different policy measures is 
rather mixed. Subsidies keep labour and farms in agriculture, 
and therefore also act against structural change necessary for 
productivity purposes. This somehow echoes the original 
dilemma – whether the CAP wants European agriculture to 
become productive (competitive) or socially fair (inclusive). 
The answer seems to be both as the political economy 
analysis of degressivity and capping suggests. The aim of 
direct payments is at least as much to increase competitive-
ness of farms as to be socially fair and equal by redistrib-
uting payments by farm size. However, as is evident from 
the above data, capping seems to be causing more harm 
than good. As the Hungarian example shows, it has actu-
ally decreased farm sizes and contributed to massive farm 
splitting. Therefore, the question today pertains not to the 
exact rate of degressivity and capping but rather to its very 
existence as the continuation of this idea seems to lead to the 
creation of smaller and hence less competitive farms. The 
idea of capping has, in practice, had results the opposite of 
what was intended.
Table 4: Number of farms by physical size categories in Hungary, 2012-2016.
 Farm size (UAA) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0-3 ha 58,546 59,732 60,143 55,373 54,922
3.01-5.00 ha 25,448 25,653 25,280 25,698 25,456
5.01-10.00 ha 32,214 32,433 32,134 33,808 33,863
10.01-25.00 ha 30,465 30,280 30,195 28,961 28,572
25.01-50.00 ha 12,997 13,032 13,024 13,035 13,044
50.01-100.00 ha 7,689 7,761 7,792 8,170 8,308
100.01-300.00 ha 6,509 6,574 6,669 6,979 7,154
300.01-600.00 ha 981 982 1,067 1,231 1,227
600.01-1,200.00 ha 556 566 565 701 773
1,200.01 ha - 477 443 439 323 259
Total 175,882 177,456 177,308 174,279 173,578
Source: own composition based on Hungarian Paying Agency data 
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Introduction
The European Union has as an aim the sustainable devel-
opment of agriculture and rural areas, an objective which 
is reflected in design of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) instruments (Kociszewski, 2014; Krzyżanowski, 
2015). The CAP has come under increasing criticism for not 
doing enough to limit the negative effect that certain farming 
practices have on the environment and climate, the acknowl-
edgement of which recently justified setting a new direction 
for agriculture development and support (European Court of 
Auditors, 2017a:10).
Under the new direct payment scheme, an obligation has 
been introduced since 2015 to apply agricultural practices 
deemed favourable for the climate and the environment, the 
so-called greening requirements. Greening is a major inno-
vation brought in under the 2013 CAP reform, making the 
system of direct payments more environmentally friendly. 
Mandatory green standards connected to direct payments of 
the first pillar of the CAP were defined as a novel approach 
(Matthews, 2013). “It was designed to reward farmers for 
having a positive impact on the environment which would 
otherwise not be rewarded by the market” (European Court 
of Auditors, 2017b: 1). The introduction of the new greening 
measures within Pillar 1 of the CAP was a significant but 
controversial aspect of this reform (Hart et al., 2016:57). 
All farmers entitled to the Single Area Payment Scheme 
in 2015 are obliged to implement greening, the extent 
depending on agricultural surface and structure. Currently, 
30% of the national financial envelope is connected with 
greening. In 2015, the rate of greening payment in Poland 
amounted to about 70 EUR/ha (MRiRW, 2015). 
Depending on the area of arable land used and the share 
of permanent grassland, farmers are required to follow one, 
two or three greening practices. Greening practices include: 
diversification of crops (applicable to farms with an arable 
land area of 10 ha or more), (b) maintenance of permanent 
grassland1 (the ratio of grassland to total agricultural area 
1 The reference ratio is calculated as a ratio of the permanent grassland area (de-
clared in 2012 and new permanent grassland area, not included in 2012 but declared 
in 2015) to the total agricultural land declared in 2015 (ARiMR, 2015b). As indicated 
in the announcement of the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (Dz. U. of 
30/11/2015, item 1163), the reference ratio was 18.75%.
may not decrease by more than 5% compared to the refer-
ence ratio) (MRiRW, 2015), (c) maintenance of Ecological 
Focus Areas (EFA) on at least 5% of arable land (this applies 
to farms with an arable land area of 15 ha or more). 
The greening mechanism involves many equivalent pro-
environmental practices, the selection of which is left to 
the individual farmer (Hart, 2015). Such a mechanism has 
allowed farmers to choose practices that are relevant to the 
specific character of their farms, including their location and 
the landscape (including valuable landscape elements within 
the farm), and the mode of agricultural production.
The requirement of crop diversification binds farmers to 
grow at least 2-3 different crops on arable land (depending on 
its area) and defines their percentage in the cropping pattern. 
Crops may also be diversified by using an equivalent practice 
applied as part of the agri-environment and climate measure 
under the RDP 2014-2020 (MRiRW, 2017b). As regards 
the EFA maintenance requirement, its fulfilment entails the 
maintenance of landscape, forest and agricultural features. 
Agricultural features include fallow land and the cultivation 
of plants that favourably affect soil condition, including the 
cultivation of nitrogen-fixing plants in the main crop, also in 
the form of catch crops and companion crops2.
EU regulations also provide for a number of exemp-
tions from the greening obligation. Farms where over 75% 
of agricultural land is permanent grassland or farms with a 
high percentage (over 75%) of arable land used for produc-
tion of grass or other green fodder crops or fallowed due to 
the favourable environmental impact are exempted from the 
crop diversification obligation or the obligation to maintain 
ecological focus areas3. Farms that participate in the small 
farms scheme are allowed to receive the greening payment 
despite the exemption from the greening obligation. The 
greening payments are automatically granted to farmers who 
2 The selection of specific EFA-eligible elements is to be made by individual Mem-
ber States (EC, 2017d). 
EFA elements in Poland: EFA1. fallow land, EFA2. hedges, EFA3. single trees, EFA4. 
trees in line, EFA5. trees in group, EFA6. field margins, EFA7. ponds, EFA8. ditches, 
EFA9. buffer strips, EFA10. land strips without production along forest, EFA11. land 
strips qualified for the payment, located along forest edges, EFA12. short-rotation cop-
pice, EFA13. afforested areas, EFA14a. stubble catch crops, EFA14b. winter catch 
crops, EFA 14c. undersown grasses, EFA15. nitrogen-fixing crops, see: (ARiMR, 
2015a). 
3 Provided that the arable land area does not exceed 30 ha.
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operate their farms in line with organic farming principles 
(ARiMR, 2015a; DPB, 2016; MRiRW, 2015).
In general, greening requirements have allowed farmers 
to get total support within the framework of direct payments. 
Farmers who use farmland in more sustainable way and care 
for natural resources benefit financially. As the European 
Commission (EC) justifies “Greening supports action to 
adopt and maintain farming practices that help meet envi-
ronment and climate goals. Market prices do not reflect 
the effort involved in providing these public goods” (EC, 
2017b). Changing agri-environmental practices as a condi-
tion of obtaining additional support helped spread the “pro-
vider gets principle” (Mauerhofer et al., 2013). According 
to the instrument’s underlying assumption, the majority of 
farmers were entitled to green payments, a fact which guar-
anteed the popularisation of those practices on the majority 
of EU agricultural land. 
The aim of this paper is to present the first effects of 
greening implementation in FADN farms in Poland, in the 
context of requirements concerning crop production organi-
sation and the maintenance of ecological focus area (EFA). 
The paper presents the organisation and outcomes of farms 
before and after greening introduction, both those entities 
that were obliged to comply, and those that were exempted 
from new requirements. The popularisation of greening 
practices indicates the efficiency of agricultural policy 
implementation.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section after 
introduction gives an overview of the existing literature on 
the topic, followed by the presentation of the research meth-
odology. The fourth section presents the main results, while 
the last section concludes. 
Literature review
The European Commission has assessed implementation 
and effectiveness of the various greening measures in 2015 
and 2016. The first review was focused on issues such as the 
implementation of greening measures and whether they cre-
ated a level-playing field, as well as their production poten-
tial (EC, 2017b). In 2015, agricultural land subject to at least 
one green direct payment obligation amounted to 72% of the 
total EU agricultural area. In the case of Poland, this indica-
tor amounted to over 80%. This area demonstrates the poten-
tial of green direct payments in delivering of environmental 
and climate benefits on a large share of the EU farmland. 
“The proportion of farmers under at least one greening obli-
gation stands at around 36% of direct payment beneficiaries” 
(EC, 2016: 5). In 2015, the most frequently declared EFA 
types were those linked to productive or potentially produc-
tive agricultural areas: nitrogen-fixing crops and catch crops 
that reached 54% of the total weighted EFAs (39% and 15% 
respectively, after applying the weighting factors), and fal-
low land. This was 5.4 % of the arable land under the EFA 
obligation (EC, 2017a: 8). In 2016, in the second year of 
greening implementation, the data suggested little change in 
comparison to 2015. Conversely, if one takes into account 
the level of difficulty for fulfilling specific greening require-
ments – the actual environmental improvement depends on 
the environmental ambition of the measures taken, which 
vary across EU Member States4. 
The evaluation based on international research (carried 
out after only two years of implementation of the greening 
measures, looking at the effects of the greening measures 
compared with the situation in 2014) indicated, that over-
all the greening measures have led to only small changes in 
management practices, with the exception of a few specific 
areas. The greening mechanism made only a low contribu-
tion towards promoting more sustainable farming practices 
and had a negligible effect on production or the economic 
viability of farms (EC, 2017a). “As currently implemented, 
it is unlikely to enhance the CAP’s environmental and cli-
mate performance significantly” (European Court of Audi-
tors, 2017a:1). Research based on modelling echoed this 
argument, indicating that in present form, the environmental 
impacts are rather limited and will not contribute much to 
improving the CAP provision of public goods (e.g. Solazzo 
et al., 2015; Cortignani et al., 2017; Gocht et al., 2017). 
There are indications that the CAP greening needs to be 
redefined and regionalised to ensure the transition towards 
‘greener’ agriculture (Galán-Martín et al., 2015). “However, 
the proponents of CAP greening argue that the inclusion of 
such measures is first political step to ‘open the door’ for the 
future adoption of novel agricultural policy measures pro-
moting a better environmental performance of the EU farm-
ing sector” (Louhichi et al., 2018). 
Another important strand of the literature in this topic 
analyses the relationship between greening and the produc-
tion potential of agriculture. Preliminary studies indicated 
that the effect of green direct payments on land use and agri-
cultural production is generally projected to remain very low 
over the medium term, with the noticeable exception of a 
slight increase in the share of permanent grassland, fallow 
land and protein grain production compared with a situation 
without green direct payments (EC, 2016:15). This is the 
basis for the claim that at present there is no competitive 
relationship between the environmental and production pur-
poses of the greening mechanism. However, first models in 
this regard indicated the reduction of agricultural outcomes 
in the short run and the increase of production costs in the 
long run as side effects of greening (Matthews, 2011). Sce-
nario modelling approach showed a reduction of production 
and an increase in the prices of agricultural products (Can-
tore, 2012), while the CAPRI model results indicated a slight 
reduction in farm productivity (Gocht et al., 2016). 
An assessment of likely CAP greening effects in Poland 
was already undertaken at the stage of preliminary administra-
tive proposals (Czekaj et al., 2012; Czekaj et al., 2014). The 
analysed greening scenarios indicated that the environmental 
restrictions concerned only a minor part of farms and they 
would have little impact on their operation and outcomes. 
There have also been scientific papers based on the public sta-
tistics data in order to identify the effects of greening in Poland 
(Wąs and Jaroszewska, 2017; Wąs and Jaroszewska 2017b), 
although applied methodology so far have not been able to 
separate external factors affecting Polish farms after greening. 
On the whole, the majority of international research con-
cerning the effects of greening is very general (EC, 2016; 
4 See (EC, 2017d).
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EC 2017; Hart, 2015; Hart et al., 2016), with these compris-
ing changes in the agricultural sector, at both the country and 
the EU levels. Studies taking into account the performance 
of farms generally were based on model solutions, since 
the available data did not allow an assessment of the actual 
effects of greening (Galán-Martín et al., 2015; Louhichi et 
al., 2018). 
The results of studies commissioned by the European 
Commission, which involve international comparison, high-
light the problem of the effectiveness of greening5. There-
fore, this also underlines the need to precisely examine prac-
tices related to the implementation of greening in individual 
Member States, taking account of the organisation of agri-
cultural production both on farms under the greening obliga-
tion and farms exempted from it, and factors that have deter-
mined it, also prior to the introduction of this mechanism6. 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of greening is the basic 
determinant for the continuation and possible modification 
of this mechanism in the next Common Agricultural Policy 
programming period. 
Methodology
Concerning the above, there is high need for accurate 
selection of groups of farms which were obliged directly to 
implement the greening requirements, in order to identify 
the actual first effects of greening. Agricultural accounting 
data have made it possible to conduct such research, with 
the selection of targeted farms, to monitor organisational, 
production and economic effects of the analysed legal rules. 
From 2015, Polish agricultural accountancy data resources 
have provided detailed identification of farmers’ actions cov-
ered by the mechanism of greening7. The proposed research 
approach presented in the paper is an example of agricultural 
accounting data used in the context of greening, which can 
be developed on the basis of other EU countries data sources.
The paper is based on the panel of 7.4 thousand private 
farms included in the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN), both in 2014, and 2015. FADN data allow an analy-
sis of agricultural holdings situation, both in terms of organi-
sation and production, as well as economic performance. 
Individual agricultural accounting data allow researchers 
to recognise the actual situation of agricultural holdings, 
selected according to the adopted justified criteria. In con-
trast to the model approach, the actual FADN data enable the 
farms’ state in the studied range to be represented with high 
precision. 
From 2015 Polish FADN has introduced an additional 
questionnaire survey on the effects of the greening mecha-
nism, which has been in force since the introduction of the 
new legal rules connected with agro-environmental practices 
(EC, 2016b). In accordance with the Commission Imple-
menting Regulation, there was a transitional period between 
2015 and 2017 for detailed information on greening (EFA 
elements), (Official Journal of the European Union L. 46/1, 
5 Comparison of greening effects in different European countries is presented in: 
(EC 2016; EC, 2017d; Hart et al., 2016).
6 Papers that concern the implementation of greening in Poland in 2015, see e.g. 
(Wrzaszcz 2017a, Wrzaszcz 2017b).
7 See: (EC, 2016b).
2015). In the case of the Polish FADN, detailed information 
has been already collected since 2015, enabling detailed 
analysis of greening in the first year of its implementa-
tion. Polish FADN took into account both formal greening 
requirements, including individual practices of this mecha-
nism and exemptions (FADN, 2018). There was the same 
agricultural holdings` panel (and farms` groups panel) cho-
sen for the research, taking part in agricultural accounting in 
the year before the introduction of greening (2014) and in a 
year when greening was already formally in force (2015). 
Additionally, as recent studies have indicated (MRiRW, 
2016; Kowalski, 2018) natural, institutional and market con-
ditions as expected did not diversify the production situation 
in Polish agriculture in 2015, as compared to 2014. National 
legislation on agriculture in 2015, was also not a factor dif-
ferentiating the farmers` production decisions, as compared 
to 2014. Therefore, thanks to the deliberate choice of agricul-
tural holdings in accordance with the greening requirements, 
the changes that have occurred in these farms, with high 
probability, can be identified as correlating and/or caused by 
the new greening mechanism based on deduction reasoning.
All analysed farms participated in Single Area Payment 
Scheme. The study omitted agricultural holdings exempted 
from greening on the basis of general principles (e.g. organic 
farms, farms with high share of permanent grassland, etc.) 
and those applying the equivalent practices. Greening mech-
anism focuses on production organisation on arable land, 
hence the studied farms’ population does not include entities 
lacking this land type. 
The farms’ panel selection made it possible to identify 
organisational changes in agricultural production after the 
introduction of greening in 2015, compared with 2014, that 
is the year when the greening mechanism was not in force. 
The farms’ panel was divided into two groups, namely: small 
farms, not obliged to greening fulfilment (below 10 ha of 
arable land) and those farms, obliged to greening (with an area 
of at least 10 ha of arable land). The second group was addi-
tionally divided into two sub-groups, namely smaller farms 
(10-15 ha), which are required to crop diversification, as well 
as larger farms (15 ha or more), which in addition to diversi-
fication of crops, should also ensure adequate surface of EFA. 
Classifying the analysed farms’ panel in this way made it 
possible to indicate agricultural production changes, which 
were mainly organisational, depending on the scope of the 
existing administrative requirements related to the mecha-
nism of greening. Both farms obliged to greening and those 
exempted from the obligation (the control group) were ana-
lysed in the scope of agricultural production organisation to 
identify the actual impact of the administrative instrument and 
symptoms of those changes, beyond the formal requirements. 
Identification of agricultural production organisation in farms 
exempted from greening makes it possible to assign observed 
changes (or the maintenance of the status quo) to other condi-
tions of farms’ operation, beyond the administrative mecha-
nism of greening. As a complement to the study, there were 
illustrated the production and economic results of analysed 
farms’ groups. Precise evaluation of farms’ results requires 
further analysis based on the data from subsequent years.
Due to the fact that since 2015, the FADN system has 
been registering the practices that are applied on farms under 
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the greening mechanism in order to identify actual farming 
practices related to EFA maintenance, a population of farms 
with at least 15 ha of arable land that are covered with this 
requirement has been singled out. The 2015 population of 
farms with EFA area amounted to 4,700, while the popula-
tion of farms keeping agricultural accounts consisted of 
12,105 private farms.
Farms’ number and land use
The studied population of 7,392 farms was dominated 
by those that were under the greening obligation (77%, 
Figure 1, left). The population of farms under the greening 
requirements amounted to 5,705, and the majority of these 
farms were larger farms, i.e. farms with the minimum of 
15 ha of arable land. Larger farms are obliged to comply with 
the greening requirements in regard to both crop diversifica-
tion and maintenance of ecological focus areas. The impor-
tance of this group of farms results from their total area. In 
the case of the studied panel, the farms with at least 15 ha of 
arable land held over 90% of area.
The greening requirements basically refer to the manner 
of arable land use but also involve monitoring related to the 
maintenance of permanent grassland. Therefore, this study 
has focused on both the classification of land in the identified 
groups of farms and on the changes in this regard (Table 1).
The arable land area in farms under the greening obliga-
tion was comparable in the analysed years. In the case of 
smaller farms (10-15 ha), the fallow land area and change to 
it was small in physical terms and resulted in a small reduc-
tion in crop area. However, the larger farms (15 ha or more) 
increased their arable land area, including the fallow land 
(by nearly 50%)8. In the latter group, the additional land was 
put to use in 2015. The increase in this area was related to 
the adjustment of the larger farms in order to comply with 
the EFA maintenance. Driven by the aim of increasing the 
area of ecological focus, the farmers increased the farm area 
by including additional fallow land and at the same time 
maintained the area used for crop production9. The farmers 
purchased or leased the land that had not previously been 
used for agricultural purposes. 
In the case of farms exempted from greening (ones with 
less than 10 ha), the area of arable land in use and perma-
nent grassland was comparable in the analysed years. The 
fallow land area was a minor portion of their area. Their area 
increased to an extent that is definitely smaller than in the 
case of farms obliged to maintain EFAs.
What needs to be emphasised is the fact that the farms 
exempted from greening strongly differed from the larger 
ones in terms of land use. In the former group, permanent 
grassland took as much as a third of the agricultural land 
area, which determines their significance in terms of the 
carbon sequestration capacity, soil production potential and 
biodiversity. On the other hand, among farms under green-
ing obligation, the percentage of permanent grasslands was 
significantly lower (21% for farms with 10–15 ha, and 9% 
for farms with 15 ha or more). These figures show that it
8 In physical terms, however, this area was small and amounted to mere 0.7% of 
arable land area.
9 Compare with results for farms population in Poland, presented in: (Wąs and Jaro-
szewska, 2017).
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Figure 1: Structure of farms` number (left) and agricultural land (right) by area farms` groups in 2015.
Source: own composition based on FADN data 2015.
Table 1: Land use in not obliged and obliged farms to greening (in ha).
No. Specification
2014 2015 Change  
(in ha)
2014 2015 Change  
(in ha)
2014 2015 Change  
(in ha)≤10 ha 10-15 ha ≥15 ha
1 Arable land 14,168 13,870 -298 19,491 19,286 -205 205,904 208,570 2,666
2 Fallow land 229 274 45 145 170 25 985 1,472 487
3 Orchards 1,565 1,597 32 308 322 14 705 701 -4
4 Permanent grassland 7,667 7,786 119 5,192 5,186 -6 20,131 19,457 -674
5 Agricultural land 23,400 23,253 -147 24,990 24,794 -196 226,739 228,729 1,990
Source: own composition based on FADN data for 2014-2015.
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Table 2: Crops in not obliged and obliged farms to greening (in ha, change in %).
No. Specification
2014 2015 Change 
(in %)
2014 2015 Change 
(in %)
2014 2015 Change 
(in %)≤10 ha 10-15 ha ≥15 ha
1
Winter crops  
(for the next year)
4,525 4,654 103 7,791 7,739 99 113,782 117,858 104
2 Catch crops 266 198 74 386 318 82 5318 11,343 213
3 Cereals 9,133 8,753 96 13,581 13,177 97 136,619 134,087 98
4 Pulses for grain 350 542 155 396 683 172 6,305 11,456 182
5 Pulses for grain: edible 32 46 144 40 112 280 436 1,333 306
6 Pulses for grain: fodder 199 372 187 197 413 210 2,975 7,488 252
7 Fodder: field pea 22 28 127 47 71 151 383 1,154 301
8 Fodder: horse bean 10 30 300 22 49 223 234 801 342
9 Fodder: sweet lupine 105 204 194 87 229 263 2,058 4,931 240
10
Pulses for grain: pulse mixes 
with others 119 124 104 158 158 100 2893 2,635 91
11 Industrial crops 542 522 96 1,202 1,150 96 37,825 36,800 97
12 Potatoes 447 411 92 620 548 88 3,387 3,434 101
13 Fodder crops 2,614 2,669 102 3,069 3,206 104 17,260 18,931 110
14 Fodder crops: Grasses 611 663 109 508 612 120 2,380 2,834 119
15 Fodder crops: Pulses 11 31 282 27 20 74 99 200 202
16
Fodder crops:  
papilionaceous 99 119 120 144 196 136 839 1,383 165
17
Fodder crops: papiliona-
ceous mixes with grasses
746 662 89 451 344 76 2,757 2,311 84
Source: own comparison based on FADN data 2014-2015.
40% respectively). Farmers had numerous options allowing 
them to ensure the required number of cultivated crop spe-
cies, which shows the great flexibility of the greening instru-
ments. The farmers’ selection in this regard was determined 
primarily by the organisation of crop production in 2014, i.e. 
just before the imposition of greening. The maintenance of 
cropping patterns that take account of the relevant propor-
tion of spring and winter crop varieties in 2015 resulted in 
the exemption of farmers from the obligation to introduce 
significant organisational changes to crop production. It can 
be stated that greening contributed to the continuation of the 
favourable status quo regarding the winter vegetation cover. 
In this respect, greening can be considered effective.
In the case of the smallest farms exempted from the 
greening obligation (below 10 ha), the winter crop area was 
definitely lower compared to the farms under the obligation 
because these crops took as little as a third of the crop area 
on arable land. Also, when comparing 2015 to 2014, there 
is no favourable change in this regard. Farmers utilising a 
small arable land area are not legally bound to diversify their 
crops, and they are also not motivated to increase the winter 
crop area.
The cropping patterns of farms under greening obligation 
were dominated by cereals (as of 2015, in the case of the 
10–15 ha farms, the percentage of cereals was 69%, while in 
the case of farms with 15 ha or more it was 65%). The per-
centage of cereals slightly dropped, when comparing 2015 to 
2014 (about 2 percentage points). When assessing the crop-
ping patterns of an average farm under greening obligation, 
it can be stated that the proportion of other crops, including 
soil-improving crops, i.e. pulses and papilionaceous crops is 
negligible – in total, they amount to just a few per cent. How-
ever, pulses and papilionaceous crops, both edible species 
grown for grain and fodder crops, are an important element 
of the cropping pattern, which has favourable impact on the 
is reasonable to vary the greening requirements depend-
ing on the farm’s area and structure of agricultural land 
because on the smaller farms, the percentage of grass-
land is higher (on average) – it is a particularly important 
natural habitat for both the preservation of species and 
the continuity of natural processes. From this perspective, 
larger farms, where larger area is used for crop produc-
tion through arable land use, should ensure its organisa-
tion so that it is favourable for generating environmental 
benefits resulting from the agricultural practice. However, 
the substitution scale of permanent grassland maintenance 
and proper management of arable land is an open question.
Arable land use
The fulfilment of the crop diversification and EFA 
requirements correlates to a specific cropping pattern. There-
fore, analysis of the cropping patterns on arable land has to 
pay attention to the varieties and groups of main crops and 
catch crops. 
In accordance with the greening requirements, farms 
under the crop diversification obligation should grow at least 
two crop species. According to the legal rules, spring and 
winter crops are treated as separate species. As shown in 
Table 2, inclusion of spring and winter varieties to a large 
extent allowed the crop diversification requirement to be sat-
isfied, particularly in the case of farms with 10–15 ha. The 
high value of winter cover ratio makes it possible to state 
that the organisation of crop production to a large extent had 
complied with the crop diversification requirement a year 
before it was introduced. The observed cropping pattern in 
regard to winter cover on arable land was more favourable 
on large farms than on smaller farms (in 2015, the percentage 
of area under winter crops in these two groups was 57% and 
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soil organic matter, and in turn on the soil productivity. This 
is a reason for considering the papilionaceous crops as an 
ecological focus area. When comparing 2015 to 2014, there 
is a need to observe that the area of soil-improving crops 
significantly increased, which was particularly observable 
on larger farms10. These changes occurred both on smaller 
farms, which selected pulses for the sake of crop diversifica-
tion, and the larger ones, which were in addition obliged to 
ensure EFA. In the case of larger farms – 15 ha or more – the 
area of edible and fodder pulses for grain grew 3 and 2.5 
times respectively. 
Another important element of the cropping pattern were 
fodder crops, particularly papilionaceous crops and pulses 
for green fodder and grasses on arable land. In the case of 
the farms under greening obligation, their area on average 
increased over 1.5 times. Operators of larger farms, i.e. farms 
with 15 ha of arable land or more, were more active in this 
regard. These results show the impact of legal regulations 
related to greening, including ones concerning the mainte-
nance of EFAs, on decisions made by farmers in regard to the 
area of soil-improving crops. 
The cropping patterns of farms exempted from greening 
were also dominated by cereals (65% in 2015). In the case 
of these farms, a relatively larger crop area was under fodder 
crops (particularly fodder maize, field grass and papiliona-
ceous mixes and multi-species mixes). The smaller farms 
tend to combine crop and livestock production, which also 
determines the manner of arable land use. The dynamic 
of changes in pulses area, however, did not equal the ones 
observed in the case of farms under greening obligation.
 As shown by the presented figures, the farms not legally 
obliged to diversify their crops and maintain EFAs also fol-
low the same course in the reorganisation of crop production, 
but they differ in its dynamic. The increase in the area of 
pulses and papilionaceous crops can surely be attributed to 
greening, but it is not the sole determinant. In this context, 
there is a need to stress the importance of other instruments, 
such as the agri-environmental programmes, or direct sup-
port for soil-improving crop production, which have been 
encouraging farmers to cultivate crops in a symbiosis with 
natural environment11. The additional incentive in the form 
10 See (Wąs and Jaroszewska 2017a). The same direction of changes was observed 
for population of farms in Poland. The different influences of soil improving crops on 
biodiversity need to be outlined (Hart et al., 2016). 
11 The observed direction of the sown area change in Poland, indicated the influence 
of the CAP instruments, that support the production of protein crops in recent years. 
The increase in surface of these plants from 2010, was associated with the area direct 
payments (Wąs and Jaroszewska 2017b). The more dynamic growth of this surface 
took place in 2015. The presented figures indicated that, in addition to area direct pay-
ment for the protein crops, greening had the essential importance in farmers` produc-
tion decisions, which provided an extra boost to the increase of soil improving crop 
cultivation.
of the greening payment surely incentivised farmers to make 
the desired and more dynamic changes to their farms. 
Apart from the change to the area of main crops, there 
was also a change to the area of catch crops. Catch crops 
are one of the most important elements forming the agricul-
tural EFA. Their importance results from the soil-improv-
ing and protective properties, but they can also be used as 
fodder. As shown by the data, catch crops supplemented 
the cropping patterns in farms under the greening obliga-
tion, but their area significantly grew in 2015 in the case 
of the larger farms (obliged to ensure EFAs). In the case of 
those farms, the percentage of catch crops increased from 
2.6% to 5.5%, when comparing 2014 and 2015. On the 
smaller farms, however, this area dropped, which indicates 
the significance of the greening mechanism. In the case of 
farms exempted from greening, catch crops were grown on 
an even smaller area, which significantly dropped in 2015 
compared to 2014 – by 25%. Thus, the percentage of catch 
crops in the cropping patterns dropped from 1.9% in 2014 
to 1.5% in 2015. Presented changes in the cropping pat-
terns and the catch crop area (growth on the larger farms 
and drop on the smaller farms) indicated that the greening 
effectively encourages farmers to maintain EFAs through 
agricultural practices. Farmers not legally obliged to grow 
catch crops didn’t introduce organisational changes aimed 
at increasing this crop area. 
EFA specification12
The applicable legislation specified many different ele-
ments of EFA, that are related to agriculture, forests and 
landscape13. In accordance with the specification, most of 
these elements concern landscape, while some of them are 
related to the organisation of plant production, i.e. the use of 
catch crops and companion crops, as well as the cultivation 
of nitrogen-fixing plants. The farmer can decide which ele-
ments are to be used to comply with the EFA requirement. 
In 2015, total EFA in farms keeping agricultural accounting 
was 15,000 ha14, which accounted for 6.5% of arable land 
(tab. 3). This number shows that the analysed farms fully 
complied with the requirement to maintain EFA (taking into 
account the result for the entire analysed farms` group). 
As indicated in Table 3, farmers concentrated on suitable 
plant production, adjusted to environmental requirements, 
12 See (Wrzaszcz, 2017a).
13 See footnote No. 5.
14 This area refers to the weighted area. Due to different environmental significance 
of the various EFA elements (agricultural and landscape ones), an EFA weighted area 
is given (MRiRW, 2016).
Table 3: The main EFA elements (in 2015).
Elements
Farms Surface EFA
Number % Converted (ha) Weighed (ha) Converted (%) Weighted (%)
EFA14a: stubble catch crops 2,707 57.1 16,749 5,025 54.2 34.2
EFA15: nitrogen-fixing crops 2,229 47.0 11,173 7,821 36.1 53.2
EFA14b: winter catch crops 275 5.8 1,610 483 5.2 3.3
EFA1: fallow land 228 4.8 804 804 2.6 5.5
EFA in total 4,744 n.a. 30,910 14,699 100 100
Source: own composition based on 2015 FADN data.
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and only few of them selected landscape and forest elements 
(these accounted for just a few per cent of the total EFA). 
A total of 87% of the weighted ecological area was used for 
stubble catch crops and the cultivation of nitrogen-fixing 
crops. Farmers did not diversify EFA – one or two EFA 
types were selected most often on the farm level (which 
was done by 94% of farms). Farmers’ choices related to 
meeting the EFA requirement by plants cultivation in the 
main crop and secondary crop translated into a change in 
the cropping pattern in their farms, thus improving water 
and soil conditions.
These results demonstrate the importance of the agricul-
tural elements of EFA in the context of compliance with this 
requirement of the EU law. The farmers’ selection of specific 
EFA elements could have been imposed to a large extent by 
the administrative requirements related to specific elements 
of ecological focus area. Particular difficulties that a farmer 
faced were related with keeping the registration of specific 
landscape elements. Pursuant to the administrative require-
ments, there is an obligation to measure and illustrate the 
size of each EFA element, which also involves its presenta-
tion on the maps. An important issue is the preparation of 
an up-to-date record of valuable natural resources in Poland, 
including their location on farms under the EFA obligation. 
The results can indirectly indicate a small proportion of valu-
able landscape and forest features compared to the utilised 
area on larger farms. 
Farms’ outcomes15
Analysing the impact of greening on the farms` organi-
sation, there is a need to mention their production and 
economic outcomes. The results of the analysed farms 
have been illustrated both through the factor productiv-
ity and profitability indicators and the subsidies absorption 
15 According to FADN data, the average exchange rate in 2015 was EUR 1 = PLN 4.18. 
(Table 4)16. The data presented should be regarded as a rec-
ognition that farms’ production and economic situation differ 
according to the scope of their greening requirement imple-
mentation. Due to administrative decisions related to the 
earlier payment of advances on direct payments in 2015, it is 
not possible to quantify precisely the economic effects in the 
first year of the greening implementation. Detailed diagnosis 
also requires additional price analysis of agricultural prod-
ucts variety. It should be underlined that greening was not 
associated with higher subsidy value for farmers, but was a 
necessary condition to get a part of direct support. However, 
organisational changes associated with greening can also 
have an impact on the agricultural production volume, its 
sort structure and final value. Thus, greening’s influence on 
the farms’ outcomes can be assessed indirectly. As indicated 
by the figures in Table 4, the final economic outcome of the 
agricultural producer to a comparable extent depended on 
the value of agricultural production and the size of the sup-
port in the form of subsidies.
With farms under the greening obligation, the productiv-
ity of production factors slightly dropped, while their profita-
bility was comparable in the analysed years, both in the case 
of the smaller (10–15 ha) and the larger ones (15 ha or more). 
The amount of the granted subsidies has to be seen otherwise 
– this value grew significantly in 2015 compared to 2014 – 
by 18%. The increase in the subsidy transfer should be attrib-
uted primarily to the administration decision (scope of and 
criteria for the granting of subsidies, and the introduction of 
advance payments related to direct payments) and then to 
the farmer (their greater activity). It has to be remembered 
that in 2015, the first year when greening was implemented, 
only a small percentage of the beneficiaries actually received 
the related payment. The role of the administrative decision 
that granted advances of direct payments to farmers in late 
2015 (MRiRW, 2015) also needs to be acknowledged: i.e. it 
took place much earlier than in the previous years. Subsidy 
16 Categories and definitions of standard results of farms were presented in: 
(Floriańczyk et al., 2017).
Table 4: Outcomes, subsidies and their relation*.
No. Specification
2014 2015 Change 
(in %)
2014 2015 Change 
(in %)
2014 2015 Change 
(in %)≤10 ha 10-15 ha ≥15 ha
1 Total output (1000 euro/ha) 1,93 1,99 103 1,73 1,65 95 1,57 1,47 94
2
Total output  
(1000 euro/AWU)
14,69 15,30 104 18,48 17,62 95 39,16 37,14 95
3
Gross farm income  
(1000 euro/ha)
1,00 1,14 114 0,85 0,87 102 0,78 0,76 97
4
Gross farm income  
(1000 euro/AWU)
7,66 8,72 114 9,08 9,27 102 19,38 19,31 100
5 Income (1000 euro/ha) 0,67 0,79 118 0,59 0,60 102 0,56 0,54 96
6 Income (1000 euro/FWU) 5,08 6,08 120 6,29 6,40 102 14,08 13,74 98
7 Direct Payments/Subsidies 
(%)
65 70 5 p.p. 69 75 6 p.p. 63 71 9 p.p.
8 Single Area Payments/ 
Subsidies (%)
52 57 5 p.p. 57 61 4 p.p. 56 61 5 p.p.
9 Subsidies/Output (%) 16 17 1 p.p. 15 19 3 p.p. 17 21 4 p.p.
10 Subsidies/Income (%) 54 49 -5 p.p. 50 57 7 p.p. 53 65 12 p.p.
11
Balance Subsidies and  
Taxes/Income (%)
38 37 -1 p.p. 38 46 8 p.p. 38 49 11 p.p.
* 1 AWU/FWU is the equivalent of the full-time labour of all workers/only farming family members. All production and economic categories in current prices; p.p.– in percent-
age points.  
Source: own studies based on FADN data 2014-2015.
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transfers for the preceding years were basically made in the 
following year17. 
When comparing 2015 to 2014, it can be stated that the 
role of subsidies contributing to the economic situation of 
farms under the greening obligation increased, which is 
shown e.g. by the higher ratio of payments to farm produc-
tion value. In 2015, nearly half of the farm income came 
from that source, while in 2014, its share was 38%18. The 
presented figures indicate that the funds in the form of subsi-
dies now exert an increasing impact on the economic condi-
tion of farms, particularly in the case of larger farms. In addi-
tion, this phenomenon has recently become more visible.
Productivity of production factors on the farms exempted 
from greening was comparable in the analysed years, and the 
profitability rations grew significantly (from a dozen or so 
per cent for added value to 20% in the case of income when 
comparing 2015 to 2014), which has not been observed in 
the case of farms under the greening obligation. The subsidy 
to production ratio indicated that the economic situation of 
the farms exempted from greening was less dependent on 
the cash flows from subsidies compared to the farms under 
the greening obligation. The studied years also saw a decline 
in the importance of such subsidies for the economic perfor-
mance of farms below 10 ha. 
Main conclusions
This paper has discussed the effectiveness of greening 
scheme in Poland. The changes that occurred on farms after 
new requirements introduction were evaluated on the bases 
of 2014-2015 Polish FADN data. The first year of analysis 
presented the farms` state before the implementation of 
greening, while the next year showed the situation when the 
requirements came into force. This analysis has been sup-
plemented by a parallel analysis of farms exempted from that 
obligation, which were used as a control group. Comparison 
of results for farms under the greening obligation (at least 
10 ha of arable land) and exempted from it (below 10 ha 
of arable land) enabled the identification of organisational 
changes to farms that were introduced as a consequence of 
the new administrative solutions.
The main conclusions from the study, which refer to the 
analysed group of Polish FADN farms and legal regulations 
related to greening that have been binding on farmers since 
2015:
1.	 Greening requirements related to land use had no adverse 
impact on the production potential of farms. 
2.	 The different structure of agricultural land in use has 
indicated that it is reasonable to diversify the environ-
mental requirements imposed on smaller and larger 
farms. 
3.	 Farms with at least 15 ha of arable land took the most 
organisational measures to adjust to the new adminis-
trative requirements. This state of affairs corresponds to 
17 In 2015, the advances of direct payments were paid for the first time. These ad-
vance payments, at 50% of the total payment, were paid in advance of: the Single Area 
Payment, additional payment, protein crop payment, and the soft fruit payment. In 
total, about 80% of the direct payment beneficiaries received such advances (MRiRW, 
2016).
18 Also including tax liabilities. 
the assumed impact of the greening mechanism, which 
confirms its effectiveness.
4.	 The environmentally friendly organisation of Polish 
farms before the introduction of the greening require-
ment allowed them to adjust smoothly in 2015. 
5.	 Maintaining the status quo on farms (as regards win-
ter crop) or the introduction of desired organisational 
changes to crop production is the quintessence of the 
measures related to the meeting of the greening require-
ments. In this aspect, greening can be considered effec-
tive. 
6.	 In the context of pulse and papilionaceous crop areas 
increasing, there is a need to stress the importance of 
greening, but also the agri-environmental programmes 
and direct support for soil-improving crops, which have 
been encouraging farmers to cultivate crops in a “sym-
biosis” with the environment.
7.	 The farms not legally obliged to diversify their crops 
and maintain EFAs also follow the same course in the 
reorganisation of crop production, but they differ in 
terms of its dynamic. The more favourable dynamic of 
such changes on farms under the greening obligation 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the mechanism.
8.	 Maintenance of EFAs on farms requires basically an 
appropriate crop production organisation. It is reason-
able to carry out administrative work aimed at simplify-
ing the procedures related to the listing of landscape and 
forest elements, to encourage farmers to preserve them.
9.	 Another issue that should be considered important is the 
determination of substitutability of different agricultural 
practices in terms of the environmental impact and main-
tenance of natural resources at the farmers’ disposal. 
10.	 The extent to which the “desired” agri-environmental 
practices are implemented should serve as a basis for 
assessing the environmental effectiveness of greening. 
As indicated in the discussion presented in the academic 
literature, the environmental effects of greening are 
deemed insufficient due to the adopted greening require-
ments. 
11.	 In the first year of the implementation of greening, these 
requirements did not adversely impact the production 
and economic performance because the area allocated to 
the ecological focus areas amounted to mere several per 
cent of the area in use and the crop diversification crite-
ria did not force any significant organisational change in 
crop production. 
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Introduction
China first implemented the export tax rebate policy in 
1985. This policy enables export companies to get a partial 
or total refund for the indirect tax paid during the production 
and distribution processes. In the agricultural sectors, the 
export tax rebate is implemented not only in order to provide 
the exporting firms with a higher profit, but also in order to 
enhance the income of farm producers. This is due to the 
connection between the retail and farm markets, and thus the 
tax rebate is considered to alleviate the poverty of China’s 
rural population (which accounted for 50.32% of the total 
population in 2016, according to FAO data). 
However, this policy imposes a heavy fiscal burden on 
the Chinese government, and the large size of the rebates can 
be said to crowd out government expenditures on education, 
social security, etc. (Cui, 2003). An export tax rebate can be 
split between an increase in the domestic price and a reduc-
tion in the export price, and thus improves foreign consum-
ers’ welfare. Many financial commentators point out that in 
some industries, the tax rebate is decreasing the export price 
to a larger extent than increasing the domestic supply price. 
Hence it works more to subsidise foreign consumers than 
domestic producers. As a result, the debate over whether this 
policy should be abolished in certain sectors continues. 
The effects of the export tax rebate have attracted much 
attention in the literature. Most studies find a positive rela-
tionship between the tax or tariff rebate and exports (Chao 
et al., 2001; Chandra and Long, 2013; Chen et al., 2006; Gour-
don et al., 2017), except for one case in the agricultural and 
food industry (Chao et al., 2006). However, when it comes 
to welfare effects, studies on export tax rebates or export 
subsidies mainly focus on the whole country’s welfare (e.g., 
Brander and Spencer, 1985; Chao et al., 2006; Jarvis, 2012; 
Yin and Yin, 2005). Few discuss how the welfare gains or 
losses are distributed among different groups in a specific sec-
tor, including domestic producers, domestic consumers, and 
foreign consumers at the retail level, or among suppliers of 
different inputs. An export promotion policy (such as an export 
subsidy or export tax rebate) increases the domestic price and 
thus, according to the price theory, such a policy improves the 
domestic producers’ welfare at the expense of domestic con-
sumers’ surplus. However, is it possible that the beneficiaries 
are foreign consumers, instead of domestic producers? What 
affects the welfare distribution effects of such policy? Moreo-
ver, in an agricultural sector, how does such a policy affect the 
farm and non-farm input producers? As mentioned before, the 
export tax rebate imposes a heavy fiscal burden on the govern-
ment, and may be detrimental to domestic consumers; thus, it 
is important to address these questions.
This paper attempts partially to fill this gap by simulating 
the incidence of the export tax rebate, including the price 
effects and the distribution of welfare gains among differ-
ent groups in an agricultural sector with a partial equilibrium 
approach. Then, the model is applied to the Chinese fish-
ery sector, which provides a typical context for the disputes 
on the export tax rebate policy. In 2008, the rebate rate for 
several types of fishery products1 was increased from 5% to 
13%. Critics have pointed out that the export tax rebate is 
subsidising foreign consumers and that domestic produc-
ers are getting few benefits, and thus this policy results in a 
waste of taxpayers’ money.
In this paper, we first use an equilibrium displacement 
model (EDM) to investigate the effects of the export tax 
rebate on prices and trade flows. EDMs are widely used to 
evaluate the effects of exogenous shocks in food and agricul-
ture sectors, especially those caused by government policies 
(Dhoubhadel et al., 2015; Gardner, 1975; Kinnucan and Cai, 
2011; Leister et al., 2015; Wohlgenant, 1989). Then, follow-
ing the method of Sun and Kinnucan (2001), we calculate the 
distribution of welfare changes for Chinese domestic pro-
ducers, domestic consumers, and foreign consumers using 
the EDM simulation results. 
1 They include frozen tilapia, frozen tilapia fillets, frozen crustacean, molluscs, etc.
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Although the policy is implemented at the retail level, 
we also consider the farm level and the linkage between the 
two levels, as not considering such vertical linkage may pro-
duce inaccurate results. In this paper, Wohlgenant’s (1989) 
method is followed since the retail and the farm markets 
are linked through the retail price and the farm price. In this 
way, we are able to obtain not only more accurate results for 
the retail market, but also a realistic estimate of the benefits’ 
allocation between producers of farm and non-farm inputs at 
the input level.
Methodology
Model
Consider a simplified situation in which retail producers 
purchase inputs from the farm market to produce a homo-
geneous product and sell them in both domestic and export 
markets. An export tax rebate is implemented in the retail 
market for the export goods. The industry is assumed to be 
competitive within the country2 and the Law of One Price 
holds. The economy is large in that it affects the world price. 
Ignoring all tariffs and other trade barriers, the initial equi-
librium of an agricultural sector can be defined as follows:
Retail market: 
 (Domestic demand) (1)
 (Inverse supply) (2)
 (Export demand) (3)
 (Domestic price) (4)
 (Export price) (5)
 (Market clearing) (6)
Farm market:
 (Inverse demand) (7)
 (Supply) (8)
 (Market clearing) (9)
In this model for China, DR and SR are the retail-level 
domestic demand and supply, respectively; XR is the retail-
level export;   is the retail-level domestic demand price;  
 is the retail-level export price;   is the retail-level sup-
ply price; DF and SF are the farm-level demand and supply, 
respectively; and PF is the farm-level price. The variables 
VAT and ETR represent the value-added tax and the export 
tax rebate3, respectively. Then, an isolated increase in  VAT 
increases both domestic and export prices, while an isolated 
increase in ETR increases the domestic price and reduces the 
export price. Finally, PN is the price of non-farm inputs. The 
retail- and farm-level markets are linked by the domestic 
retail-level supply equation and the farm-level demand equa-
2 According to Enke (1944) and Kinnucan and Zhang (2004), when one takes into 
account the ability of the government to exercise market power, a country within which 
there is pure competition amongst buyers and sellers can be treated as a “large econo-
my”, which means that when it acts as a collective unit, this country holds monopoly 
power or monopsony power to influence the world price.
3 VAT = 1+ rV  , where rV is the rate of value-added tax; ETR=1 + rg , where rg is the 
rate of export tax rebate.
tion. Overall, this model contains nine endogenous variables 
(DR, SR, XR, , , , DF, SF, and PF) and three exogenous 
variables (VAT, ETR, and PN).
4
By taking the total differential, the model can be written 
in the equilibrium displacement form, which characterizes 
the change in equilibrium prices and quantities from shifts in 
VAT and ETR, as follows: 
Retail market:
  (10)
  (11)
  (12)
  (13)
  (14)
  (15)
Farm market:
  (16)
  (17)
  (18)
Here, the asterisked variables refer to approximate rela-
tive changes (e.g., ,). Parameters are defined 
in Table 1. For normal sloping supply and demand curves, 
 and .
The distribution of benefits brought by the export tax 
rebate can be measured in two ways: by the passing on of the 
export rebate to Chinese producers and foreign consumers 
and by the welfare distribution among each group. 
The pass-through of the export tax rebate
By imposing the market clearing conditions and drop-
ping equations (12) and (14), China’s export supply equation 
can be obtained as follows:
 (19)
where  is China’s export supply elasti-
city with respect to the retail supply price. For normal para-
meter values, , indicating that the increase in the sup-
ply price increases the export supply to the international 
market.   and  are the export 
supply elasticities with respect to the farm price and the price 
of non-farm inputs, respectively. Both of them are negative, 
implying that a higher input price reduces the export supply. 
The effect of the value-added tax on the export supply is 
indicated by , which takes positive values. This 
means that a higher value-added tax on the retail domestic 
market increases the export supply.
Then, by equalizing equations (19) and (12) and substi-
tuting (14), the retail supply price can be obtained:
 
(20)
4 All other exogenous variables that may affect demand and supply are assumed 
to be constant, and hence are suppressed. PN (e.g., the price of marketing service) is 
assumed to be exogenously given to simplify the derivation of the price transmission 
elasticities (see Appendix A for details).
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When the linkage between the farm and the retail mar-
kets is not considered, the reduced form of the elasticity of 
supply price with respect to the export tax rebate is repre-
sented by , which is restricted to being a posi-
tive value, indicating that an export tax rebate on the export 
products causes the supply price to move up. Hence, the 
effect of the tax rebate on the supply price is determined by 
the relative magnitude of the export demand and supply elas-
ticities. When the domestic producers face a perfectly elastic 
export demand curve or a perfectly inelastic export supply 
curve, then . This means that the export tax 
rebate is completely passed on to Chinese producers, and 
thus it has the largest possible effect. In contrast, when China 
has a perfectly elastic export supply curve or a perfectly 
inelastic export demand curve, , that is, the 
tax rebate has no impact on domestic producers. As derived 
above, , indicating that a larger retail 
supply elasticity, domestic demand elasticity or a larger mar-
ket share of the domestic market increases the export supply 
elasticity, and thus attenuates the effectiveness of the export 
rebate. This result is consistent with the study by Ishikawa 
and Kuroda (2007), which finds that whether or not an export 
promotion policy improves the welfare of the export country 
depends on the slope of the inverse demand curve and the 
market share. 
If, instead, the linkage between the farm and retail mar-
kets is taken into consideration, the reduced-form supply 
price is as follows:
 
(21)
where , suggesting that after 
taking into account the farm-retail linkage, the effects of the 
export tax rebate on Chinese producers’ supply price become 
larger.
When one turns to the effects of this policy on the 
farm price, the relationship between the farm and the retail 
supply prices can be obtained by imposing the market clear-
ing condition in the farm market:
 
(22)
where the coefficient , indicating 
that the effects of a value-added tax or an export tax rebate 
on the farm price are in the same direction as the effects on 
the retail supply price. Therefore, an increase in the value-
added tax in the export market depresses the farm price. In 
other words, the farm price can be increased by an export tax 
rebate. For the farm price, the effectiveness of the export tax 
rebate is determined not only by the relative magnitude of 
the demand and supply elasticities of export and by the mar-
ket shares, but also by the relative magnitude of the demand 
and supply elasticities at the farm level and the price trans-
mission elasticity from the retail market to the farm market. 
A higher price transmission elasticity implies a larger effect 
of the export rebate on the farm price. Since 
,  has an upper 
limit of  and a lower limit of 0.
The measure for welfare
According to Alston et al. (1995), in a multi-stage mar-
ket, the measurement of welfare change is not affected by 
the choice of the market level to be measured. To avoid 
Table 1: Baseline data and model parameters.
Item Definition Value
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a Taken from Han et al. (1997), Dey (2008), and Ma (2004), respectively.  
b Taken from Dey (2008) 
c Taken from Graham et al. (1998) 
d Computed based on Tewari (2003): as 
D
P
S
*
*
*
F
N
R
R
D
F
h
h
 changes, 
D
P
S
*
*
*
F
N
R
R
D
F
h
h  varies too 
e See Appendix A for details 
f Taken from the Chinese Yearbook of Fishery Statistics (2012) and the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
g Taken from the Chinese Yearbook of Fishery Statistics (2012) and the Report of the Ministry of Agriculture of China. All data include tilapia, crustacean, and molluscs. Unit: 
million dollars 
h Computed based on the formulas in Sun and Kinnucan (2000) 
Source: own composition
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double counting, in this paper, we choose the retail market 
to measure welfare changes in the industry. Following Sun 
and Kinnucan (2001), by assuming parallel shifts of demand 
and supply curves, the welfare changes for Chinese domestic 
producers, domestic consumers, and foreign consumers are 
approximated by the following formulas:
 (23)
 (24)
 (25)
where  is the change in domestic consumer surplus 
associated with the export tax rebate changes;  is the 
change in producer surplus at the retail level;  is the 
change in the foreign consumer surplus due to a change in 
the export tax rebate. Moreover,  is the retail-level 
domestic consumer expenditure in the initial equilibrium; 
 is the total revenue of Chinese producers for both 
domestic and export markets in the initial equilibrium; and 
 is the foreign consumer expenditure on Chinese pro-
ducts. , , and  are the relative changes in retail-
level domestic demand price, supply price, and export price, 
respectively. Similarly, , , and  are the relative 
changes in retail-level domestic demand, total supply, and 
exports associated with the changes in the export tax rebate, 
respectively. Finally, VS is the percentage change in the retail 
price when the changes in both quantity and non-farm price 
equal zero.
As mentioned before, considering a multi-stage market 
allows us not only to represent a more realistic setting, but 
also to obtain the producer surplus changes in the farm mar-
ket as follows:
 (26)
where  is the change in farm producer surplus associ-
ated with a change in the export tax rebate;  is the 
revenue of farm producers in the initial equilibrium;  is the 
relative change in the farm price; and  is the relative change 
in farm supply.  VD is the percentage change in the farm price 
when the changes in both quantity and non-farm input price 
equal zero. 
Parameterization
To apply the above model to Chinese fishery sector, we 
survey the empirical literature to determine or derive the 
“best-bet” values for the numerical values of the elasticities 
of demand, supply, and price transmission. These values, 
combined with other necessary data in Table 1, are then used 
to simulate the effects of VAT and ETR on prices, trade flows, 
and welfare distribution. Among the parameter values, there 
is a large variation in the value of domestic demand elasticity 
reported by different studies. Thus, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed by considering alternative values of this param-
eter to determine sensitivity, and to highlight the finding that 
a higher domestic demand elasticity (which implies a higher 
export supply elasticity) impairs the effectiveness of the 
export tax rebate policy. Moreover, two scenarios are con-
sidered, depending on whether the vertical linkage between 
farm and retail markets is considered or not (Scenario 1 and 
Scenario 2, respectively).
Results
Pass-through of the export tax rebate
The incidence of the export tax rebate in the Chinese fish-
ery sector is shown in Table 2. For example, the reduced-
form elasticity of the domestic supply price with respect to 
the export tax rebate indicates the percentage change in the 
supply price associated with a percentage change in ETR. As 
mentioned before,  means that the linkage between 
farm and retail markets is considered. Since the non-farm 
price  is used to derive the parameters, we will not discuss 
its effects.
Focusing first on the retail market, when , a 1% 
increase in VAT5 is split between a 0.13%-0.55% increase in 
export price (as well as domestic demand price) and a 0.45%-
0.87% decrease in the Chinese supply price. Chinese produ-
cers have a heavier burden as the domestic demand elasticity 
rises. The higher domestic demand price reduces the quan-
tity demanded in the domestic market by about 0.17%-
0.21%. The lower supply price reduces the quantity of sup-
ply by about 0.17%-0.21%.
When it comes to the effects of the export tax rebate, 
Table 2 shows that a 1% increase in ETR is split between 
a 0.05%-0.09% increase in the retail supply price and a 
0.91%-0.95% decrease in the export price. In other words, 
the export tax rebate has a much larger effect on reducing 
the foreign consumers’ price than on improving the domestic 
producers’ one. As a result, the quantity of export is increased 
by 0.86%-0.90%, whereas the quantity of domestic supply is 
only increased by at most 0.04%. 
As the sensitivity analysis suggests, the domestic produc-
ers’ benefits get smaller when the domestic demand becomes 
more price elastic, which in turn increases the magnitude of 
the export supply elasticity. This highlights the fact that the 
positive effect of the export tax rebate on the supply price 
depends on the relative magnitude of the export supply and 
demand elasticities. Specifically, if the export supply elas-
ticity is much larger than the export demand elasticity, an 
export tax rebate has a small effect on increasing the domes-
tic supply price, but a large one on reducing the export price. 
Then, when one focuses on the farm market, an increase in 
the value-added tax reduces the quantity of supply at the retail 
level, and thus depresses the price at the farm level and reduces 
the quantity of farm supply and demand. On the other hand, a 
1% increase in ETR increases the farm quantity by 0.03% 
(which is insensitive to the change of ), and increases the 
farm price by 0.04-0.06%. Based on the foregoing results pre-
sented in Section 2, the reason for such results is clear: the 
retail supply is enlarged by an export tax rebate, and thus 
quantity and price for the farm are also enhanced.
5 It should be noted that a 1% change in variable ETR equals a 1% change in (1+rE) 
instead of a 1% change in rE. Similarly, a 1% change in variable VAT equals a 1% 
change in (1+rV), instead of a 1% change in rV.
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TWG under Scenario 1, and 57%-73% under scenario 2). 
This implies that, as highlighted by some financial commen-
tators and taxpayers, with the “best-bet” parameter values, 
the export rebate in the Chinese fishery sector is subsidising 
foreign consumers more than domestic producers. 
The value and percentage of the benefits for Chinese 
producers are enhanced even without considering the 
farm-retail connection, but such an increment is not suf-
ficient to alter the conclusion that foreign consumers are 
the major beneficiaries of the export tax rebate policy. The 
comparison between the two scenarios indicates that if we 
do not consider the farm market, the simulation results on 
values and percentage of domestic producer gains would be 
overestimated, and the loss for Chinese consumers would 
be underestimated. This sheds light on the importance of 
considering the farm-retail linkage even when the input 
markets are not of interest.
The sensitivity analysis shows that the total welfare gains 
are increasing with the growth of the domestic demand elas-
ticity with respect to price. Under both scenarios, the gains 
for domestic producers and the loss for domestic consum-
ers are both decreasing when the domestic demand becomes 
more price elastic (which makes the export supply become 
more elastic as well). This is consistent with the last section, 
in which we conclude that as the export supply elasticity of 
an industry rises, ceteris paribus, we expect the effects of the 
export tax rebate on domestic producers to decline. There-
fore, reducing the export supply elasticity (e.g., by improv-
ing the reliance on imports to reduce the domestic demand 
elasticity) may be helpful to enhance the effectiveness of the 
export rebate.
Dividing the welfare measurements of Scenario 1 in 
Table 3 by 25.11 million dollars (the government spend-
Results of Scenario 2 are also shown in Table 2. The 
comparison implies that, as indicated before, the change in 
the domestic supply price will be underestimated if the verti-
cal linkage is not considered. However, the supply quantity 
will be overestimated; thus, the welfare effects of not con-
sidering the farm-retail linkage are ambiguous, a topic which 
will be discussed in detail in the next subsection.
Distribution of the welfare gains
In order to simulate the distribution of welfare gains 
caused by the changes in ETR, inserting the reduced-form 
elasticities in Table 2 into equations (23)-(25) yields:
 
(27)
 
(28)
 
(29)
where , , , , , 
and  are set equal to the corresponding reduced-
form elasticities given in Table 2. 
The “best-bet” measure of the welfare changes is pre-
sented in Table 3. All results are for a 1% increase in ETR. 
The third, fifth, and seventh columns show how an increase 
in welfare is distributed between Chinese producers and for-
eign consumers. Generally, under both scenarios, the total 
welfare gains (TWG) range from 32.93-42.61 million dol-
lars, most of which go to foreign consumers (60%-75% of 
Table 2: Reduced-form elasticities.
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ing corresponding to a 1% increase in the export tax rebate) 
yields the marginal benefit-cost ratios (MBCRs) shown in 
Table 4.
The results for MBCR1 suggest that the total welfare 
gains overweigh the government expenditure if TWG is 
con-sidered as comprising the overall “benefits” of this 
policy.  MBCR1 increases with a reduction in .
.
.
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. However, 
as discussed, the total welfare gains are shared between 
domestic producers and foreign consumers, and with the 
“best-bet” elasticities, the latter obtain most of the benefits. 
Only in the extreme cases where the export demand elastic-
ity approaches 1 or the export supply elasticity approaches 
0 can the entire export tax rebate be passed on to Chinese 
producers. Therefore, the results for MBCR
2
 are of more 
interest to us. When the domestic demand elasticity is 
between -0.31 to -1.40,  MBCR
2 
ranges from 0.33 to 0.63. 
We also compute MBCR
3
, which takes the Chinese con-
sumer surplus into account, as Kinnucan and Cai (2011) 
state that, when analysing the effectiveness of a trade pro-
motion policy, the so called “societal MBCRs” should not 
be ignored, for they indicate the effectiveness from a soci-
etal perspective, instead of an industry one. The results 
imply that when MBCR1 equals 1.31-1.56, MBCR3 approxi-
mates 0, due to the fact that the benefits for domestic pro-
ducers are almost completely offset by the loss for domes-
tic consumers. This is in line with previous studies (e.g., 
Alston et al., 1993; Wohlgenant, 1986), which find that 
with the assumptions of no distortion in other sectors and 
the opportunity cost of government spending equals the 
amount of payment, such export promotion policies are a 
costly way to improve domestic producers’ welfare.
According to Alston and James (2002), the changes in 
retail-level producer surplus equal the sum of changes in the 
producer surplus for all inputs. Thus, considering the farm-
retail linkage enables us to obtain the distribution of the wel-
fare gains for Chinese producers between farm and non-farm 
input producers. To this end, we rewrite equation (26) as fol-
lows, and then calculate the welfare changes of both inputs 
with equation (30) and the results for  in Table 3. The 
results are presented in Table 5.
 
(30)
where  and  are set equal to the correspond-
ing reduced-form elasticities given in Table 2.
Table 5 indicates that the welfare distribution between 
producers of farm and non-farm inputs is very sensitive to 
the variation of . Farmers’ share of the welfare gains 
improves dramatically with the increase in China’s domestic 
demand elasticity in the fishery sector. As the domestic 
demand becomes more price elastic, farmers gradually 
become the biggest winners at the input markets. When 
ranges from -0.31 to -1.40, farmers obtain 7.32 to 9.26 mil-
lion dollars, accounting for 46% to 99% of the total producer 
surplus.
Table 3: Welfare distribution at the retail level (million dollars).
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Table 4: Marginal benefit-cost ratios for a 1% increase in ETR in 
the Chinese fishery sector.
 dh MBCR1 MBCR2 MBCR3
-0.31 1.56 0.63 Approximately 0
-0.80 1.43 0.46 Approximately 0
-1.40 1.31 0.33 Approximately 0
Note: ; ; . 
Source: own composition
Table 5: Welfare distribution at input level (million dollars).
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Discussion and conclusion
The basic premise of this study is that when considering 
an export tax rebate, the policymakers should not be indiffer-
ent about the benefit distribution among groups. This paper 
finds that the effectiveness of the export tax rebate on domes-
tic producers depends on the relative magnitude of the export 
supply and demand elasticities. When the export country has 
a relatively large export supply elasticity, the benefits of 
domestic producers are very limited. Applying the model 
to the Chinese fishery sector, we find that with the “best-
bet” parameters, although the total welfare gains overweigh 
the cost for the government, most of the gains go to foreign 
consumers. When considering the welfare changes of Chi-
nese consumers, according to Gardner’s (1983) criterion6, 
the export tax rebate is efficient (under Scenario 1, dPS/dCS 
approaches 1.00). Nevertheless, from a societal perspective, 
the marginal benefit-cost ratio is almost zero.
Our results are consistent with the previous literature in 
that when considering an export promotion policy which 
redistributes welfare among producers, consumers and tax-
payers, the policy makers have to assign weightings among 
these groups (Wohlgenant, 1986). Moreover, this paper 
emphasizes the importance of considering the transfer from 
domestic consumers and taxpayers to foreign consumers. 
Our derivation indicates that the export supply elasticity 
is determined by the elasticities of supply and domestic 
demand, and by the relevant market share. Therefore, in 
an industry with a relatively large domestic market share, 
a large domestic demand elasticity, or a large retail supply 
elasticity, the policymakers should be more prudent when 
considering such policies.
Another policy implication of this paper is that when 
evaluating a trade promotion policy in an agricultural sec-
tor, it is of great importance to take into account the benefits 
allocation among input producers, which has hardly received 
attention in the literature. In an industry with a relatively 
higher domestic demand elasticity, it is expected to have a 
larger effect on farm producers. 
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, the 
export tax rebate is not considered as a subsidy as long as the 
tax rebate does not outweigh the tax paid by companies. The 
aim is to let the exports enter the international markets at tax-
excluded prices and thus avoid double taxation on exports. 
The reduced-form elasticities indicate that the value-added 
tax raises the export price and lowers the quantity of exports. 
Hence without the rebate (or with an incomplete rebate), the 
value-added tax acts as an export tax (Feldstein and Krug-
man, 1990). Therefore, if the WTO requires its members to 
phase out export taxes, an export tax rebate system may be 
utilised as an export tax to realise export control. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the model is based on 
the assumption that the price of non-farm inputs is exog-
enous. However, this may not be the case in reality. Hence 
the relaxation of this assumption provides a topic for fur-
ther research to extend the present analysis. Moreover, the 
simulation results are based on elasticity values taken from 
6 Gardner (1983) states that, when dPS/dCS approaches 1.00, the deadweight loss 
per dollar of consumers’ welfare transferred to producers is zero at the margin, thus the 
policy designed to benefit producers is considered efficient.
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Appendix A. Derivation of price 
transmission elasticities
In a two-input, one-output demand and supply system, the 
output supply and the input demand functions are given by:
 (A.1)
 (A.2) 
 (A.3)
By taking the logarithmic total differential of the first two 
equations we get:
 (A.4)
and
 (A.5)
Thus, we get equations as follows:
 (A.6)
and 
, (A.7)
where εRF and ηFR are the elasticity of retail supply with 
respect to the farm price and the elasticity of farm demand 
with respect to the retail price, respectively. To obtain the 
values of εRF and ηFR, the above demand and supply system 
can be written as:
 (A.8)
 (A.9)
 (A.10)
With the restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry:
 (A.11)
 (A.12)
 (A.13)
 (A.14)
 (A.15)
 (A.16)
Together with the values of εR, ηF, and ηN, the values of 
εRF and ηFR can be obtained. 
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Introduction
Understanding the effect of land use on water quality is 
an important question in environmental policy. Agriculture 
is consistently identified by the EPA as a cause of water 
quality degradation due to fertilizer runoff entering nearby 
waterways (EPA, 2002). These effects have important eco-
nomic and ecological consequences, such as adverse effects 
on recreation and drinking water quality. As has been known 
since the time of Pigou, these effects are a classic case of 
a market failure (Pigou, 1920). Since water quality is not a 
market good, the free market will not result in an optimal 
level of lake water quality. Efficient government intervention 
requires understanding the benefits and costs of land use on 
water quality, however measuring these effects has been dif-
ficult, primarily due to a lack of suitable data.
The primary research objective of this paper is to estimate 
the elasticity of lake water quality to land use change. These 
estimates can be used by future researchers and policymak-
ers as part of cost benefit analyses, where policies affect land 
use change near lakes. My approach combines high quality 
water measurements across 100 Iowa Lakes over 15 years, 
along with satellite data on cropland use and PRISM data 
on weather. As an extension, I estimated a secondary model 
of the elasticity of land use change to crop prices. I use the 
estimates from these two models to estimate the effect of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) on lake water quality. Due 
to the inelastic estimates from both models, I find a negligi-
bly positive impact of the RFS on lake water quality.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. 
First, it exploits 15 years of water quality measurements 
across Iowa to perform a statistical analysis of the effect of 
land use on water quality. Second, it provides strong statis-
tical evidence of a persistent effect of water quality across 
time. Third, it adds to the literature on the response of crop-
land expansion to crop prices. Finally, it adds to the literature 
on the environmental effects of biofuel related policies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides some background on the typical techniques used to 
assess the relationship between land use and water quality. 
This is followed by a description of the econometric model 
used in both the water quality and cropland response models. 
I then give a detailed description of the data set, followed by 
the results for both models. These results are then used in an 
application to estimate the effect of the RFS on lake water 
quality, followed by a summary.
Background
There is a long history of studies that attempt to iden-
tify the relationship between land use and the water quality 
of lakes, rivers, and streams. Most of these studies can be 
divided into two types- simulation models such as SWAT 
and BASINS2, and econometric models. The former are able 
to model complex relationships between the climate, land 
use, and water quality to examine issues that might other-
wise be intractable. For example, simulations from these 
types of programs have been used to examine the hypoxia 
“dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico (Rabotyagov, 2014), the 
effect of corn-based ethanol on environmental quality (Sec-
chi, 2009), and the potential for cropland to reduce flood risk 
(Schilling, 2014). Simulation models are invaluable for gain-
ing insight into issues that may otherwise be too complicated 
for any one statistical model to capture, but they have draw-
backs. On a practical level, the complexity of the simulated 
relationships requires many parameters, and choosing these 
parameters requires a significant amount of expertise. This 
can make it difficult for other researchers to truly understand 
what is generating the results. Statistical models, on the 
other hand, are helpful in their ability to model relationships 
between variables in a relatively straightforward and trans-
parent way.
Many statistical analyses in the literature rely on simple 
correlation coefficients between different land uses and a 
2 SWAT stand for Soil and Water Assessment Tool; BASINS stands for Better 
Assessment Science Integrating point & Non-point Sources.
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measure of water quality. For example, Tong (2002) found 
a statistically significant positive correlation of 0.1913 and 
0.1563 between agriculture and total nitrogen and phospho-
rous in surface water, respectively, in 11-digit HUCS in Ohio. 
In fact, most studies find a positive correlation between the 
two variables (Meador, 2003; Dauer, 2000). While correla-
tions are informative, they do not help isolate causal effects. 
In other words, the question arises: does an increase in crop-
land cause the water quality to drop, or could it represent 
something else, such as the quality of the land? Answering 
this requires a model that controls for the quality of land, as 
well as other possible omitted variables. 
Many studies have used regression techniques to try to 
estimate the relationship. Tu (2011) uses geographically 
weighted regressions to estimate local effects in an area sur-
rounding Boston. He estimates a separate univariate regres-
sion for 6 different water quality variables and 14 land uses, 
for a total of 84 regressions. The results showed little influ-
ence of agricultural land on water quality. A drawback of 
this study is that water quality measurements are averaged 
over time and estimated using only one year of observed 
land uses. In fact, cross-sectional regressions are common in 
water quality studies – possibly due to a lack of quality, pub-
licly available time series data. Another technique used in 
the literature is to use simple univariate regressions of land 
use on water quality (see, e.g. Lougheed, 2001). Limiting the 
model to one period, or not controlling for other factors that 
can affect water quality can potentially bias the coefficients 
of interest.
This omitted variable bias problem can potentially cre-
ate misleading results. For example, Sprague (2012) stud-
ies the effect of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
on total nitrogen and phosphorus loadings in rivers using a 
cross-sectional regression and found a marginally positive 
effect, indicating that CRP land increases nutrient levels; this 
is the opposite effect intended by the program and lacks a 
credible explanation. The key problem in this study is that, 
for the results to hold, the model must assume that CRP land 
is randomly distributed across space and uncorrelated with 
omitted factors that affect water quality. This is unlikely to 
be the case since profit maximizing landowners will choose 
to retire the least profitable farmland into the CRP first. In 
Iowa, for example, CRP land is concentrated in the south, 
where the soil quality is relatively low. Therefore, it would 
not be surprising to find a negative correlation between CRP 
land and water quality, since lower quality soil typically 
means increased runoff.
The geographic characteristics of water bodies has led to 
some studies that use more complicated regression models. 
Atasoy (2006) employs spatial econometric techniques to 
study the effect of urban land use on water quality. Their 
analysis uses monthly nutrient measurements over a four-
year period combined with monthly measures of urban 
development, weather variables, and a single year of satellite 
imagery to control for agricultural land. Their emphasis on 
rivers and streams is an example of how geography plays an 
important role in the specification of an appropriate econo-
metric model when studying environmental issues. In their 
study, upstream river quality clearly affects downstream 
river quality as it is carried through a stream network, thus it 
makes sense to explicitly include a spatially-lagged depend-
ent variable while allowing for temporal correlations in the 
error term. In this study, where the observed unit is lakes, it 
does not make sense conceptually to include a spatial lag, 
since lakes do not flow into each other. Instead, it is appro-
priate to include a temporal lag of the dependent variable, 
since lake water remains relatively stationary over time. This 
implies that nutrient levels may persist; this effect is known 
as the “hydraulic retention time”. As an example, Jeppesen 
(2005) reduced the nutrient levels in multiple lakes and 
observed that the lakes did not reach a new, lower steady 
state for 15 years. 
Existing lake water quality studies that attempt to include 
dynamics have typically been confined to one lake and its 
watershed. For example, Balkcom (2003) use multiple sam-
ples from a lake over time to calibrate an integrated assess-
ment model, which was then used to analyse different land 
use scenarios. By contrast, this study uses data on over 120 
lakes over 15 years, creating a rich variation in lake quality, 
geographical characteristics, and the characteristics of sur-
rounding land use.
As one of the most productive farming states in the country, 
Iowa land use can be particularly sensitive to changes in farm-
ing policies. Therefore, given the evidence of the link between 
cropland and water quality degradation, government policies 
can directly and indirectly affect water quality. Two primary 
examples are the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and 
the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The CRP has evolved 
from its initial goals of removing cropland from production 
to focus more on maximizing the environmental impact of the 
program. Only land currently in production or expiring CRP 
land are eligible to be retired and receive CRP subsidies, and 
retired land must be planted with species that will improve 
environmental health and quality. Thus, the possible water 
quality benefits of an acre of CRP land are 1) removing a hec-
tare of cropland, and therefore all related nutrient use, and 2) 
replacing it with a hectare plants that can help improve soil 
quality and reduce runoff of nutrients from the surrounding 
area. CRP land in Iowa began a major decline around 2007. It 
is likely that multiple factors contributed to this decline, espe-
cially rising crop prices (and thus profitability of land) and a 
decline in funding for the program.
The RFS, first established under the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, mandated 28 billion liters of ethanol be used by 2012. 
The scope of the biofuel mandate expanded significantly in 
2007 by mandating 136 billion liters of ethanol in the U.S. 
by 2022. Most of the current biofuel supply comes from corn 
ethanol. Therefore, the biofuel mandate has and will continue 
to have significant economic and environmental impacts on 
Iowa, the nation’s leading corn producer. Researchers have 
identified water quality degradation as an important conse-
quence of biofuel production (Simpson, 2008). Although 
corn cultivation requires a significant amount of water, water 
shortages are typically not a concern in Iowa. Rather, the 
increased use of nutrients from expanding corn production 
along both the intensive and extensive margin are of concern. 
In addition, an increase in the demand for corn can affect the 
price of other crops, such as soybeans, which can cause crop-
land expansion for those crops as well. As corn uses nitrogen 
relatively inefficiently (Balkcom, 2003), switching over to 
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corn from other crops can potentially increase the amount 
of nitrogen in the soil. Finally, if we assume that farmers 
grow crops on the best farmland available, cropland expan-
sion will likely occur in marginal, more environmentally 
sensitive areas, including CRP land (Secchi, 2009). Thus, the 
two policies mentioned here are to some degree interdepend-
ent, as farmer’s will look to maximize their profit by either 
accepting subsidies to retire the land into the CRP, or to farm 
the land and sell their crops.
Data
Water quality data were downloaded from Iowa State’s 
Limnology Laboratory website 3. The Iowa Lakes data uses 
consistent, scientifically based, and well documented hydro-
logical sampling methods. In this paper I use the average of 
three annual measurements. Averaging three lake water sam-
ples over a year offers adequate precision for water quality 
indicators (Downing, 2006). CTSI, a measure of lake water 
clarity, is used as the main water quality indicator because 
it summarizes the outcome of increased sediment or nutri-
ent loadings, as opposed to a measurement of the inputs of 
sediments or nutrients into a lake. Most lakes have a CTSI 
between 0-100, with each increase of 10 units representing 
an approximate doubling in algal biomass. An intuitive way 
to think about the index is that a CTSI of 0 represents a vis-
ible depth of 64 meters, while a CTSI of 100 represents a vis-
ible depth of only 6.4 centimeters. The CTSI can be approxi-
mately divided into four trophic classes: oligotrophic (less 
than 30-40), mesotrophic (40-50), eutrophic (50-70), and 
hypereutrophic (70-100+). The left panel of Figure 1 shows 
the locations of the 123 lakes used in this study.
Annual land use data comes from USDA NASS cropland 
data layers (CDL’s), which are satellite images. Each pixel of 
a satellite image is assigned a land use based on color analy-
sis. I find the total land use for a geographic region by sum-
ming the pixels assigned to each land use. Since the focus 
of the paper is water quality, land use was aggregated to the 
local watershed level, known as a HUC (hydrologic unit 
code). Aggregating to a watershed captures drainage char-
acteristics more accurately than aggregating to an arbitrary 
governmental boundary. HUC’s differ in size and are nested 
3 http://limnology.eeob.iastate.edu/lakereport/default.aspx
within each other- a HUC12 is located within a HUC10, 
which itself is within a HUC8, and so on. The right panel 
of Figure 1 shows the size of typical HUC12 watersheds, as 
well as the larger HUC8 which contains them. 
For this paper I focus on land devoted to corn, soybeans, 
and grassland4. An issue with using cropland devoted to corn 
and soybean use is they are strongly positively correlated, 
with a correlation coefficient of .80. To avoid multicollinear-
ity, I sum these two land uses into a single variable labeled 
crops. Since official CRP enrollment numbers are only avail-
able at the county level, I include grassland as a proxy for the 
effect of CRP land on water quality.
Data for precipitation and temperature were calculated 
from Oregon State’s PRISM dataset5. PRISM provides the 
daily precipitation and temperature for 30km by 30km grid 
cells that cover the continental U.S. To find the annual precipi-
tation for an individual HUC12 I sum the daily data for each 
PRISM grid cell across the watershed, and then sum the daily 
values over the year. To find the average annual temperature 
for each HUC12 I average daily temperatures across PRISM 
grid cells, and then average the daily values over the year.
Table 1 provides a description and summary statistics for 
the variables included in the analysis.
Empirical Models
Water Quality Model
I use the following dynamic panel data model to estimate 
the effects of land use on water quality:
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, , , , is a measure of water qual-
ity for lake i in HUC12 j at time t. For the measure of water 
quality, I use Carlson’s Trophic State Index (CTSI). CTSI is
4 Although CDL data includes other crops such as wheat, they are more difficult to 
accurately identify. Data on CDL accuracy can be found at http://www.nass.usda.gov/
research/Cropland/sarsfaqs2.htm
5 Downloaded from http://prism.oregonstate.edu
 
Figure 1: Location of Iowa lakes, represented by solid dots (left), a HUC 8 watershed comprised of smaller HUC12 watersheds (right).
Source: Iowa State Limnology Department, retrieved from http://limnology.eeob.iastate.edu/lakereport/default.aspx
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an index of water quality from 0 to 100, where an increase 
indicates a degradation in water quality (Table 1).
Table 1: Summary statistics of the variables.
 mean sd 10th  percentile
90th 
percentile
water quality model:     
CTSI 60.81 9.89 47.00 73.00
Crops 5.17 2.89 2.05 8.98
Grass 2.26 1.51 0.63 4.26
Precipitation 39.26 16.60 21.21 58.96
Temperature 9.57 2.37 6.48 12.95
cropland model:     
Crops 5.41 2.99 1.74 9.61
Expected Price 1.70 0.55 1.00 2.51
Fertilizer 71.97 26.25 37.40 101.40
Fuel 68.73 23.45 33.40 99.30
Precipitation 38.77 16.33 22.20 55.75
Temperature 9.59 2.25 6.71 12.64
N 27,472    
Notes: The unit of observation for both models is a HUC12 watershed. The water qual-
ity model contains data from 2001-2016 for 123 Iowa lakes, with some gaps. CTSI 
stands for Carlson’s Trophic State Index, a measure of water quality. The cropland 
model contains annual data from 2001-2016 for all 1717 HUC12 watersheds in Iowa. 
The sources for “Crops”, “Precipitation”, and “Temperature” are the same for both the 
water quality model and the cropland model.
Source: own estimations based on USDA and PRISM data
I include the lag in Q to account for the stock effects 
of lake water; the coefficient is expected to be positive as 
a certain amount of nutrients in a lake carry over across 
years. Including a lag of Q implies both short and long-term 
impacts from the other right-hand side variables on water 
quality. The short term, i.e. contemporaneous impacts are the 
estimated coefficients on the variables, while the long-term 
impacts are these coefficients multiplied by the dynamic 
multiplier (Greene, 2000):
B1
1
1
v =
-^ h  (2)
The variables C and G represent year t, HUC12 j’s hec-
tares of cropland and grassland, respectively. The main coef-
ficient of interest is , which measures the short-term mar-
ginal change in water quality due to an increase in cropland. 
Since an increase in CTSI represents lower water quality, is 
expected to be positive due to nutrient runoff. Of secondary 
interest is the marginal increase in water quality due to an 
increase in grassland, , which could be considered a proxy to 
the effect of CRP on water quality. A negative sign on would 
indicate beneficial qualities of increased grassland near lake 
water. Since the CRP program requires active cropland to 
be retired, the total short-term effect of CRP on lake water 
quality is (–Β
2 
+ Β
3
).
I control for the effect of weather on water quality by 
including annual measures of precipitation, W, and tempera-
ture T. Although the focus of the paper is on the effect of 
crops on water quality, the effect of weather on water qual-
ity is an important and complicated topic. For example, it is 
not clear a priori what the sign of these weather effects will 
be; increased rainfall, for example, can dilute existing nutri-
ent levels, but can also increase nutrient runoff from nearby 
farms. Several papers have also highlighted the importance 
of studying the effects of weather on water quality, given 
the predicted increased variation in weather due to climate 
change (Delpla, 2009). The coefficient estimates on precipi-
tation and temperature help shed light on these issues.
I control for time invariant, unobservable variables 
through lake level fixed effects, thus the coefficients are 
identified by the variation of the data within a lake. The 
unobservable variables could be, for example, geographic 
features that are fixed over time, such as soil quality, slope, 
or surface area, and it can also include permanent man-made 
structures that can alter the flow of water to lakes, such as tile 
drains. Year dummy variables control for unobserved trends 
over time.
Each HUC12 watershed is contained within larger water-
sheds which share drainage properties. To control for cor-
relation between HUC12’s within the same drainage area, I 
cluster standard errors at the HUC8 level.
Cropland Response Model
To estimate the response of cropland to crop prices I 
estimate the following Nerlovian partial adjustment model 
(Nerlove, 1956):
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This model assumes that a representative farmer in water-
shed j make spring acreage decisions based on last year’s 
acreage, climate and operating costs, as well as the expected 
crop prices during fall harvest. Operating costs consist of 
fertilizer, F, and fuel, G. 
The variable of interest is which represents the marginal 
change in cropland due to an increase in expected prices. For 
the expected price I construct a Laspeyres price index using 
futures prices on corn and soybeans, along with observed 
soybean and corn acreages (Huang, 2010; Evans, 2015):
 
(4)
where c is either corn or soybeans. Figure 2 shows the crop 
price index in Iowa from 2001-2016, averaged over HUC12 
watersheds.
Estimation
Dynamic panel data models with fixed effects suffer 
from the well-known “Nickell bias”, which results from the 
within transformation that subtracts the time mean from each 
group in order to remove the fixed-effects (Nickell, 1981). 
In a dynamic model, this will cause the lagged, transformed 
dependent variable to be correlated with the error term, vio-
lating the assumed orthogonality condition. One solution is 
to use the Arellano-Bond model (henceforth abbreviated as 
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AB), also known as the “difference GMM” (Arellano, 1991), 
which constructs instruments for the lagged dependent vari-
able using transformations of the data.
The model’s nickname comes from using first differences 
of the data to remove fixed effects. However, when there are 
gaps in the data, as is the case with the CTSI measurements, 
they can result in a significant loss of observations. For exam-
ple, all lakes in the data set are missing the year 2008, so nei-
ther ΔQ
{i,2008}
, or ΔQ
{i,2009}
 can be included in the estimation. 
Instead of the first difference transformation, I employ the 
forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) transformation, where 
the mean of all future observations of a variable is subtracted 
from the current observation for each year. This purges the 
fixed effects and allows for more observations than the first 
differences in an unbalanced panel.
AB estimates are typically estimated in both one and two-
step variants. The two-step model uses a weighting matrix 
that is the inverse of an estimate of Var(z’e), where z is the 
vector of instruments. This is the optimal weighting matrix 
in the sense that it is asymptotically efficient. However, in 
finite samples the two-step estimates have been shown to be 
biased downward. To fix this, I employ the finite sample bias 
correction described in (Windmeijer, 2005).
Results
Table 2 displays the results for the water quality model. 
All variables are estimated in log form, so the coefficients are 
interpreted as the elasticity of water quality with respect to 
each variable. Column (1) shows the estimated coefficients 
using the Arellano-Bond model, which instruments for the 
endogenous lagged dependent variable. 
The coefficient on the lag of CTSI is statistically signifi-
cant and positive, which provides evidence that water quality 
conditions persist over time. The coefficient on Crops is posi-
tive and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in 
cropland increases CTSI and therefore lowers water quality. 
This result is intuitive since an increase in cropland implies 
increased nutrients on the land, which can drain into neigh-
boring water bodies. The elasticity for the Crops coefficient 
is 0.0538 in the short run and, using equation (1), 0.0727 in 
the long run. I do not find a statistically significant effect of 
grassland on lake water quality.
The coefficient on precipitation is positive and statisti-
cally significant. This indicates that the overall effect of 
precipitation on water quality is detrimental. In other words, 
the effect of runoff due to precipitation dominates the dilu-
tion effect of increased precipitation in lakes. I do not find 
evidence of an effect of temperature on lake water quality.
Columns (2) and (3) of table 2 display the results of OLS 
and fixed effects (FE) estimation for comparison. The OLS 
estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias since it does 
not control for time invariant fixed effects. The coefficient on 
the lag of CTSI is positive and statistically significant, and 
over twice as large in magnitude as the Arellano-Bond esti-
mate. This positive bias is a direct result of the omitted vari-
able bias, as shown in (Roodman, 2009). The coefficient on 
Crops is positive and statistically significant. The magnitude 
of the coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in cropland is 
associated with a 0.08% increase in CTSI (and therefore water 
quality is worse). This estimate is slightly higher than the 
Arellano-Bond model. As with the Arellano-Bond model, 
the effect of precipitation is positive and significant, indicat-
ing that an increase in precipitation increases CTSI. 
The fixed effects model, which does not instrument for 
the endogenous lagged variable, finds a positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient on the lag of water quality. The 
magnitude of the coefficient, at 0.300, is like the Arellano-
Bond model. The coefficients on Crops and Grass are not 
statistically significant. The coefficient on precipitation is 
positive and marginally significant, although the magnitude 
is like the other two models.
Table 3 displays the results for the cropland response 
model. Again, the variables are logged so that the estimates 
can be interpreted as the elasticity of cropland to a specific 
variable. All variables show a statistically significant effect 
on cropland. The variable of interest, price, shows the 
expected positive relationship with cropland. The magni-
tude of the elasticity of cropland to prices, 0.066, is small 
0.0
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
201
5
201
6
201
3
201
4
201
1
201
2
200
9
201
0
200
7
200
8
200
5
200
6
200
3
200
4
200
1
200
2
C
ro
p 
pr
ic
e 
in
de
x
Figure 2: Crop Price Index for corn and soybeans in Iowa, averaged 
over HUC 12 watersheds from 2001-2016. 
Note: Crop Price Index is a Laspeyres’ Index using futures prices for corn and soybean 
along with corn and soybean acreage.
Source: Chicago Board of trade, retrieved from https://www.quandl.com/data/CHRIS-
Wiki-Continuous-Futures
Table 2: Regression Results: Water Quality Model
 AB OLS FE
L.CTSI
   0.2600***
(0.0410)
   0.7430***
(0.0261)
 0.3000*
(0.0529)
Crops
   0.0538***
(0.0179)
 0.0076*
(0.0044)
0.0251
(0.0252)
Grass
0.0032
(0.0083)
-0.0085
(0.0053)
-0.0044
(0.0092)
Prec.
   0.0460***
(0.0139)
   0.0312***
(0.0093)
 0.0406*
(0.0201)
Temp.
0.0324
(0.0261)
 0.0307*
(0.0157)
0.0185
(0.0304)
N 1,484 1,607 1,607
Notes: Arellano-Bond (AB), OLS, and fixed effects (FE) coefficient estimates and 
standard errors. Each observation is a water quality measurement from a specific lake 
in Iowa. Data include the years 2001-2016, excluding 2008. All estimates include 
year fixed effects. CTSI stands for Carlson Trophic Secchi Index. Crops is equal to 
the sum of corn and soybean land. Standard errors are clustered by HUC8 watershed. 
*** stands for 1% of significance, ** for 5% and * for 10%
Source: own estimations based on USDA and PRISM data
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but comparable to other estimates from the literature (Barr, 
2011; Evans, 2015). Using the dynamic multiplier, the long 
run elasticity is 0.104.
Table 3: Regression Results: Cropland Response Model.
AB OLS FE
L.Crops
  0.3040**
(0.0798)
  0.9510**
(0.0070)
  0.6700**
(0.0278)
Price
  0.0525**
(0.0158)
 0.0466*
(0.0222)
 0.0479*
(0.0200)
L.lnPrec
0.0017
(0.0139)
  0.0235**
(0.0084)
0.0160
(0.0127)
L.lnTemp
 -0.1670**
(0.0263)
 -0.0306**
(0.0089)
 -0.0798**
(0.0151)
L.Fuel
 -0.1060**
(0.0224)
 -0.1060**
(0.0290)
 -0.1010**
(0.0273)
L.Fert
  0.0446**
(0.0112)
  0.0828**
(0.0186)
  0.0684**
(0.0147)
N 24,033 25,750 25,750
Notes: Arellano-Bond (AB), OLS, and fixed effects (FE) coefficient estimates and 
standard errors. Each observation is a HUC12 watershed in Iowa. Data include the 
years 2001-2016. Crops is equal to the sum of corn and soybean land. Standard errors 
are clustered by HUC8 watershed. ** stands for 1% of significance, * for 5%.
Source: own estimations based on USDA and PRISM data
The results for the control variables are mostly intui-
tive. The weather variable coefficients indicate that cropland 
decreases in response to increases in the previous year’s tem-
perature, while it increases in response to the previous year’s 
precipitation. The magnitude of these responses is small and 
roughly equal. Increases in last year’s fuel costs have a nega-
tive effect on this year’s cropland. On the other hand, increases 
in the cost of last year’s fertilizer have a positive effect on 
this year’s cropland. Although this result is not intuitive, it has 
been found in other research (Evans, 2015; Huang, 2010).
Columns (2) and (3) show the OLS and fixed effects results 
of the cropland response model. The signs and magnitudes of 
the coefficients are similar across all three models, except for 
the coefficient on the lag of crops, where the FE and OLS esti-
mates are larger than the Arellano-Bond estimate.
Application to the Renewable Fuel 
Standard
This section uses the previous elasticity estimates to 
measure the impact of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 
on lake water quality in Iowa. Since the RFS was enacted 
in 2005, I focus on the effects over 2006 to 2016, which is 
the most recent year with available data. The RFS mandated 
a large increase in ethanol, which is equivalent to a large 
increase in demand for corn since it is the primary feedstock. 
I follow the approach of Evans (2015) and use the price 
effects of this shock in demand to corn to connect the RFS 
to lake water quality. Specifically, I calculate the percent 
change in water quality using the following formula:
 (5)
where represents the elasticity of water quality with respect 
to cropland, and represents the elasticity of cropland to 
prices. I calculate (2) using both the short and long run elas-
ticities, which can be considered lower and upper bounds.
For the change in price, I use estimates from (Hausman, 
2012). Using a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) 
model, the authors estimate that an increase in the demand of 
corn acreage for ethanol of .40 million hectares increases the 
price of corn and soybeans by 0.06 and 0.03 cents per cubic 
meter, respectively. According to data from USDA ERS, 
1.29 billion cubic meters of corn were used to produce etha-
nol in 2005/2006, compared to 4.18 billion in 2015/2016, an 
increase of 2.89 billion cubic meters. Over the same period, 
the national average corn yield was 79 cubic meters of corn 
per hectare. Thus, the shock in demand is equivalent to an 
approximate 9.31 million hectare increase in demand for 
corn acreage. The above estimates from (Hausman, 2012) 
imply this increase in demand would increase the price of 
corn by $1.84 per bushel and the price of soybeans by $0.92 
per bushel. I use these changes to calculate the counterfactual 
price index for each HUC12 in 2016. The average HUC12 
experienced an approximate 58% increase in the price index 
because of the RFS.
Finally, I calculate the percentage change in lake water 
quality using both the short and long-term elasticities esti-
mated from the previous analysis. The average lake experi-
enced a 0.13% increase in CTSI in the short run, and a 0.27% 
increase in the long run. Figure 3 shows the distribution of 
these increases across the 123 lakes in the analysis. Thus, 
due to the very inelastic responses of lake water quality to 
cropland, and from cropland to crop prices, I find a negligi-
ble effect of the RFS on lake water quality.
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Figure 3: Estimated percentage change in CTSI due to the RFS.
Source: own estimates
Summary and Conclusions
U.S. agricultural and energy policies often have direct 
and indirect effects on the environment. Policies which 
affect agricultural land use can alter lake water quality 
through increased nutrient runoff. It is important to estimate 
these impacts to undertake thorough cost-benefit analyses of 
these policies.
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This study focuses on estimating the effect of land use 
change on lake water quality in Iowa. High quality lake 
water measurements over 15 years are combined with sat-
ellite imagery and PRISM weather data to create a unique 
panel data set. Using a dynamic panel data model, I estimate 
the elasticity of CTSI to cropland to be 0.05% in the short 
run, and 0.07% in the long run, indicating that increases in 
cropland decrease lake water quality by a small amount. I 
also find a positive and significant coefficient on the lag of 
the dependent variable, which is evidence of a stock effect of 
lake water quality over time.
A second model estimated the elasticity of cropland to 
crop prices to be 0.066. Using these two elasticities, I esti-
mate that the Renewable Fuel Standard decreased water qual-
ity by between 0.13 and 0.27%. The estimates may represent 
a lower bound since the paper only studies land use change 
along the extensive margin. Rather than expand cropland, 
farmers may alter crop rotations in favor of corn because 
of the RFS. Since corn requires a relatively high amount of 
fertilizer, the actual impact on water quality may be higher.
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Introduction
Micro-insurance can be an effective approach to 
smoothening income in adverse times, for example dur-
ing and after droughts, and potentially a way to achieve 
financial inclusion of vulnerable smallholder farmers. Giv-
ing smallholders access to micro-finance enables them to 
invest in improved agricultural inputs to enhance farm 
production and ultimately household income (Karlan et al., 
2014). However, its uptake remains quite low in develop-
ing countries (Carter et al., 2014). Being usually offered 
at the beginning of the growing season when farmers 
have least access to cash and most need for the capacity 
to invest, stand-alone insurance products are difficult to 
sell. Bundling insurance with credit is a logical strategy 
to address the farmers’ lack of capacity to pay, but limited 
access to financing and the high costs of agricultural credit 
complicate this approach. There is a lack of understanding 
and little trust in insurance products, and the financial lit-
eracy of smallholder farmers is very limited. Many act out 
of necessity on short-term needs as opposed to long-term 
business strategy, with insufficient attention and means to 
employ risk mitigation strategies, which include, but are 
not limited to, insurance, that could help them to break out 
of the cycle of low income and low production.
In order to be financially viable, crop insurance has to be 
low-cost and thus at large-scale. Key to success is for pro-
viders to streamline claim handling and marketing efforts in 
order to minimize transaction costs. Emerging index-based 
insurance across Africa has proven to enable efficient claim 
handling. However, direct sales to individual smallholders 
remain a challenging task without an easily scalable solu-
tion. To reach the necessary scale, it is essential to cooperate 
with aggregators in the agricultural value chain who have 
a shared interest. Such organizations include the financial 
service industry (e.g., insurers, brokers, banks and MFI’s), 
input providers (e.g., seeds and fertilizers), traders, process-
ing industry, as well as farmer-based organizations.
Limited adoption and impact studies in the field of crop 
(index) insurance go beyond a one-off field experiment, and 
mostly focus on stand-alone insurance products. See for 
example a systematic review by Marr et al. (2016). Yet those 
insurance programs that are currently running are frequently 
marketed as bundled products (linked with input purchases 
and/or credit). The current research seeks to find the deter-
minants of adoption of a credit-linked insurance bundle in 
Mali, and to gauge its contribution in enhancing the agri-
cultural productivity of smallholder farmers (i.e., income 
smoothening and income enhancement). Mali is proving a 
particularly challenging context to develop the agricultural 
insurance market. It is the least developed insurance mar-
ket in the region, with very limited capacity in the sector to 
develop and scale agricultural insurance products. With rela-
tively high operational cost, agricultural insurance remains 
expensive. Within this institutional framework there is an 
increasing recognition for the potential of insurance towards 
building a more resilient agricultural sector, but there is little 
supporting policy, such as tax waivers or premium subsidy, 
that could help in reducing the cost of insurance.
Methodology
Bundled insurance product
We consider a typical form of a credit-linked index-based 
drought insurance designed and monitored by EARS (Envi-
Short communication
Jan DUCHOSLAV*1 and Marcel van ASSELDONK**2
Adoption and impact of credit-linked crop index insurance: a case 
study in Mali
Linking insurance with credit is a promising approach towards overcoming the main difficulties of scaling up crop insurance in 
Africa. The current research revealed that credit-linked crop insurance adopters in Mali were on average larger households 
than non-adopters, were living more often from subsistence agriculture, were less patient and less likely to produce maize, 
while operating on smaller farms. However, propensity score matching revealed that changes in terms of production decisions 
or wellbeing were limited compared to credit-users. To achieve scaling, linking crop insurance with credit should not only be 
beneficial for banks to limit their exposure (on a mandatory basis), but should become beneficial as well for smallholders (in 
terms of better access to credit, lower interest rates or less required collateral). 
Keywords: crop insurance, credit, adoption, impact
JEL classifications: Q14, Q18
* Wageningen University, Development Economics Group, Hollandseweg 1, Wageningen, the Netherlands & International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Malawi Strategy Support Program, P.O.Box 31666, Lilongwe 3, Malawi (jan.duchoslav@wur.nl)
** Wageningen University, Development Economics Group & Wageningen Economic Research, Hollandseweg 1, Wageningen, the Netherlands  
(marcel.vanasseldonk@wur.nl)
Received: 11 June 2018; Revised: 23 July 2018; Accepted: 30 July 2018.
1 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5745-4183
2 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7097-2663
Adoption and impact of credit-linked crop index insurance: a case study in Mali
113
ronmental Analysis & Remote Sensing). The services are 
brokered by PlaNet Guarantee and delivered through a con-
sortium of aggregators in Mali. The sales strategy towards 
financial organizations has been an inclusive approach by 
bundling insurance with credit directly (through MFIs) or 
indirectly via credit for input purchases (input providers 
also offering financial services). Participating aggregators 
made crop insurance mandatory for all clients requesting an 
agricultural loan. The amount of insurance premium is inte-
grated into the loan amount, and eligible claims (i.e. index 
pay-outs) are deducted from the clients’ debt.
The index insurance is based on Relative Evapotranspi-
ration (RE). In principle evapotranspiration consists of two 
components, namely water loss from bare soil (e.g. run off) 
and water loss through plant leaves (i.e. transpiration). RE 
is a better predictor of crop growth than precipitation, and 
as such the explanatory value of an RE index is higher for 
credit risks than that of a precipitation index (Von Negenborn 
et al., 2018).
In our case in Mali, three alternative RE-based drought 
indices were distributed. Insurance coverage included 
a generic drought index policy (marketed from 2016 
onwards), and crop-specific drought indices for maize and 
sesame (marketed from 2015 onwards). The maize coverage 
had a three-phase structure (i.e. germination, vegetative and 
flowering) with a flexible start (i.e. early start or late start). 
Sowing period of maize ranges from 11th to 31th of July, 
while harvest is typically at the end of October. The generic 
and sesame coverages were both based on a “single-phase” 
design with a fixed start. Sowing sesame starts on the 11th of 
August while harvest starts on the 11th of October. 
In 2015 and 2016, 7,282 and 6,102 smallholders respec-
tively were insured. Initially, maize coverage was most pop-
ular (54% maize versus 46% sesame insurance policies), but 
after launching the generic product sesame insurance became 
more prominent (28% maize versus 44% sesame versus 28% 
generic policies). The average insured plot size and insured 
(input) amount per smallholder was approximately 1 hectare 
and 50,000 CFA franc (76€). Average premium per farm 
amounted to 5,535 CFA franc (8.41€) and depended on the 
geographical zone, for which premium ranged between 10% 
in the least drought prone climatic zone (south) up to 14.8% 
in the most drought prone climatic zone (north). 
Adoption and impact design
The current adoption and impact research would cause 
minimal interference with the initiatives that would normally 
be undertaken by the broker and aggregators in Mali. Impact 
was assessed by means of a cross-sectional double-differ-
ence design by sampling adopters in the access villages and 
non-adopters in both access villages and control villages. In 
total, 15 villages with access to the credit-linked index-based 
insurance product were randomly sampled from a list of all 
targeted villages. Since the total number of insured villages 
per aggregator was limited, several aggregators which offered 
identical terms and conditions of credit-linked index insurance 
were included. For each access village, a control village was 
randomly selected from non-access villages within the same 
circle (administrative unit) and climatic zone (as defined by 
EARS). In each access village, 8 insured farmers were ran-
domly selected from the list provided by the aggregator, and 
8 non-insured farmers were selected at random from a village 
census provided by local authorities. In each non-access vil-
lage, we interviewed 16 farmers selected at random from a vil-
lage census provided by local authorities. The Android-based 
survey was conducted after the harvest season in March 2017 
by an independent contractor (GREAT).
The household survey included both demand and impact 
indicators. Demand was hypothesized to be influenced by 
numerous explanatory variables including household char-
acteristics, credit and liquidity constraints, preferences and 
individual characteristics, and farm characteristics. House-
hold characteristics included education of household head 
(in years), gender and age of household head, whether house-
hold head was elder, number of household members, and dis-
tance to the nearest drinking water source (minutes). Credit 
and liquidity constraints were derived by means of a wealth 
index (a principal factor of assets owned by the household 
constructed following Sahn and Stifel (2003)), whether the 
household received income from a working family member, 
whether the main occupation of the household head was 
subsistence agriculture, and whether the main occupation of 
the household head was trading. Preferences and individual 
characteristics were elicited based on a series of hypotheti-
cal lotteries to deduct risk aversion level, and standardized 
measures of patience and cognitive ability following Falk 
et al. (2016). Finally, farm characteristics entailed informa-
tion on maize production and total farm size (in hectares). 
Impact indicators comprised production and financing deci-
sions in the last agricultural season, and wellbeing in the past 
12 months. Production decisions focus on average organic 
fertilizer use (kg/m2), average chemical fertilizer use (kg/
ha), average pesticide use (l/ha), use of improved maize vari-
ety, and percentage of total farm size dedicated to growing 
maize. Financing decisions captured total outstanding debt 
of the household (thousands West African CFA franc) and 
the percentage of total outstanding debt used for investment 
(as opposed to consumption). Binary wellbeing indicators 
classified whether households were faced with a situation of 
food shortage (i.e. a situation where there was not enough 
to eat), hunger (i.e. someone in the household went to sleep 
hungry at night) or money shortage (i.e. someone in the 
household faced shortage of money).
Using data from access villages, we obtained weights for 
the determinants of adoption, and used them to predict the 
likelihood of insurance adoption of each farmer (crucially 
including those without access to insurance). Furthermore, 
we estimated the effect of the insurance on the production 
decisions of comparable farmers by interacting the predicted 
probability with a variable indicating access to insurance 
(i.e. counterfactual by means of propensity score matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983)).
Results
Following the sampling design, and adjusted for practi-
cal limitations, in total 485 smallholders were surveyed, of 
which 247 in access villages, of which 104 credit-linked 
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insurance adopters. Balance tests along adoption determi-
nants between villages with or without credit-linked insur-
ance access revealed some selective attrition in our sample. 
A smaller proportion of households cultivated maize in 
villages with credit-linked insurance access (76.9% versus 
86.6%, P<0.01) in which the main occupation of the house-
hold head was more likely subsistence agriculture (84.2% 
versus 75.2%, P<0.05). 
By means of a multi-variate probit estimation, the prob-
ability of insurance adoption cases could be predicted 70.4% 
successfully (Table 1). Adopter households were on average 
larger than non-adopters (23.96 compared to 20.22 house-
hold members) at a significance level of P<0.01. Adop-
ters were more often living from subsistence agriculture 
(P<0.05), were less patient (P<0.05) and were less likely to 
produce maize (P<0.05). Moreover, adopters operated on 
smaller farms (P<0.10).
Table 1: Determinants of credit-linked insurance adoption.
Marginal effects
HH head years of education  0.014 (0.033)
HH head female  0.299 (0.985)
HH head age  0.001 (0.008)
HH head elder -0.012 (0.294)
HH size        0.029*** (0.011)
Distance to water (remoteness)  0.007 (0.017)
Wealth -0.035 (0.091)
Paid job  0.105 (0.192)
Subsistence agriculture      0.546** (0.245)
Trading -0.006 (0.187)
Risk aversion  0.071 (0.110)
Patience     -0.119** (0.055)
Cognitive ability -0.099 (0.065)
Total farm size ha   -0.011* (0.006)
Grow maize     -0.321** (0.157)
N 240
Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the village level in parentheses. * p<0.10,  
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: own data
Impact of adopting the insurance on a range of adoption 
decisions is indicated by the coefficients in the first row of 
Table 2 (Access × Pr(Adopt)) and indicated no measurable 
statistical impact. This is not surprising since the insurance, 
mandatorily linked with credit, was not arranged individu-
ally but by aggregators, and most of the insured respondents 
were even not aware (anymore) of being insured. 
The direct impact of adopting the insurance on various 
indicators of wellbeing is shown by the coefficients in the 
first row of Table 3, and is somewhat mixed. Adoption of 
the insurance was correlated with lower probability of facing 
shortage of money, which is however likely to be due to its 
bundling with credit rather than to the insurance itself. There 
is no statistically significant effect on food security.
Table 3: Impact of credit-linked insurance on on wellbeing.
(1) (2) (3)
Food shortage Hungry Money  shortage
Access × Pr(Adopt)
-0.690  0.283      -1.800***
 (0.858)  (0.982)  (0.599)
Access
 0.398 -0.210        0.890***
 (0.379)  (0.462)  (0.238)
Pr(Adopt)
 1.060    1.374*      0.942**
 (0.673)  (0.715)  (0.470)
N  468  468   468
Probit marginal effects. SE clustered at the village level in parentheses. * p<0.10,  
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: own data
Discussion
The full impact of adopting the insurance on wellbeing 
should truly manifest itself when drought hits. To estimate 
the effect of the insurance on farmers’ wellbeing, we fur-
ther interact access to insurance and the probability of being 
insured with a variable indicating a spell of drought during 
the last agricultural cycle (as measured and defined by the 
drought index used in the insurance). Outcomes suggest that 
crop insurance reduces the probability of food and money 
shortages in times of drought. However, when taking into 
account the intensity of the drought, the effects on food secu-
rity become statistically negligible. When measuring drought 
as perceived by the respondents no significant effects are 
detected whatsoever. Adopting the insurance might never-
theless mitigate the severity of drought in other ways (or in 
a magnitude not detectable in our sample size), as it reduces 
the probability that the respondent perceives overall condi-
tions as drought.
Crop insurance has a longer history in the EU than in 
Africa, and plays a significant role in compensating yield 
losses caused by climatic risks, with or without subsidies 
Table 2: Impact of credit-linked insurance on production decisions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Organic  
fertilizer
Chemical 
fertilizer Pesticide
Improved 
maize  % land maize Total debt
Debt for  
investment
Access × Pr(Adopt)
-0.320 -42.536  2.150 -0.041   0.060  -35.069 -28.966
 (0.237)   (88.349)  (2.591)  (1.111)   (0.528) (652.545)  (21.552)
Access
 0.150   37.451 -0.524  0.003 -0.111     0.609    9.438
 (0.111)   (44.485)  (1.333)  (0.542)   (0.208) (360.561)    (8.684)
Pr(Adopt)
 0.063   46.407 -0.470 -0.503    -0.863* 142.005  11.827
 (0.089)   (54.664)  (0.780)  (0.768)   (0.459) (516.010)  (11.546)
N  385  385  385  468  468  467  125
Tobit (1-3, 5-7) and probit (4) marginal effects. SE clustered at the village level in parentheses. * p<0.10. 
Source: own data
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at Member State level or by using Article 37 of the Risk 
Management Toolkit under the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy. However, the tools available in EU Member States to 
manage crop yield risks through insurance are very diverse 
(Meuwissen et al., 2018). There are single‐peril insurance 
tools (mainly hail insurance) and multi-peril risk insurance 
schemes that secure against a wider range of weather perils. 
Yet, drought is often excluded from most combined peril 
schemes or only partially included. Moreover, the insurance 
cover is generally not marketed as a credit-linked package 
(yet financiers might request to insure crops with a separate 
financial product). Although recent developments in index-
based insurance products offer a potential for coping with 
crop losses, targeted index-based insurance products are 
offered only in a few Member States. Prominent examples 
of index-based drought insurance are marketed in Austria 
for some specific crops and grassland (Url et al., 2018) 
and specific crops in Lithuania, while in France and Spain 
index-based insurance for deprived pasture yields is avail-
able. Other examples can be considered more as pilots to test 
product feasibility (e.g. drought index cover in Germany). 
The current paper serves as an illustration on index insur-
ance, for which only few examples exist in Europe so far. 
Good partnerships are essential in overcoming the main 
difficulties of scaling up micro-insurance in Africa. Micro-
finance institutions and banks benefit from linking credit 
supply with mandatory insurance uptake directly. Financial 
institutions have a vested interest and the market power to 
enforce mandatory bundles that provides adequate coverage 
for climate related risk. Smallholders are less exposed to 
weather risks if they obtain insurance, which reduces their 
default risk. By reducing agricultural risk, financial institu-
tions are able to increase their agricultural portfolio, abso-
lutely and proportionally. Ultimately, this should result in a 
more competitive loan provision in the agricultural sector, 
manifested as better access to credit for producers, lower 
interest rates or less required collateral. 
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